THE ETHICS OF REBELLION

NURETTIN TOPCU

BERSERKER
BOOKS

THE ETHICS OF REBELLION

-Conformism and Revolt-

Nurettin Topçu

Turkish

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CONTENTS

7 Foreword to the Second Edition
13 Foreword
29 Introduction: How Does the Moral Problem Arise?

37 PART ONE: THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM
41 Chapter One: I. Freedom According to Spinoza
49 II. A Critique of Spinoza's Doctrine
55 Part Two: I. Intuition and Freedom
61 II. A Critique of Bergson's View
67 Chapter Three: What Is Freedom?

7S PART TWO: THE BONDAGE OF MAN
77 Chapter One: The Meaning of Pleasure
82 Chapter Two: Solidarity
90 Chapter Three: Domination

97 PART THREE: THE IDEAL OF RESPONSIBILITY
105 Chapter One: An Analysis of the Sense of Responsibility

US PART FOUR: IMITATION AND BELIEF
119 Chapter One: Forms of Knowledge that Prepare the Way for Belief
132 Chapter Two: What Is Belief?
147 Chapter Three: The Imitation of Belief

155 PART FIVE: NiSTIK iNAN
162 Chapter One: Aesthetic Faith
180 Chapter Two: Religious Faith

189 SECTION VI: FROM FAITH TO PRACTICE
194 Part One: Stirner's Anarchism
20J Chapter Two: Rousseau's Rebellion
211 Chapter Three: Schopenhauer's Rebellion
216 Chapter Four: God's Rebellion within Man

227 Conclusion
233 Bibliography
237 Index

FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION

We know that, like people, books too have a destiny. If so, we hope that no book will have to wait as long as this one—despite its lofty philosophical and scientific value—to be put to good use by the children of the very country for which it was written. Admittedly, whilst external and internal factors—which we dismiss as 'fate'—play a part in this, it is possible to say that, above all, the attitude of the author himself—the late Nurettin Topçu—played a significant role; yet, when we consider the reasons that led him to adopt this stance, should we not, as a society, hold up a mirror to ourselves and assess our own shortcomings?

We know that the late author replied to his students and friends, who wished for his work to be selected and published, by asking, 'Who on earth is going to read it?' This is precisely where the author's share of responsibility, as we noted above, stems from. If you, as a country, send one of your citizens abroad using public funds to specialise in a particular field, and then, having completed his career, award him the title of 'associate professor', yet refrain from appointing him as a lecturer at a university, he will conclude that knowledge and philosophy are of no use to anyone in this country, and will not make the effort to have his book published; at the very least, he will feel aggrieved. Admittedly, he is not referring to the university, but rather to

Never once did he express any open resentment at being appointed as an associate professor at a secondary school; instead, with the devotion of a worshipper, he spent forty years striving to instil a love of science and truth in his country's young people whilst they were still in secondary school. He read and wrote ceaselessly, and his books amount to thousands of pages. As a result, he has become one of the most distinguished, prolific and comprehensive thinkers of modern Turkish thought. However, we believe that his failure to be promoted to the positions he deserved has prevented him from publishing this book, which you hold in your hands and which contains the high-level foundations of his entire body of thought. It must therefore be said that our reflection in the mirror of time—within the framework of respect for knowledge and thought—is by no means a heartening one. Let us hope that this reflection has now been set right.

That said, we knew that the Professor had translated this first work of his, but we did not know how much of it he had translated, nor whether this translation would ever see the light of day. For that reason, having become acquainted with this book through our master's thesis, my colleague, Lecturer Musa Doğan, and I undertook its translation whilst we were working at Atatürk University; it was published by Dergâh Yayınları and attracted considerable interest; indeed, it was deemed worthy of the 1995 Translation Award by the Turkish Writers' Union. However, the author's other works — because his heirs had not granted permission — remained unpublished. Finally, 23 years later, when Dergâh Publications began publishing the Topçu Collection at the end of 1997 with the permission of his heirs, we learnt that his family had kindly handed over a portion of his papers to the publishing house for evaluation. Fortunately, both this work—which the Hoca had highly favoured—and the novel titled *Ila*, which he had wished to be published posthumously, emerged from the files. Mr Ezel Erverdi had been proved right; the work had been translated into Turkish in exquisite calligraphy, with the exception of the conclusion and two pages from the final chapter. For some reason—perhaps due to the psychological factors we mentioned above—a six-page section had been left unfinished. The task now was to evaluate this original translation as well. Meanwhile, the first edition had also been completed. The publishing house had the Professor's own translation

rather than publishing it directly, he deemed it more appropriate to produce a revised second edition based on the original. The esteemed literature teacher and writer Ali Yurtgezen transcribed the handwritten translation, written in the old script, into the Latin alphabet; all that remained for us was to review it. We believe it would be useful to summarise the work you have done here in a couple of lines:

On examining Topçu's translation, we realised that we had produced a translation of a very high standard in terms of both meaning and style. We realised that, despite our best efforts to convey the meaning accurately—and our struggle to find the most precise terms, phrases and clauses, particularly given the difficulties of translating from a foreign language, especially in the field of philosophy—many of these still remained somewhat ambiguous at times, whereas if you were to ask the author, you would find them to be remarkably clear. Firstly, it should be noted that, judging by the relatively heavy language of the first four sections—which make up two-thirds of the translation—it appears that the Professor began work on the translation immediately upon his return from France. The similarity to the language used in the late author's articles in the first issue of **Hareket** magazine, published in 1939, leads us to this conclusion. Following this approach and publishing the text as it stands would, in places, have created difficulties in comprehension for young people accustomed to today's simple Turkish. That said, it is worth noting that, for his time, Topçu used an exceptionally simple language. The further simplification of the language from the fifth section onwards suggests that the Professor resumed the translation in the late 1940s, after a hiatus of 10–12 years. This is because the first editions of his textbooks were published during these years under the titles **Sociology** (1947) and **Psychology** (1949) (they were subsequently published from **1952** onwards under the titles **Philosophy*, *Sociology* and *Psychology**).

A brief comparison based on the first few pages of the fifth section we mentioned may give us an idea:

Previous words	Subsequent words:
science	science

hads,	intuition
evidenc	provides
e, mûta,	proof
opposit	against
e,	competen
perfecti	ce
on	truly, a
in fact, the	supernatur
inner,	al inner
supernatura	essence
l	

However, it is known that in his writings from the 1950s onwards, Topçu adopted a more moderate approach, opposed linguistic extremism, and even harshly criticised university lecturers who, by coining the term ‘Osmanlica’, treated the Turkish of that period as if it were a separate language (According to the Professor, our Turkish language appears just as it did in Yunus, so too in Ömer Seyfettin).

Whilst reviewing our translation, we felt it appropriate to change even a single word in each sentence where it would be more accurate or clearer. On some occasions, we rewrote a sentence entirely. In terms of terminology, we endeavoured to use contemporary philosophical terms; in that respect, we did not make many changes. At times, we were pleased to see that our choice was more comprehensible and, consequently, more accurate. For example, where the Professor describes the downfall of the Egyptian, Mesopotamian and Greek civilisations at the hands of foreign powers, whilst the French translation reads: ‘These civilisations persisted due to the inner curiosity and anxiety of individuals who wished to preserve their own works’, we stated: ‘These civilisations were sustained by the anxiety of individuals to keep their own works alive at all times’ (Original text: Cellesci s’appuyaient sur l’inquiétude des individus à tenir vivante les œuvres qui étaient les leurs. p. 66–).

In contrast, whilst we had used the term ‘will to emotionality’ for ‘volonté d’affectivité’ in the section on ‘Aesthetic Belief’, we realised that the Professor, in his own translation, had used the expression ‘will to feel’, which was far more apt

expression. This is because, whilst our term “sensitivity” is used in everyday Turkish sometimes in an epistemological sense ranging from “perception” to “sensitivity”, and sometimes in an aesthetic sense ranging from “feeling” to “being moved”, what is meant here is entirely the activity of ‘being moved’ and is directed solely towards an aesthetic meaning. Many such examples of corrections could be given.

All things considered, I think we can say that we have achieved something that is rarely seen in the history of translation. Is there, I wonder, a second example of a work that has been translated and published, only for the author to subsequently produce the original translation, prompting the translator to review and rework their translation on that basis? If not, perhaps this very aspect will be one of the most noteworthy features of this book, alongside the depth and quality of its content. Furthermore, we are delighted to have played a part in ensuring that Topçu’s first work in his collected works has been published as faithfully as possible to the original.

Finally, to summarise briefly, /syan aû/ö#ı attracted considerable attention following its first edition, and this interest grew even further three years later with the successive publication of the complete works. In this regard, as far as we can tell from spoken, written and visual media, a considerable number of academics, writers and programme producers—wishing to understand Topçu and to explain him to young people who have grown up unaware of him—have written articles and produced programmes about him. Among these, the names that spring to mind first include, foremost, Prof. Dr Orhan Okay, Prof. Dr Kenan Gürsoy and Prof. Dr Coşkun Değirmencioğlu, as well as Ahmet Kabaklı, Beşir Ayvazoğlu, Mustafa Özel and Ahmet Hakan Coşkun. In addition, publications such as *Kültür Dünyası*, *Aksiyon*, *Yeni Şafak and* Zamou have also dedicated memorial pages or special features to Topçu in recent times. Naturally, we believe there is scope for much more than this. It would be heartening if the philosophy departments of our universities

organise seminars and hold symposia. We believe that as his significance becomes more widely recognised, such events will indeed take place.

I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who played a part in bringing this project to fruition. First and foremost, to the esteemed Topçu family for providing the original translation; to Mr Ali Yurtgezen for transcribing the text from the Ottoman alphabet into the modern Turkish alphabet; to Lecturer İsmail Göktürk, who, amongst his other contributions, took the trouble to carry out the first proofreading; to my son Dundar, who typeset the text, and my daughter Selcen, who carried out the second proofreading; to the esteemed friends who assisted with the index, and to the management and staff of Dergâh Publications—led by Mr Ezel Erverdi—who have meticulously produced the second edition of this book, I feel it is my duty to express my gratitude. Should there be any shortcomings that prevent this revised edition from being perfect, you may attribute this to the fact that we did not have the opportunity to show it to our esteemed professor, M. Orhan Okay. However, we have always felt his spiritual support by our side.

12 October 1998, K. Maraş
MUSTAFA KÖK

FOREWORD

This work by the late Nurettin Topçu (1909–1975) is a doctoral thesis completed at the Sorbonne University in France and published in Paris in 1934—under the name Nurettin Ahmet, as the law on surnames had not yet come into force—entitled **Conformisme et Rébellion** (*Conformism and Rebellion*). With this work, Topçu—if I am not mistaken—also became the first Turk to be awarded a doctorate in philosophy at the Sorbonne. Although he had gone there having only completed secondary school, he spent a total of six years there between 1928 and 1934, including the one-year course at the Lycée de Bordeaux in which he was enrolled in the year of his arrival. This means that during this period, he not only completed his undergraduate degree but also obtained his doctorate, whilst also undertaking supplementary secondary education at a French lycée. During his student years, alongside 'courses in philosophy and ethics', he took courses and obtained certificates in many disciplines such as sociology, psychology, art history and aesthetics. Whilst still a student, his articles were published in leading sociology journals, and he became acquainted with the renowned scholars, Orientalists and philosophers of the time. Among them were Louis Massignon and Maurice Blondel. He corresponded with these two until their deaths. Whilst in France, he made the most of every opportunity to further his education and led an exceptionally dynamic student life. What has been written and recounted,

It reveals that the years he spent in Frarısa played a very significant role in the formation of his intellectual and professional identity.

The work is, essentially, a philosophical treatise on the philosophy of ethics, commonly referred to as 'ethics' or 'morality'. However, given its rich theoretical foundation, it could be said that this work also aims to propose or establish 'a new philosophy of ethics'. The name of this ethics is 'the ethics of rebellion'. Does it possess the qualities to justify such a bold claim? If we take into account both the profound and consistent critiques it offers of other ethical systems and its ability to ground its own philosophy of ethics, we believe it is a work that is one hundred per cent worthy of such a claim. That said, it is the discussions and evaluations conducted by experts in moral philosophy that will ultimately determine this matter. Should this translation serve as a catalyst for a lively debate and critical discourse, we are ready to take our humble place within it.

Nurettin Topçu returned to Turkey after 1934 and continued his career—which he had begun as a philosophy teacher at Galatasaray High School—for exactly forty years, until his retirement in 1974. Meanwhile, he did not stop at a PhD in philosophy; he also became an associate professor with a second thesis, *The *Value of* Love*, which he wrote on the contemporary French philosopher Bergson, and this work was later published. However, apart from a two-year period of 'inactive associate professorship' at Istanbul University during the tenure of Prof. Dr Hilmi Ziya Ülken, he spent his entire career teaching in secondary schools. Despite possessing a brilliant education in philosophy, as well as the titles of Doctor and Associate Professor, the fact that he was not granted a permanent post at the university is an exceptionally important matter worthy of consideration from the perspective of analysing the mindset of the era. Here, we shall confine ourselves merely to quoting a passage and conveying an opinion on this subject. Professor Dr Afşar Tirnuçin, one of our contemporary academic philosophers, says the following about Nurettin Topçu, who taught at Istanbul Boys' High School: "We met Nurettin Topçu in our final year. Mr Topçu was exceptionally skilled at explaining even the most complex philosophical problems by simplifying them. He made us fall in love not with this or that philosopher, but with philosophy as a whole. After explaining a philosophical doctrine, he would also critique it—

. I used to try to catch every word that came out of his mouth. Clearly, he didn't think like me, but he was a good thinker. He knew full well that I didn't think like him, yet he was very fond of me. It was obvious that, like all good thinkers, he had been pushed to the margins of society. We would sometimes wonder what an associate professor was doing at our school. His resentment was plain to see on his face. The more I listened to him, the more I realised that philosophy was not a complex field of thought. My passion for clear thinking was, I suppose, partly shaped by the influence of Mr Nurettin Topçu" ("In Memory of Our Professor Macit Gökberk", *Felsefe Dünyası*, Issue 9, October 1993, p. 22). Indeed, what was a philosophy professor of Nurettin Topçu's calibre—with such a distinguished career and expertise, having authored over twenty books and countless articles, and having single-handedly published a journal of ideas and philosophy *(Hareket)*—doing in a secondary school teaching post? What, I wonder, was the reason he was not admitted to the university, and why was there such hesitation? Be that as it may, this is — to use the old expression — a different matter altogether... However, we have always carried a sense of regret: when we entered the philosophy departments of Istanbul University in the 1960s, we had many highly esteemed lecturers; most were multilingual, some had completed their studies and doctorates abroad with the state's financial support, and they were respected experts in their fields. We owe them all a great deal; we remember those who have passed away with fondness, and we wish those still with us a long and healthy life. But Nurettin Topçu was just as well-educated as any of them, a man of career and distinction, a philosophy lecturer and a man of thought who was passionately committed to the ideal of educating the nation's children in virtually every field. Why should Nurettin Topçu not have served at the university of the same nation, just like our other professors? Why is it that in these universities today, there are no longer any of the men he supervised to their doctorates, nor any philosophy professors? Was there perhaps something to be feared? Yet, to this day, no movement of ideas, philosophy or civilisation founded on fear has ever emerged on this earth.

Personally, having never been a student of Nurettin Topçu in philosophy lectures, we have contented ourselves with his books and sought to get to know him a little better—

and to get to know him a little better, we began to visit the *Hareket* magazine from time to time—which had been published by his students during his final years. And as fate would have it, in accordance with the practice of the time, we undertook our final-year pedagogical placement—a one-month course—under his supervision at Istanbul Boys' High School, thus spending a little more time in his company. The concept of 'vekar' (dignity) in the Muslim Turkish people seemed to have taken concrete form in this man. Though we surmised that storms were always raging within him, as evidenced by his writing, his clean and luminous facial features inspired nothing but tranquillity in others. Just like J. J. Rousseau, who 'would not even enter a café without excitement', he seemed to embody
without feeling any excitement. From the outside, it was not easily apparent—
A fresh excitement, perceptible only when he speaks—one that, to use his own phrase regarding another matter, 'is experienced not on the surface of the nerves, but in the depths of the soul'... He was a lover of eternity, standing as though ready at any moment to cast off the garments of the mundane and the transient and throw himself into the embrace of eternity; this man, with the demeanour of a dervish-like philosopher, was in truth a pure, contemporary Turkish philosopher, a Turkish thinker and moralist. We firmly believe that, once his works—which, as a result of a great misfortune, have not been published for nearly twenty years—are brought back into the light of day, they will have much to offer both to contemporary Turkish intellectual life and to Turkish youth. Indeed, if they are properly understood and appreciated, they possess the value to serve as a major breakthrough and a source of strength in their own right for the future of Islamic Turkish thought.

We would now like to return to the beginning and briefly touch upon the work in question. To this end, we shall first analyse the title of the work, and then attempt to summarise our author's philosophy of ethics—based on this work. However, we feel it is important to emphasise one point: as will become apparent upon reading, this work is not merely a treatise on moral philosophy, but is also—centred on the axis of morality—a philosophy of religion, society and aesthetics. The author has succeeded in presenting all these ideas—in the words of experts—within a coherent framework, making masterful and flawless use of the French

language. Subsequent developments in thought

, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that Topçu attained intellectual maturity at a young age through this work.

Why *is it a moral issue;* who is to rebel against what, and what does rebellion mean? Before addressing these questions, it is necessary to analyse the work's original title, **Conformisme et* olte*. *Conformisme* is defined in dictionaries as 'conformity', 'adapting to the times' and 'obedience'. For example, in the *Fioóm*, it is defined as 'the state of acting in accordance with rules and customs', and readers are directed to look up the word 'traditionalism', meaning it is equated with this concept. As for *révolte*, there is a single equivalent in all dictionaries: rebellion. Rebellion against what? This word denotes rebellion against the law, rules, the established order and every form of authority. Indeed, the word 'révolution'—that is, 'revolution'—also stems from the same source. Just as 'rebellion' gives rise to 'rebelliousness', its antonyms—'conservatism' and 'traditionalism'—are listed in all dictionaries. Taking into account the broad outlines of Nurettin Topçu's intellectual personality and his spiritualist-idealist philosophy, one might think that a work bearing this title would defend a conformist, conservative thesis. Yet quite the opposite is true: throughout his forty-five-year literary career, from this, his first work, right up to the very last line of his final essay, Nurettin Topçu has always—paradoxically—embraced the concept of rebellion. This, in our view, is precisely what makes this work particularly significant and important. One of the fundamental concepts of his philosophy — which is, at the same time, a unique philosophy of the will — precisely because it possesses—the 'will to rebel'.

Topçu, however, has not chosen a Turkish term such as 'obedience' or 'conformity to the times' to contrast with the word 'rebellion', but rather 'docility'. Perhaps he did not use the word 'obedience' because it generally carries a positive connotation in Islamic terminology. His choice of the word 'docility'—which has a more sociological and, in a sense, more negative connotation—seems very much in keeping with his own philosophy. For 'docility'

is predominantly associated with the meaning of ‘submission without thought’, and such an attitude is something Topçu could never accept. Although, generally speaking, ‘docility’ is also used in a positive sense, it can be said that, apart from its use in reference to children—that is, beyond the expression ‘what a well-behaved child!’—it does not possess a positive connotation that everyone would necessarily share. ‘Adaptability to the times’ or ‘conformism’, on the other hand, is a term that, in a sense, also brings to mind words such as ‘opportunism’, and for this reason is not suitable for use.

As for the reason why we did not choose *‘Submission and Rebellion’* as the title of this work, Nurettin Topçu has used the heading ‘The Ethics of Rebellion’ in two separate articles in his two published works, **The Power of Will** and **Culture and Civilisation**. These two articles essentially embody the spirit of the work you hold in your hands; indeed, in some passages, he has drawn directly from it. We felt that, had the late Hoca translated it himself, he would most likely have chosen this title.

As for the questions we posed at the beginning of this section and the summary explanation of Topçu’s philosophy of ethics:

Nurettin Topçu is a thinker whose philosophical method and outlook are rooted in the philosophy of ‘Action’—one of the leading philosophical systems of the 20th century. The Philosophy of Action is a spiritualist philosophical movement which, in opposition to the materialist-positivist currents that have developed in the West since the 18th century, views the salvation of humanity in the development of ethical and moral values. The founder of this philosophy, the French philosopher Maurice Blondel (1861–1944), demonstrated through detailed analyses in his work **L’action** (1893) that human actions progress towards God through the stages of the family, society, the state and humanity. Regarded as the Pascal of the 20th century, Blondel explained that religion is not a movement in its own right, separate from others, but rather a system of movement that pertains to our entire lives. He had a profound influence on the intellects of the era, which were grappling with the crises of faith and striving to overcome them. Blondel argued that separating reason from faith

He argued that everything—from artificial constructs to the truths of philosophy and the realms of religion that transcend empirical experience—could only be attained through the faith manifested in human actions. In this sense, he sought to bring religion and philosophy closer together.

Nurettin Topçu practised philosophy using the methods and conceptual framework of this philosophy, yet he approached the problems of universal humanity from the perspective of 'our own people', and the crisis of faith of the age from the perspective of 'our own crisis'. Rather than shedding tears before a collapsed civilisation and resigning himself to the past with nostalgia, he set his sights on building a brand-new world through a 'movement of faith' and a 'leap forward', opening himself up to the outside world, to living people, to society and to the entire universe. This world might have had much to draw from our past heritage, but it would never remain stuck in the past. This was, in a sense, 'the cause of the Irals', and whilst assessing the present, it was a yearning to envision 'Tomorrow's Turkey' and to rebuild it from the ground up. To this end, it would be necessary to be at peace with humanity, nature and indeed the entire universe; to establish a new worldview, a new economic order and a new social system. At the heart of all this would lie the 'cause of morality'. However, there is no social cause that does not rest upon the triad of truths: humanity, nature and the economy. Consequently, this was not merely a cause of pure spirituality and morality, but a cause for humanity as a whole. It is in this sense that his moral cause would be known as the 'ethics of rebellion'.

Rebellion is an 'action' insofar as it constitutes a defiance of the conditions within which the will finds itself. Thought and belief are also actions; indeed, even knowledge is an action, for in the sense of the subject's active engagement with the object (the self's engagement with things) and its appropriation of it, it too constitutes an action. Freedom is an action; for true freedom means that a person transforms both the world and themselves through their own efforts. Without action, this transformation is impossible. It is within this framework—and to no lesser extent—that rebellion is an action. According to Topçu, anything that abolishes a person's individuality amounts to the enslavement of the will

arises. In this sense, our very nature, our arrogance and pride, the social solidarity that drives our actions, and the society that demands our blind obedience—all these are forces that enslave us. The will, on its own, is virtually inadequate to combat all of these. To put an end to this inadequacy, the will seeks an authority that develops in concentric circles around it, without sacrificing individuality. The first link in this chain is the family, whilst the final link is participation in the divine will, which consists of absolute authority.

Proceeding from this point, Topçu will discuss two types of rebellion: firstly, Stirner's anarchism in the sense of godless individualism; Rousseau's pathological individualism, which denies everything derived from society; and Schopenhauer's pessimistic voluntarism, which culminates in nihilism. The second, however, is the individual will's union with the divine will in order to compensate for its own inadequacy and deficiency; in other words, it is a movement of God within man, His very own rebellion against us. Our thinker imbues this kind of rebellion with an Islamic interpretation through his own unique perspective on existence and thought, and cloaks it in a mystical theme embodied in the person of a Sufi (Hallaj al-Mansur).

To elucidate this issue, it is necessary to examine ethical theories within the framework of Topçu's understanding and, ultimately, to set out the 'ethics of rebellion'.

Throughout the history of ethics, it could be said that several ethical perspectives have clashed with one another: rationalist, empiricist and social-realist (sociological) approaches to ethics... The rationalists equated virtue with knowledge. Socrates stated that 'knowledge of the good brings with it its practice' and that 'evil is ignorance; no one does evil knowingly'. This view was defended as a principle throughout the ancient, medieval and modern eras. Knowledge and reason were deemed sufficient for ethics. According to Topçu, these concepts conflated the moral ideal—that is, the end—with the knowledge of moral facts. However, knowledge is what remains after moral action; it is a consequence of it. It is here that empirical ethics comes to the fore, asserting that merely knowing what is good is not enough; its application is essential; it is not enough to hold the idea of virtue, but one must live it. This, in turn, requires prior experience. One who has not suffered

cannot rush to the aid of another's suffering. In other words, the practice of the good precedes knowledge of it. Therefore, moral action also determines its own knowledge.

According to empiricists, Kant—who based his philosophy on practical reason (conscience) as both the source of moral duties and commands and the agent that enacts them—has also fallen short. The mere idea of duty cannot motivate human action. Moreover, practical reason is dry, abstract and dubious. Apart from Kant, both rationalists and empiricists have taken human happiness into account. Although their answers to the question 'What will make a person happy?' may differ (pleasure, the satisfaction of instincts, individual or social benefit, altruism, selfishness, etc.), their ultimate goal has remained the same.

According to Topçu, the reason why empiricists are led astray is that they all proceed from an empirical element. However, moral truths are not 'factual truths' but truths of necessity. Instead of examining the will that emerges in action, they examined the consequences of these actions. None of these are the true aims of human action. In other words, pleasure, utility, etc., cannot be the ends of action. The purpose of action is to lead every living being to its own perfection. Human action, too, is dedicated solely to self-perfection. Indeed, it is not true that humans seek pleasure and flee from pain. Just as much as pleasure, pain may also present itself as a necessity of life and may be sought after. For the goal is to attain perfection.

The social-realist moralists, who belonged to the third group, sought to link happiness and utility to social solidarity. Yet solidarity can be practised for evil just as much as for good. There are many examples of this in societies and international alliances. They reconciled experience with reason, and the good with duty. Ultimately, a hybrid principle emerged. If goodness prevails, one falls into the error of utilitarianism. If duty is prioritised, it remains abstract and vague. Finally, if the moral ideal in a society is limited by that society's desires, and conforming to these desires is regarded as a duty, individual consciousness becomes dulled, giving rise to social conformism (complacency). In such a situation, without giving due consideration to one's duty

is a ‘man of honour’ and a good person. This morality finds its expression in the phrase ‘I close my eyes and do my duty’. Yet that duty is sometimes imposed even by the hands of executioners.

Now, let us consider Topçu’s ‘ethics of rebellion’ in the light of these three distinct conceptions of morality. ‘We,’ says Topçu, ‘place the concept of responsibility at the centre of the moral question. In his view, all moral systems have approached this concept from a negative perspective. That is to say, they have spoken of the responsibility that awaits us as a consequence of a wrongful act. Responsibility in this sense is not a cause of action, but merely a deterrent.’ Indeed, legal scholars also understand it in this way, equating it with sanctions and punishment. Yet, according to Topçu, responsibility is positive and is the cause of an action, not its consequence. Nor can it have any connection with the inner state of conscience, which expresses remorse, because that too arises as a result of an action. Human responsibility is subject to a way of thinking that strives for universality. Human responsibility requires one to step forward and take the initiative before the action is carried out. For that reason, it precedes, rather than follows, like a pang of conscience. Therefore, the source of spiritual life is moral life. All our spiritual states are subject to morality. Happiness, utility, duty—all of these, whilst being human emotions, also express passivity. Morality stands above and beyond all of these. To understand this, one must analyse the action itself, whose aim is infinity. For since happiness, utility… etc., are the gates of human bondage, a person is moral only to the extent that they are freed from these and are free. Thus, one opposes every obstacle that stands in the way on the path to perfection. This is the essence of Topçu’s rebellion. And the ethics of rebellion is the ideal of responsibility whereby the will, with the aim of reaching the infinite, rebels against every kind of self-interest and temptation—even against finite goodness and happiness.

So when does a movement come to be called a rebellion? Every rebellion is a movement, but is every movement a rebellion? No. According to N. Topçu, ‘a movement is only called a rebellion if it is directed towards an order superior to itself’. Rebellion for the sake of rebellion, or mere negation,

whether radical or temporary anarchism, naturally amounts to a denial of rebellion itself. Stirner, Rousseau, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were none of them true rebels. For in denying the order they rejected, they also denied themselves. Whilst the first two took refuge in selfishness or their own selves, the latter two sacrificed even the possibility of rebellion in the abyss of nihilism. Of these, only Schopenhauer's path was correct, but he lost his way by aiming at the wrong target: Nirvana.

Düşiinürürnfız states that, through an analysis of consciousness, he has inevitably progressed from intuition and thought to belief, and from belief to faith, and that this constitutes a journey of thought. According to him, before the will desired Allah, it desired all beings in nature, recognised love, and from this, aesthetic faith arose. Failing to find satisfaction there, it reached out further. In B1onde1's words, 'by leaping over hollow satisfactions, it found itself facing a void of unfathomable depth'. Thereafter, the will became bound to existence beyond nature. This is called faith, but from this moment onwards, a duality between the self and God emerges within faith. According to Topçu, the will's leap towards the supernatural in order to complete itself is the movement of God within us; the self, aware of its own inadequacy, is the self without God. This duality and conflict within the inner life arises from the clash between the self without God and the self that has surrendered to a power—a divine being—which realises its own destiny alone, that is, the self that possesses God. God's action within us is, in fact, a rebellion against us. And in the same vein, as Blondel famously put it, 'Action is a synthesis of man and God'. Thus, this rebellion is an invitation from the aforementioned inadequacy to this redemptive power—to God.

Here, Nurettin Topçu, faced with the impasse of the will, draws on the optimism of the Sufis, embodied in Hallaj, rather than the pessimism of Schopenhauer and his ilk. In his view, the aim of Hallaj's mysticism is to remain indifferent to the selfish and reckless ego—and indeed to rebel against it—by surrendering to the divine will. This involves renouncing the ego's desires entirely and

a leap towards a transcendent, supernatural being.

Hal1ac's action is a mystical rebellion. Neither the individual nor society recognises this mystical rebellion. For whilst anarchism springs from the individual's pursuit of self-interest, the ethic of solidarity within society serves to eradicate individuality, viewing human beings as docile sheep. Topçu rejects both; in his own words, he stands at a transitional point where individuality lies between man and God—that is, at the point of personality. This is the point of rebellion, which is the individual's leap towards God; there, both an anarchist and a conformist coexist. Every moral act is, on our part, an act of anarchy; yet, in the face of divine will, it is an act of docility. Whilst in motion, neither divinity nor our humanity alone exists; perhaps what is at stake there is humanity's participation in God. Within the act of rebellion, humanity is united with God. It is God's movement that rebels within us. He is present within the human being Himself. Nor does the human being accomplish anything without God. Indeed, there are no longer two separate entities here. That is to say, the human will is lost within God's will. Thus, if morality is a matter of will—a matter of realising the good through the will—then, in Topçu's thought, the question of God merges with the question of morality. Which of the two will be resolved? For a mystical thinker, there is no such thing as the 'question of God'. He is, through inner experience, that which we experience directly—the very essence of being, which never requires proof through logical means. In other words, He simply is. It is, therefore, the question of morality that requires resolution, and only God knows its solution. This point falls within Nurettin Topçu's philosophy of religion, the details of which we have already addressed in a study examining the philosopher's philosophy of religion.'

On this basis, all the prophets, saints and moral heroes who find within themselves the will and action of God do not become prisoners of their own nature, but rather of the external natural world and society,

* See Mustafa Kök, **The Philosophy of Language in the Nwr.tlin, Volume 'r'**, Dergâh Publications, Istanbul
bul, 1995.

Without being enslaved by any external force, without being enslaved by their own egos, and without being enslaved by any authority that weighed upon their consciences, they acted solely by virtue of their sense of responsibility and the freedom that stemmed from it. In other words, each of them was a rebel, yet they were moral to that very degree. For morality is only possible when the Truth is not confined to our consciences but manifests itself in our actions. Only then is there a union between man and God. It is in this sense that the Prophets, who would not turn back from their cause even if the moon were placed in one hand and the sun in the other; the Hallajs, who sought God's grace even for those who dragged them to the gallows; and the Akifs, who declared, "I trample upon it, I shall be trampled upon, yet I shall uphold and raise the Truth", the Akifs who declared, the Hüseyin Avnis who believed they represented the nation's will where they saw it as the 'Kaaba of the Nation', and even the Socrateses—whose connection to the religion of Tawhid is unknown, yet who, heeding a spiritual voice within, stood alone against Athens at the cost of their lives—and the Candhis, who defied the judges of Great Britain with their frail bodies—were, according to Topçu, the greatest representatives of the Truth, reality and morality.

As I bring this foreword to a close, I must also gladly fulfil a customary duty. We have truly put a great deal of effort into this translation. There are many reasons for this. However, the fact that philosophical terms have not yet become firmly established in our language, and the confusion within our language itself, were the greatest sources of difficulty. Nurettin Topçu, of course, is a thinker whose works—apart from this book—are entirely in Turkish and who possesses a distinctive style; consequently, our endeavour to ensure the translation did not feel too foreign in terms of language and style further complicated our task. However, we have achieved a good collaboration with our dear friend Musa Doğan, and we are exceptionally pleased to have contributed this work to Turkish thought, despite all its shortcomings. According to something the late Professor once mentioned, this work was partially or entirely translated by Dr Ezel Erverdi himself, but its whereabouts are unknown. We would like to extend our special thanks to Mr Ezel for his encouragement in undertaking this translation. As for the Professor's recommendation to Mr Sam

İsmail Hakkı Akın to translate the work during his final years,

This strengthens the likelihood that it has not been translated in full. However, Mr İsmail believes that by reviewing a large part of our translation with us during the typesetting process—whilst making considerable sacrifices in terms of his own work—he has, to some extent, repaid his debt to the Professor. We, too, feel it is our duty to thank him for this effort, from which we have benefited immensely.

Furthermore, to Assistant Professor Dr Emin Işık, one of Topçu's students, who participated in one of our sessions with a strict focus on language and style—to Assistant Professor Dr Emin Işık, one of Topçu's students; to Professor Dr Orhan Okay, who has never withheld his support and has always offered valuable advice; and, together with Dr İsmail Kara, to the members of the Dergâh; and, together with my friend Musa Doğan, we extend our thanks.

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CONFORMISME ET RÉVOLTE

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INTRODUCTION
HOW DOES THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY ARISE?

"Action is a synthesis of man and God."
Maurice Blondel

1. THE ETHICS OF ACTION AND MORAL VOLUNTARISM

Every movement that is the product of the will is a leap towards a more perfect movement. This is an exercise in which the will tests its own strength. Even in a movement requiring the slightest effort, all the body's forces come together. Movement is an inner state, a force that arises suddenly within us, ready to radiate outwards. Man's endeavour to step outside himself consists entirely of struggling against all the tendencies and bodily habits he has acquired subsequently. Movement is not a pure spontaneity, but a spontaneity that has been restrained. It is, as it were, a distillation of the individual will. Man recognises himself only within movement, and then movement breaks away from him like a leaf. A person comes to know themselves and the world through movement. Indeed, they can only come to know the external world by establishing certain relationships of identity or similarity between their own movement and that of others. The experiences passed down to us from generation to generation, the preconceived judgements arising from society,

To be accepted, it requires a personal examination and a more or less rigorous critique within each of us. This is a kind of inner knowledge—which we might call 'belief'—a knowledge acquired by making it our own. All true knowledge is, in fact, a belief that is the fruit of action. This belief gives rise to a higher form of action within the individual. Since every true knowledge—that is, every belief—is not mere imitation, it prepares the individual for a new form of action. As this action gradually expands, it acquires universality. And just as every action expresses a tendency towards universality, so too does every voluntary action bear the stamp of morality. Indeed, morality begins with a voluntary act. In this sense, it can be said that 'action is goodness in itself'.

Since thought is an expression of action, and since a person's volition determines both action and thought, the will thus becomes the common source of spiritual and moral life. Spiritual life arises from a will to act and, once it has arisen, illuminates that will. In fact, spiritual life cannot be reduced merely to an illuminating intellect. It is appropriate to distinguish between the various forms of knowledge residing within it, some of which are based on love, others on passion, and still others on intuition, and so on.

There is yet another form of knowledge that transforms action into life. The logical *(discursive)* intellect loses its universality by confining its activity within the framework of vital needs and thereby imprisoning itself within its own individuality. In an intellect that thinks in this manner, moral life and spiritual life begin to diverge from one another. It is there that the scholar, the man of practice, the citizen, the man of honour—all of these

1 Maurice Blondel, *he /nocâs ‹/r f'zn/e//tg'en,rr*, pp. 261, 205, 270, 272.

* Discursive thought (or intellect) is one of the two fundamental modes of human thought and refers to the mind's operation in drawing inferences by moving from one concept or proposition to another. Whilst recent Turkish philosophical dictionaries have proposed the term 'gidilnli düşünce' — or 'thinking' — as a translation for this concept, we (taking into account its logical connotations) had deemed 'delilli düşünce' (reasoned thought), derived from 'istidlâl', to be the appropriate equivalent. Now, however, in accordance with the author's preference, we have used the expression 'logical intelligence' (the other style of thought, as is well known, is **'intuitive** thought'). **(Trans.)**

They differ from the moral man—the virtuous individual who recognises himself as a universal being and whose actions are aligned with the universal order. A person's discovery may bring harm to humanity; love of one's country breeds hatred of the enemy within a person; whilst the honourable man takes pride in following the existing order and fulfilling his duty, it is possible that this order and this duty were established and imposed by certain individuals who act in pursuit of their own interests, as enemies of a section of humanity.

There is no true morality outside the universal order. Science, the nation, industry, and the welfare of the state—all of these can, from a moral standpoint, lead to either good or evil in equal measure. To measure one's actions against the universal standard and, by embracing the universe through one's own actions, to seek one's own knowledge therein—this is how human moral behaviour ought to be. The obstacles that halt this movement towards the universal order, diverting it towards the pleasures and needs of the individual and society, constitute, to that extent, various forms of human bondage. The human being, who first lives their individual life and then their social life, is compelled to follow the order established by life and society. Therefore, moral action consists of overcoming this bondage through a kind *of conversion,* with a view to reuniting with the universal will. This stance is contrary to the view of the philosopher Spinoza, who sacrifices human will to a mere passive knowledge of the determinism that governs the universe. The final sentence of the second part of his famous work, *Ethics*, reads as follows: 'The will and the faculty of understanding are one and the same thing.' Indeed, according to Spinoza, morality consists solely of a complete and clear knowledge of the universe, which is objective reality; and man is a part of the universe. And since the laws governing the universe are predetermined, human actions are equally predetermined. Human beings cannot alter their own actions, but they can recognise them and the necessity that governs nature; and this is precisely what human beings

‘Perfection also comes from beer.’ ‘Evil consists of nothing but error.’

Here, our aim in discussing nature, contrary to the understanding mentioned above, is to investigate the universal will to which all our actions and knowledge are subject. Whether it be Spinoza’s intellectualism—which, through its own form of pantheism, leaves the investigation of every moral ideal entirely to the intellect—or the morality of renunciation arising from Bergsonian intuitionism, *or* finally the social conformism *(conformisme)* preached by the School of Sociology to its own followers, all these doctrines leading to moral fatalism have driven us to rebellion. And rebellious thought has discovered, within its very rebellion, a volitional ideal.

2. DIVERSE ETHICAL SYSTEMS

For some rationalist *(nationalist)* philosophers, the path leading to the identification of virtue with knowledge distanced them from the true realm of ethics. Socrates said, ‘Knowledge of the good necessarily entails its practice’; ‘Evil is a form of ignorance; no one does evil knowingly.’ This view was also adopted by Plato, Aristotle, the Scholastic philosophers and the Encyclopaedic Enlightenment thinkers. In their view, teaching is sufficient to make people moral. These philosophers thus conflated the moral ideal with knowledge of moral events. Yet knowledge is what remains after action. To truly act, personal experience is necessary, and in morality, it is solely this experience that matters. Undoubtedly, morality can only be realised when a firm conviction regarding the value of the good is formed within a person. A mind possessing such a conviction must utilise all its material and spiritual faculties for virtuous behaviour, sacrifice all its pleasures, and place virtue above all else. But is this conviction regarding the value of virtue merely an idea? To possess such a conviction fully, prior experience is necessary; the experiences of others—

2 Delbos, *I.e. firohhmir. inarul ‹lans ła Jolti.losoylii.« de Sk!!!*^-*.p- 4-

3 Ibid., p. 10.

In order to decide that one's neighbour's suffering must be alleviated, one must first have suffered oneself; if one wishes not merely to know about compassion but to truly act upon it, one must experience compassion for oneself. Here, the practice of goodness takes precedence over knowledge of it. Even if I fully understand what is good, if I lack the sufficient strength to act, I may find myself at the mercy of my instincts and certain external pressures to conform to society. Thus, the realm of morality lies beyond the realm of knowledge. Moral behaviour determines its own knowledge. It is not the idea of goodness that determines the realisation of goodness. The idea of duty, as a mere idea, is insufficient to move a person to action. In Kant, the practical reason that determines duty is, in our view, a dry, abstract and vague form of reason. Practical reason is far removed from action, which can be universal and bears the seed of the good within it. For an action to be lived out through an idea and concrete belief—arising from the individual and extending to the universal order—it requires its actual implementation. The knowledge of such an action is, too, unquestionably concrete and universal.

The reason why empiricists[1] are led astray is that, by focusing on its nature, they proceed not from the moral phenomenon itself, but from an empirical element—be it biological, sociological, psychological or philosophical. They have forgotten that moral truths are not truths of fact, but truths of necessity. Instead of examining the will within the action, they have contented themselves with examining certain general consequences produced by the action, such as pleasure and happiness, social or individual interests, and so on. Yet none of these are the true ends of moral actions. The philosophy of moral happiness *(eudemonism)*, whilst seeking to link moral behaviour to pleasure, is at odds with reality. The end of every action is to attain the perfection of its own form. It is not true, as proponents of the ethics of happiness claim, that human beings seek pleasure and avoid pain. Action is a necessity and an indispensable consequence of life; human beings willingly accept pain as much as, if not more than, pleasure. Utilitarian ethics (utilitarism-

(*me)* linked pain and pleasure to the realisation of individual and social benefit. The aim of the movement is neither pleasure nor benefit. It is nothing other than the principle of the expansion of pleasure. All the criticisms levelled at the ethics of happiness also apply to utilitarianism.

Doctrines of social solidarity, on the other hand, advocate solidarity directed towards happiness and utility. Ethics of solidarity do not establish morality but presuppose it. Solidarity can be practised for evil as well as for good.

The sociological school of thought, beginning with Émile Durkheim, is a form of solidarity that seeks to reconcile two principles—one empirical, the other rational—namely, goodness and duty. Consequently, a dualistic principle emerges from this. Ultimately, it is impossible to know which of these two principles will prevail over the other and lead it in its wake. If goodness is chosen, one falls into the error of utilitarianism; if duty is chosen, we shall once again point out that this principle is vague, obscure and obscure.

Finally, if the moral ideal in a society is confined to the desires of that society, and defines itself in such a way as to demand obedience to social duty, this gives rise to a morality of conformity *(conformism)* that blinds the individual's conscience. After all, there are many tendencies and many wills at work within a society. One must take sides with one of them. One must align oneself with one of them. It is precisely when the individual makes a choice between them in their own conscience that morality begins.

The 'honourable man's' ethics, as established by F. Rauch, is simply the *rationalist* development of this sociological ethics. According to the 'honourable man', closing one's eyes is sufficient to fulfil one's duty. For duty is the name given to the task entrusted to him by society. 'The honourable man makes his decision before reflecting on the nature of his action, and proceeds to act

'…and goes about its business'. Just as in sociological ethics, here too human will is neither free nor autonomous; it is dependent on the will of the group and on the decisions of certain other individuals. The free unfolding and spread of action is limited solely by social utility. It is an undeniable fact that, within society as a moral environment, individual wills are exploited by other, more powerful wills. Ultimately, the morality of the honourable man, just as in sociological morality, leads to human docility and blind obedience.

3. FROM THE IDEAL OF RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ETHICS OF REBELLION

We, on the other hand, place the concept of responsibility at the heart of the question of morality. All moral doctrines have approached responsibility from a negative perspective; that is, they have spoken of the responsibility arising from the commission of this or that evil act. According to them, responsibility is a force that serves to protect ourselves; it is not a cause of action. In our understanding, the issue takes a different turn and responsibility becomes positive; it thus becomes the very cause of action. The source of this understanding of responsibility lies in conscience. Conscience reproaches itself for failing to act in the face of responsibility. There is no resemblance whatsoever between our understanding of responsibility and the feeling of remorse, which is entirely an internal state and merely a form of passivity. For remorse creates no constructive element in the person who acts morally. —It is, after all, more a consequence than a cause— Our responsibility is inseparable from the nature of consciousness, which strives for universality. It is human concern that drives action towards the universal order. Just like action, thought too arises from this concern. This universal responsibility emerges within a life of faith that constitutes your spiritual life. A spiritual life nourished by concern constantly increases the very concern that gave rise to it. Responsibility gives rise to the act of thinking, and the more a person reflects, the more responsible they feel for the actions they are about to take. Therefore, in terms of its source,

4 F. Rauh, **L'expérience morale**, p. 7.

When one reflects on it, life stems from the moral life. Instinct, self-interest, sympathy, happiness, kindness and duty… all these are human emotions, yet they also imply passivity. Morality, however, lies beyond and above all of these. To define the realm of morality, it is by no means sufficient to analyse these emotions, which appear to dominate one another. What is required is a profound analysis of the movement itself—a movement that never ceases at the finite but always extends towards the infinite. The will to infinity has, without a doubt, been obstructed by the many so-called moral principles established by moral systems. Utility, happiness, conscience, society… all of these are forms of human bondage from which one must break free. Life is moral to the extent that all its forces are expended in this clash within and without the moving being. At the end of this clash, the human being reaches the point of scorn for the illusions that fill the cosmos and feels himself to be greater than the cosmos itself. Everything that exists outside of himself and the movement extending towards the Infinite—that is, towards Allah—is now nothing but illusion and delusion. This state is a kind of conversion aimed at attaining one's own unity. Thus, the self that has attained perfection resists every obstacle that stands in the way of the path to unity. From this struggle springs a movement of rebellion—a fully moral movement—expressed in the following words: 'I am the Truth: Ene'l-Haqq.'

PART ONE
THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

Rebellion, which forms the subject of this study, presupposes the existence of freedom in human action. In fact, rebellion is the harbinger of this freedom. If, alongside the docile, there are also rebels, and if certain heroes of the spiritual realm prefer suffering to repose—in contrast to the masses who accuse them of being rebels—then this contradiction within human behaviour is the clearest evidence that, even within society, there are individuals who swim against the tide, and that freedom exists alongside bondage. In every age, the masses have blindly condemned these rebels. They have sentenced them to death, sending them to the stake and the gallows. All these sentences have served no purpose other than to fuel the zeal that has ensured this heroism is passed from one spirit to another throughout human history. Have these rebels not turned their own gallows into eternal monuments to freedom? Some preachers of docility, upon seeing them, will ask: 'Why should one defy social order? Why swim against the tide?' A voice arising from the very depths of these rebels has inspired them with this: one must liberate humanity from bondage to make it truly human; it is better for a person to shape their own world according to their own beliefs; in a word, the soul must be exalted, humanity must strive to reach the Supreme Being, and must truly recognise itself in Him. At the very least, we wish to prove the following to the advocates of determinism: even if their actions are determined by nature and society, there is something in the rebels' actions that determinism cannot explain. Admittedly,

Some proponents of the theory of docility have provided examples of rebellion in their own lives. For example, Spinoza both rebelled against the Jewish and Christian communities whilst also preaching social harmony and docility; in doing so, he denied free action. In the first part of this study, we shall confine ourselves to examining the thought of such a rebel — alongside that of another — in order to distinguish it from his own practice and rebellion.

CHAPTER ONE
I. FREEDOM ACCORDING TO SPINOZA

1. THOUGHTS ON THE WILL AND THE UNITY OF GOD AND THE UNIVERSE

When Spinoza's doctrine is examined, the issue can be reduced to the following question: Is there any will in the absolute sense; or is the will nothing other than the faculty of understanding? Spinoza's answer to this question is as follows: There is but a single faculty in the mind, and that is the intellect. In fact, there are no faculties in the mind that are, in the full sense of the word, distinct from one another. The mind is synonymous with the power of thought (intellect). This view is summarised at the end of the second part of his **Ethics** (Philosophy of Morals): 'The will and the faculty of understanding are one and the same thing.' This proposition is derived in the *Ethics* through a process of geometric and deductive reasoning and is linked to the book's opening sentence. To illustrate Spinoza's line of thought

1 Spinoza, **Ethics**, Part II, Corollary to Proposition XLIX.

, we shall revisit the reasoning cited there and retrace the path he followed from a philosophical perspective in reverse, that is, moving from a proposition to the proposition that precedes it and serves as its foundation.

In fact, according to Spinoza, the will is not an absolute and free faculty possessing the power to determine itself independently. It is a general term encompassing all particular desires under the same name. In other words, just as there is no stoniness apart from stones, so there is no will apart from particular desires.° The will is therefore a metaphysical entity that cannot be separated from the particular desires through which we constitute it. It is something that the intellect brings into being. As for particular desires, they correspond to ideas; for whatever the desire, love, etc., may be, there is no mode of thought that does not rest upon some idea preceding it: how can something that is in no way conceivable be desired or loved?'

'Ideas can only be explained by ideas, and actions by actions. The belief that we exert a direct influence on our bodies stems from the existence of a complete and reciprocal connection between the body's movements and the mind's ideas.' Therefore, there is no desire in the mind that is not linked to an idea. It is a misconception to separate the faculty of understanding, which recognises a thought, from the will, which judges it. Every thought contains an affirmation from which it is impossible to separate it by any artificial means. Every idea is a collection of affirmations. Whilst these affirmations give it substance, the acts of recognition and judgement are one and the same. 'Intellect and will cannot be two separate things, existing in two distinct modes of being; they constitute a single and identical thing, namely the soul'.°° 'Thus, a free

18 *Id., ibid.,* Part II, Scholium to Proposition XLVIII.

19 Leon Brunschvicg, Spinoza *and his Contemporaries*, 1923, p. 94.

20 Victor Delboss, **The Moral* Philosophy of *Spinoza* in the history of Spinozism,* 1893, p. 87.

21 Brunschvicg, *SpinoZo P.f SRS* fOZI/PM§., 1923, p. 95.

When we believe that we are performing a bodily movement, we are, in essence, summarising a double error arising from a double ignorance: we imagine that the idea expressing this movement in our mind is self-sufficient; yet this idea is dependent on another set of ideas; we suppose that the movement occurs of its own accord, whereas it is dependent on another set of movements. We establish an artificial link between these two states, which are, in reality, separate from their causes: the uncertainty arising from our ignorance becomes the uncertainty of our desire. It is true that the mind's decision and the body's movement are one and the same thing; when we establish its connection with thought, we call it a decision, and when we view it in terms of its outward manifestation, we call it movement." [6]

These explanations are summarised in the following proposition: 'As long as an idea exists in the mind as an idea, there is no desire, affirmation or denial other than what it contains.'

When human beings are attributed with unconditional freedom (free will), this is understood to mean that they possess the power to perform this or that action solely by their own will and independently. Likewise, it is accepted that human beings possess the ability to bring about certain states of their own without relying on a determining cause. It is claimed that we sense the existence within ourselves of a power capable of interrupting or altering the flow of our judgements and actions. Is not the very conception of the possibilities that arise prior to our action proof that our choice is made in a completely free manner? If freedom did not of its own accord determine the sequence and direction of bodily movements, it would be nothing more than an imaginary force, for the body's movements are the result of thought. We are, therefore, to a large extent the creators of our own living and thinking individuality. Yet this is merely an illusion; for the inclinations that drive us to action are merely our own

22 Delboss, **Le problème moral dans la philosophie de* Spinoza*, pp. 8D–89.

23 Spinoza, **Ethics**, Part II, Prop. XLIX.

It arises not only from our intellect, but also from the influence of the things within us. ‘Blinded by ignorance and pride, we are unaware of the support provided to us by the whole of nature.’ The proposition in *Ethics* points to this: ‘There is never any absolute or free will in the soul; rather, the human soul is moved by a cause to will this or that, and that cause is determined by another cause, and that by yet another... and so on ad infinitum’.’

The tendencies that drive us to action are not efficient causes, but rather efficient causes. “It is possible to describe the will not as an efficient cause, but only as a necessary cause.” Only Allah is the cause that creates causes—that is, the efficient cause. “Any finite or infinite capacity for understanding, when it comes to motion, must grasp Allah’s attributes and actions, and nothing else.”[11] And Allah, being the active cause, does not act with free will... ‘As is evident in motion, rest and all other natural phenomena, will and intellect also exist within Allah’s sovereignty.’” “Without the ‘unity of Allah and the universe’, it is impossible to conceive of Allah as the Creator of the universe or the universe as the work of Allah; in the same way, we are compelled to deduce the existence of Allah from His essence, and from His existence the idea of the infinity of His attributes and *modes*.” God exists necessarily by virtue of His own essence, and the universe exists necessarily by virtue of its own cause, which is God. It is a consequence of this relationship that Nature is in motion within God, and God is in motion within Nature. ‘Allah acts solely through the necessities of nature and cannot be subjected to pressure by anyone.’ For this reason, as a free cause, He is simply—

24 Delboss, *I.e. flrob. iimi'ul ‹1s us In J›liilr.sn|›ltie dr S]›iTloza,* pp. 80–85.

25 Spinoza, *Ethics,* Part II, Prop. XLVIII.

26 *Ethics,* Part I, Prop. XXXII.

27 *Ethics,* Part I, Prop. XXX.

28 Part I, corollary to Prop. XXXII.

29 Brunschvicg, *Spinoza and his contemporaries,* p. 78.

30 *Ethics,* Part I, Prop. XVII.

we may call upon Allah. For Spinoza defines free being as follows: "By free being, I mean that which exists solely by the necessary laws of its own nature, and whose movements are determined solely by itself."

Necessity is a condition of comprehensibility, and comprehensibility is a condition of reality. If there is no immutable order whereby every particular idea is linked to the idea of essence, and every particular state of existence is linked to the wholeness of a cosmic system, then there is no relationship between individual *modes* and absolute modes; and, by virtue of the relationship between the finite and the infinite, if the finite does not possess, to a certain extent, the capacity for infinity, its existence is incomprehensible. 'An attitude is a transient datum, an auxiliary product of the imagination; reason accepts it only as a starting point for linking it to eternity and infinity, which are the source of all concrete reality.' [6]The reality of the universe leads back to its own cause, which is Allah. "Everything that exists is in Allah, and without Allah, nothing exists nor can anything be conceived." [7] "Thus, since their sources are infinite, *modes* are bound *to* an *attribute*; likewise, since they possess infinity, attributes are bound *to* a *substance*... And since the substance is infinitely infinite, nothing exists outside it... Every being belongs to the substance... Every being is in the substance, whilst the substance is in itself; it is within every being." "Existence belongs to the essence of the substance." [19]

Allah, the absolutely infinite Being, is a substance; for if He were not a substance, He would have been conceived by a being other than Himself. This, however, would contradict the definition of Allah:

31 *Elhique,* Part I, Definition VII.

32 Brunschvicg, *Spinoza and his contemporaries,* p. 72.

33 *Ethics,* Part I, Proposition XV.

34 Brunschvicg, Spinoza *and his Contemporaries,* p. 73.

35 *Ethics,* Part I, Prop. VII.

"By God, I mean the absolute infinite Being—that is, the essence—composed of infinite attributes, each of which expresses the infinite and eternal essence."[2] ' "The essence is infinite, for since infinity necessarily follows from the definition of 'infinite Being', it is existence itself. Infinity is the most concrete form of existence. It is that which best manifests its power of self-creation, always in a form identical to itself and in an endless, inexhaustible state."°' "In the nature of things," he says, "there exists an absolute, infinite and sole substance."*° And Spinoza defines substance as follows: "It is that which exists and is conceived in and of itself; that is to say, that which does not require the aid or conception of any other being for its conception to take shape".[2] ' It has been proven that God exists of Himself (is self-existent) and does not require recognition through anything else; therefore, according to the first axiom: "Everything that exists is either self-existent or exists in something else".°' It follows, then, that the definition of God is identical to the definition of substance. God is the sole substance: 'By "the cause of itself", I mean that which contains existence in its essence (zâti); in other words, that whose nature is known only as existence'.[25]

Nature, regarded as equivalent to Allah, recognises Allah as the sole cause of its existence. Human actions are bound to the necessity of divine existence. The nature of our actions is determined by Allah. All our actions stem solely from divine action.

Thus, the notion of unrestricted freedom in Spinoza's system appears to have been eliminated. 'Our belief in unrestricted freedom rests on two grounds: the desire of which we are conscious—

36 *Ethics*, Part I, Prop. VI.

37 Brunschvicg, **Spinoza et son époque**, p. 58.

38 *Ethics*, Part I, Schol. on Prop. X.

39 *Ethics*, Part I, Def. III.

40 Ethics, Part I, Axiom I.

2. *Ethics*, Part I, Definition I.

‘not knowing the external causes that both bring them into being and permit their realisation…’°"

2. FROM THE MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING OF FREEDOM TO PEACE

Having rejected, within his own system, every notion of unrestricted freedom, Spinoza defines true freedom as follows: ‘Freedom is, precisely, the opposite of unrestricted freedom. It signifies the most perfect determination, combined with the highest degree and the greatest spontaneity for the individual.’ Undoubtedly, the determination of our actions by external causes diminishes our capacity for action; yet for us there are not only external determinants, but also internal ones. Consequently, when our actions are determined by ourselves, this is what is meant by ‘freedom’; this form of determination does not imply that our actions are without cause, but rather that we possess all these causes within ourselves”.°’ The principle of freedom must be understood in terms of this internal determination. And the development of our freedom consists in reducing the power of external influences to that of internal influences.

Consequently, the source of freedom lies in the act itself; through this, every being constitutes its own essential existence.° The continuity and strength of the freedom possessed by every being are measured by its relationship to its own essence (zât). If God is the absolutely free being, this stems from the fact that He is an infinite being—that is, from the fact that His essence encompasses His eternal existence. Human beings can be both free and enslaved, for they possess, on the one hand, a determined essence and, on the other, an existence that does not derive solely from their own essence. Their freedom will develop to the extent that they succeed in embracing the causes and factors that explain and encompass their existence and modes of being.*’ “External events, in us

26 Delbos, *Le problème moral dans Spinoza*, p. 86.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 94.

28 *Id., ibid.*, Part I, Chapter IV.

29 *Id., ibid.*, p. 95.

To the extent that they become fully formed ideas, we become free. And since the idea of God is the Idea of all ideas, only He can set us free and lead us to salvation."(0) "Human power is entirely limited, and the power of external influences is infinitely superior to our own; consequently, we possess no absolute power to bring things outside ourselves under our control. Nevertheless, we are merely a part of the nature to which we submit. If we understand these things clearly and distinctly, that aspect of our being defined as intellect—that is, our best part—will find peace and strive to remain at peace. For, as long as we remain in this state, we cannot desire anything that is not necessary, and we can find absolute peace only in truth; and precisely because we have understood this, the endeavour of the best part of our being is in harmony with all of nature".[3] 'Thus, the freedom of the soul consists solely in the clear recognition of necessity. "To the extent that our knowledge of the necessity of existence corresponds to these specific matters, which we conceive of in a clearer and more genuine manner, the soul's power over its own passions increases." The reason the wise person possesses greater spiritual freedom is that they have a clearer understanding of the necessity of their actions than other people. Because he is so free, there is a peace within his soul that the ignorant do not know. The cause of this peace lies in the knowledge of the Truth (Allah).

30 *Elhique*, Part IV, Scholium on Proposition XLVIII.

31 if/tiqm, Part IV, Appendix, Chapter **XXXII.**

32 *Elhique,* Part V, Scholium on Proposition VI.

II. A CRITIQUE OF SPINOZA'S DOCTRINE

1. THE QUESTION OF SALVATION AND THE UNDERSTANDABILITY OF NATURE

Spinoza seeks a solution to the question of salvation. How can a person attain eternal happiness? According to him, eternal happiness lies in peace of mind, in perfect tranquillity. By nature, a person is an anxious and therefore unhappy being. What is the source of this anxiety? Nature offers us tranquillity. There is order and harmony within it. The laws that govern it are perfectly comprehensible. Human beings project the restlessness within their own souls onto nature. To eliminate this restlessness of the soul, the flawless comprehensibility that we observe in nature must also be instilled in the human soul. Here, too, the same laws of nature must prevail. This is indeed the case. Yet we are unaware of this, and the restlessness of the soul stems from this very fact. As a result of our ignorance, our arrogance and our conceit, we delude ourselves into believing we are free, and place ourselves outside the order of nature. Such is the misery of humankind

It begins at this point. Consequently, in order ultimately to submit to them, one must seek the solution in a thorough understanding of the laws of nature. This is a unique order directed towards divine unity. For such an order to exist, natural phenomena must be precisely defined. Therefore, since human beings are part of nature, there is a precise determinism in them just as there is in nature. To attain salvation and tranquillity, it will suffice to consider spiritual phenomena on the same plane as natural phenomena and to recognise the precise determinism that prevails there alongside the laws of the soul. In the moral sphere, no method can be found that differs from scientific methods; and amongst the sciences, the one that is the most accurate—the one that provides the geometric and precise formulas of natural phenomena—will serve as our model. The mathematical sciences, particularly geometry, will provide the method for ethics. Consequently, Spinoza accepts the validity of the mathematical mechanism for spiritual phenomena. In other words, the search for ultimate causes will be set aside, and human moral life will be examined in the same way as the properties of geometric shapes. In this way, eternal happiness will be attained.

By positing a single substance—namely, the divine Substance—Spinoza attributes human actions to it, just as he does all other entities in the universe. Like all entities, all actions derive from this divine Substance; just as the properties of a geometric figure are derived from the figure itself... To conceptualise human action, it is sufficient to recognise this unity of substance, which is both precisely defined and itself defining. This amounts to nothing more than the knowledge of the laws governing nature.

In the 18th century, the philosophy known as the 'Enlightenment' followed this intellectualist (mentalist) movement alongside the Encyclopaedists, who later paved the way for the birth of positivism. In truth, Goethe's age was the age of intellect and positive science.

Like Spinoza, H. Taine also proposes a reform of the capacity for understanding for the development of morality. This is only possible through the development of the positive sciences and the experimental method. 'Based on experience—

"The principle he puts forward is that nothing in the cosmos can escape this absolute determinism. 'As recognised by science, the universe is a living geometry'." As for moral truth, it must be investigated solely on the basis of scientific truth. For moral truth is either the consequence or the purpose of the latter... Accordingly, the subject of ethics is not to reveal vice and virtue, but to determine under what conditions they manifest themselves." The conclusion he reaches is this: "Life must be governed by science."* "Just as reality exists in its own right, so too is the only reality within us that which can be understood by the intellect." [6]

2. FROM THE REALITY OF ACTION TO THE FREEDOM OF ACTION

Is it true that the sciences bring us face to face with concrete reality and can reveal its secret to us? According to *conceptualists*, the task of science is to organise nature. It necessarily follows from this statement that science creates a rational truth. However, what is rational is not entirely spiritual; nor is it, in the full sense of the word, real. Science is pragmatic. Its aim is to establish harmony between us and natural phenomena, to establish dominion over their elements, and to elevate us to the 'sovereignty of nature'. But what is the nature of this pragmatism? According to H. Poincaré, science endeavours to provide us with a kind of harmony. The postulates and hypotheses in science are suited to the workings of the mind. In scientific work, the mind always turns towards simpler elements. According to the philosopher L. Roy, too, scientific intellect seeks results that are suitable for application. And to achieve this aim, it breaks reality down into parts. It schematises it, drawing on sensory data and with the aim of utilising it, and places it within abstract frameworks. It attempts to turn reality into a tool. Every scientific discipline has its own specific application, a

33 *V.* Delbos, *I.r. Proh. mor‹il d‹ ti,s 1,'hi.sloire du SJ›inozisnie,* pp. 501, 503.

34 Art., *op. cit.,* pp. 508, 512.

35 *Ibid.,* p. 518.

36 *Ibid.,* p. 527.

has a technical aspect. Thus, sciences that have strayed from reality have lost their unity in the realm of truth. The differences between the methods employed by each science also demonstrate that there is no unity amongst the sciences themselves. It follows, then, that scientific knowledge

The world of science is no closer to reality than the world of everyday, mundane knowledge. Just as science falls short of giving us an understanding of reality, so too does it fall short when it comes to recognising morality—which is the very essence of humanity. The science of humanity operates on a different principle from the natural sciences. In contrast to the regular, observable and experimentally verifiable phenomena of the natural sciences, the science of humanity will proceed from the universal nature of human actions. As we have just seen, the intellect lacks the capacity to recognise the universal; it can only extend to the particular, which is derived from the totality of reality. Likewise, it can never recognise concrete reality and can only penetrate the abstract. The two fundamental characteristics of human activity, however, are that it is both concrete and universal. Is there no method of thought for recognising the reality of activity and for establishing the science of activity? Some have spoken of *intuition* to such an extent that there is no need to elaborate on it here. This is a direct and unmediated path to recognition. So to speak, it is the manifestation of the whole attained in a state of inner enlightenment. In reality, intuition is a form of concrete intelligence, an 'emotional impulse'. It does not create a universal method; it illuminates motion, but follows in its wake. It is not so much that it follows man as that man drags it along. Intuition is not the whole of man; it is a part separated from him. Just as all forms of external thought are, it is at the service of movement. Spinoza's error lay in this: accepting a single substance as the source of Being and deriving all of man's movements from this intellectual substance. What we are doing is demonstrating that motion and intellect are things of a different kind. Therefore, since intellect is a part of the human being, in order for us to be able to study the science of human motion, we need another principle that provides us with the whole of the human being. We find this principle in motion itself. For only motion can guide the human being; only motion

Only it can encompass the entirety of human existence, comprehend it, and plunge into the infinity into which only a human being—in the truest sense of the word—can enter. If one can speak of an essence here, then movement is the 'essence of humanity'. Thought is a part separated from it, and 'just as the development of thought requires and determines the development of movement, so too does the development of movement facilitate the development of thought.' Thought arises from movement, is nourished by movement, but reaches beyond movement to discover new grounds for new movements. It drives motion both from the front and from behind. As for the resulting motion, it infinitely surpasses thought. Thought serves as a medium between the motion that precedes it and the motions that will follow. I wonder whether it is necessary to add that the analytical or geometric thought which Spinoza substituted for all other forms of thought falls far short of illuminating the true reality of motion? Motion itself is intelligent. What the intellect, which follows it, does is, in reality, nothing other than analysing the elements of motion, or, if it so chooses, grasping it directly and within its own wholeness. Reason can never go any further, nor can it ever spontaneously set a person in motion. 'Alongside the knowledge arising from the perfect use of reason, and even above it, there is an inner knowledge arising from the fact that the thing known is of the same nature *(connaturalité)* as reason itself'.[37]

Action is freedom. Just as there is an unfortunate tendency to deny action, so too is there a tendency to deny freedom. For to act truly is to be free. Through action, human beings oppose the determinism of nature. To will to act is to be convinced that one can change something in nature; it is to resist the spontaneous formation of existence. Freedom is a phenomenon brought about by action. Spinoza, regarding human beings as well as

37 Maurice Blondel, *Le *Processus de l'Intelligence**, p. 18.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 268.

an element of nature alongside his own intellect. By denying man's free and universal movement, one does nothing more than describe his complete enslavement. To be universal, movement must be the fruit of inner curiosity and restlessness; and every movement gives rise to greater curiosity and restlessness—that is, anxiety—in man. The peace and tranquillity Spinoza desires are contrary to the very nature of human movement.

CHAPTER TWO

1. INTUITION AND FREEDOM

THE FALLACY OF UNCONDITIONAL FREEDOM (LIMITED FREE WILL) AND DETERMINISM

Henri Bergson will not deduce determinism, as Spinoza did, on the basis that the absolute state of being can be recognised by the intellect; on the contrary, he will criticise Spinoza for failing to take into account 'duration' *(durée)* – which consists of infinity – in order to rest in a single instant.[3] Bergson will demonstrate that, just as the claim of determinism is a fallacy, so too is the notion of unconditional freedom. In this way, the issue is resolved. In reality, with every transition to action, we possess an intuition of our freedom.

We shall present a summary of Bergson's view of freedom, endeavouring to grasp his philosophy in all its subtlety. Subsequently, we shall also examine how freedom, alongside movement, reflects—and in fact

S9 Bergson, **Les instants immédiats de la conscience**, 1928, p. 159.

strict determinism, and that it cannot be reduced to a mere intuition arising within motion.

Unlike Spinoza, Bergson does not base his views on a metaphysical perspective. In his view, the study of human freedom is not an extension of a philosophical system. If there is scope for a psychological investigation of freedom, he will endeavour to conduct it within the framework of the analysis of mental phenomena.

He proceeds from the premise that mental states are pure qualities that cannot be reduced to certain spatial dimensions. Inner states cannot be measured in the same way that spatial dimensions are measured. Similarly, states of consciousness cannot be conceived of in the same way that objects are conceived of in space. For the changes in these states occur not in space, but within pure duration. Generally, by treating our inner states as magnitudes—a complete confusion—we end up incorporating space into the concept of time.' [0]"If we could always call intensities 'quantities', the real duration perceived by consciousness would be arranged in a sequence of these so-called intensities; in truth, this is not a quantity, and when one attempts to measure it, one unwittingly substitutes space for it."[41] In the true sense, time has neither moments that are identical to one another nor moments that exist outside one another; 'this is an inner multiplicity and a continuous formation. The different moments of time do not exist outside one another; they cannot be added to one another. The moments of time, which are not of a single kind, are intertwined.' Within our self, this 'denotes a succession, a fusion and an order'." This means that we imagine the symbolic representations of states of consciousness—which have become abstracted (symbolic)—can be reconstructed by substituting them for the states themselves. This is unconditional freedom

40 *Ibid.*, p. 55.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 81.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 91.

43 *Ibid.*, p. 97.

And this is where determinism goes wrong. The associationist school, building on this confusion, claims that, since all the conditions of an action are given before it takes place, the action is determined by those conditions. And the fallacy of 'unconditional freedom' leads to the following postulate: before we made a choice, we could have chosen differently. The fallacy arises from focusing on the movement as it is, rather than on the movement that does not actually take place in either case; the justification for some is that this movement is merely possible, whilst for others it is that it is predetermined. We imagine two lines or two paths joined together in space. And we place the movement at the point where they converge. The movement oscillates mechanically between these two lines. If the self has chosen one of these two paths, it is because it has hesitated and deliberated. It could, therefore, just as easily have chosen the other path. Such is the origin of unconditional freedom. Determinists, however, will respond as follows: 'The self chooses one of these two paths for a specific reason, and whilst it is pointed out that choosing the other path is equally possible, this reason is being overlooked.'

In truth, the shaping of time in this way within space is symbolic; time cannot be conceived of in the same way as space; real duration is a pure becoming, and the various moments of this becoming, which are intertwined, cannot be conceived of as existing independently of one another. Advocates of unconditional freedom reason as follows: 'The path has not yet been mapped out, so one can go in any direction.' Yet they, too, forget that one can only speak of a path once the journey is complete; by then, however, the path will have been mapped out. At that very moment, it would no longer be possible to deviate onto another path. On the other hand, determinists also say, 'The path was drawn like this; therefore, its possible direction is not just any direction, but this was its own direction.' But before the path was drawn, what

44 *Id., ibid.,* p. 137.

possible direction, nor an impossible one; for the path was not yet in question."

When we look at the matter from a genuine perspective—that is, from the perspective of the action that is in the process of being completed—the fallacy arising from action and determinism disappears of its own accord.

Let us set aside completed movements and consider future movements; according to determinism, the question is 'whether a superior intellect, knowing all the conditions that prepare the movement, can or cannot foretell the decision that will result from them'.[46] "The question is whether a philosopher named Paul, living in a different era or several centuries earlier than a man named Pierre, could—by knowing the entire set of conditions of motion within which Pierre lives—definitely predict in advance the choice Pierre would make."[47] '

Here, Bergson takes as his starting point a judgement he formulated at the beginning of his work: psychological states are intensities that cannot be measured from the outside, just as space cannot be measured. It is therefore impossible to conceive of them. These are qualities that can only be experienced and felt. Yet, to specify all the conditions of movement is to specify the movement itself. In our example, for Paul to know all the conditions of Pierre's movement means accepting that he experiences and feels in the same way as Pierre, and within the same duration; were this not the case, he would not bear witness to the events to which Pierre bears witness; for the same moment never returns and is never repeated; in which case there would no longer be two people named Pierre and Paul; only Pierre would remain, moving. Once the conditions of human movements are fully in place, one approaches the experience of living them, and thus it is no longer a matter of foreseeing or predicting, but solely of moving—the movement that is taking place—

45 *Id., ibid.,* p. 139.

46 *Id., ibid.,* p. 140.

47 *Id.,* ibid., p. 141.

"can be reached." In Bergson's words, there are two major fallacies at the root of the determinists' claim to foresee movement. One is a failure to recognise the nature and intensity of states of consciousness; the other consists in "substituting the finished material symbol of this development for the concrete reality and dynamic development within consciousness"; these two fallacies give rise to a third, which is the substitution of the symbol of pure time in space for pure time itself."

Determinism has no recourse but to invoke the law *of causality*; the essence of this law is as follows: the same causes produce the same effects. Yet in spiritual life, the same cause rarely arises more than once... For 'our understanding of time had come to accept the fundamental difference in nature between profound psychological phenomena and the impossibility of complete similarity between two phenomena; for these constitute two distinct moments in a history'." "This would amount to forgetting the psychological elements' own personalities and their unique lives."

In fact, causality is understood as a subjective relationship—that is, as the succession of two events—whereas the moment the first is given, the second is perceived. The cause directly brings about its own effect. There is a subjective associative relationship between them."° The scholar constantly brings the cause closer to its own effect in his imagination. Causality thus approaches a relationship of identity. This final principle expresses the following: : 'The thing thought of is thought of at the very moment it is thought of.'[3] The principle of identity 'transfers the future to the present time

48 *Id., op. cit.,* p. 144.

49 *Id., i* , p. 145.

50 *Ibid.,* p. 152.

51 *Ibid.,* p. 153.

52 *Ibid.,* p. 155.

53 *Ibid.,* i , p. 158.

"rather, it relates to the present, the here and now".[54] Its absolute necessity stems from this. In the succession of events in the physical world, time may be disregarded. To put it plainly, there is no time for these events; time exists for consciousness. It is for this reason that one can speak of a causal relationship in physical events that bears a striking resemblance to a relationship of identity. However, when it comes to psychological events, it is not possible to eliminate the movement of time. It cannot be replaced without being experienced. Every moment in consciousness has a value in its own right. The emergence of every psychological event carries its own cause within itself. Within the structure of a psychological event, cause cannot be distinguished from effect. Since psychological life is in a state of constant becoming, cause and effect are inextricably linked; it is impossible to distinguish between its various moments. The chain of cause and effect in psychological events is an illusion born of disordered thought."°

Now, if the self is a becoming over time, must we accept that it is a free power? This, in turn, would lead us to accept freedom. However, this notion of power, derived from nature, brings with it the idea of necessity and the concept of a determining entity. Yet, 'consciousness neither affirms nor comprehends the absolute determination of future actions'. Here, one can speak only of a free, spontaneous process. 'The internal causal relationship is an entirely dynamic one'.

Let us therefore attempt to define freedom. This is "the relationship of the concrete self to the action it performs. Since we are clearly free, it is impossible to define this relationship." When one attempts to define the spontaneity of consciousness, spontaneity becomes ineffectual

54 *Id., ibid.,* p. 158.

55 *Id., ibid.,* pp. 159–163.

56 *Id.,* ibid., p. 165.

51 Ibid., p. 167.

58 *Id., ibid.,* p. 167.

‘it vanishes, and all definitions of freedom lend credence to determinism.’

II. A CRITIQUE OF BERGSON’S VIEW

SPONTANEOUS GENERATION, CREATION, BECOMING AND CONSCIOUSNESS

According to the Bergsonian conception, freedom is reduced to a ‘free’ spontaneity, distinguished from ‘inertia’. Freedom lies not in the movement itself, but in ‘a particular *nuance* or quality’ *of* it. It must be sought “in the relationship of this movement to that which does not yet exist or to that which might be”. We become aware of our freedom through the intuition arising from this spontaneous emergence. Just as intuition eludes the definition of the elements that constitute it by consciousness

59 *Ibid., op. cit.,* p. 168.

60 *Ibid.,* p. 168.

61 *Ibid.,* p. 165.

62 *Ibid.,* p. 140.

If a direct form of definition is not feasible, then the definition of freedom is likewise not possible in the realm of consciousness. What prevents us from defining freedom is this: we do not know the causality to which it is bound, and we cannot grasp the transition from cause to effect. For, as we have seen previously, in a mental event, cause and effect are inseparable. Every event in consciousness carries its own cause within itself as it comes into being. Mental events possess characteristics unique to themselves. Consciousness, in which events are intertwined and each emerges only once—and cannot recur—is a distinct kind, and within this consciousness, the same cause can never produce the same effect again." [3]Within this continuous becoming, there is an incomprehensible causality, and it keeps its mystery from us. In this causality, 'the result is found within the cause only once. Perhaps the result exists within the cause merely as a possibility and a vague conception, without any corresponding action following it'." It is the fluctuations in consciousness that inform us of the existence of such causality in the world of the spirit. "If there is a genuine psychological causality, it must be distinguished from physical causality, for whilst physical causality implies that nothing new is created in the transition from one moment to the next, psychological causality, on the contrary, signifies the creation by the movement itself of something that did not previously exist. Whilst in motion, we are in the intuition of creative freedom; but it is futile to claim that this freedom exists in this or that state, separated from the simple whole of consciousness by a series of schematic views derived from outside the unity of the whole with motion. 'One must seek freedom in the "plan" of intuition'. [G]'The act of creation that grants us our freedom is akin to a very ripe fruit falling from a tree.' This is, as it were, a spontaneous creation, in and of itself

63 *Ibid.*, p. 179.

64 *Ed., ibid.*, pp. 161–162.

65 *Bulletin de la Société de Philosophie*, 1903, pp. 102–103, Communication by Mr BERGSON at the session of 26 February 1903.

66 Bergson; **Le temps**, *op.* cit., p. 135.

It is movement that creates itself. Just as we become aware of the fruit's condition only when it falls from the tree—even though we do not know how it ripened… In exactly the same way, movement is the work of consciousness, yet we do not know how consciousness brings it about; movement manifests itselfBergson is fond of saying that movement is prepared within a 'sphere of a different kind' and in the deeper strata of consciousness. Using these very terms, he describes the realm of life into which no consciousness penetrates. A period in which no anticipated element is to be found, and which no previous consciousness has ever illuminated, is nothing other than the mysterious flow of life; this is the progression of life within us. The term 'the deep strata of consciousness' points to life. Undoubtedly, consciousness is a vaccine administered to life. It is life taking on a certain harmony. Yet there is a fundamental difference between life and consciousness. A movement prepared within the pure duration and in the depths of consciousness—without ever touching the consciousness that is, at least at certain moments, manifest—is the mechanical movement governed by life. Bergson would not accept this objection. He would say: 'There are rare moments when we become aware of our freedom. These are the moments when we seek to enter into our very selves.' 'It is precisely because we rarely grasp our self that we are rarely free.' This argument in favour of freedom serves no purpose other than to weaken it beyond recognition, ultimately leading to its denial. For, as Bergson puts it, we listen to the flow of life within us without ever remaining passive. 'The mistake,' Bergson will say, 'is that we are within life, and the moment you seek to separate certain specific moments from the concrete manifestation of the self, you project it onto space and substitute a conscious mechanical movement for the self's free activity.'[69] For 'our mental states will thus become rigid through being separated from one another; consequently, there will be constant associations between our crystallised ideas and the behaviour we project outwards'

67 *Ibid., op. cit.,* p. 184.

8 *Ibid.,* p. 178.

69 *Ibid.,* p. 184.

'will come into being; and gradually, our consciousness, by mimicking the reflex movements of our nerves, will suppress and conceal the freedom of mechanical movement'."[7] "A thought or intention, separated from consciousness as a whole and giving rise to a movement, is, according to Bergson, a mechanical movement of consciousness; for there is a necessity here. Consequently, he accepts neither the intention nor the thought; what remains is a movement brought about by pure spontaneity. Bergson does not admit that he wishes to defend a mechanical movement that entirely denies consciousness; 'Nevertheless, the whole is occupied by barely perceptible mediators—which take the form we call the "sense of effort", a form that is unique to us *(sui generis)*—situated between thought and movement. The transition from thought to effort, and from effort to movement, is so continuous that it is impossible for us to say where thought and effort end and where movement begins".*[1] According to this definition, there is no thought that exists as a plan prior to the execution of movement and possesses the origin of movement; there is only the fact of manifestation. Effort, as defined by Bergson in this way, is the effort of life because it is linked to movement, and it is the muscular effort evident in automatic movements. There is no motive for movement; it emerges within pure duration itself; that is to say, it is to immerse oneself in the illusion of duration and to transform oneself into duration itself. Bergson states that, in reality, the key to the matter must be sought in 'a careful analysis of the concept of duration'. One must set aside the concept of the self. For us, the self resembles a machine and is unaware that it is a machine. For duration is not a self; to put it plainly, it cannot create a self. According to its own definition, the self and the emotions that set it in motion are not fixed entities; for this reason, they do not remain identical to themselves throughout the entire process of operation. "The truth is that the self, having merely experienced the first emotion, experiences the second emotion—

70 *Ed., op. cit.,* p. 182.

71 *Ibid.,* p. 161.

72 *Ibid.,* p. 18S.

undergoes a slight change when it emerges: ‘At every moment of judgement, the self changes and alters both the emotions that set it in motion.’ According to Bergson, the constantly changing self is ‘nothing other than the dynamic succession of states that interpenetrate, reinforce one another and, through a natural evolution, lead to a new movement.’ In this natural evolution, there can be no question of freedom. Within a dynamic series, the self no longer exists, for the very same reason that it is no longer the previous self. If it is unaware of its mechanisation, this is because it is not present in its own consciousness. For to be aware of one’s mechanisation requires an awareness of freedom; and once this awareness is present, one realises at certain moments that one is not free and does not belong to oneself. Bergson describes the formation of the self as a lump of clay that, as it rolls, continually gains in size
It depicts. However, our self is not like a snow shelter,
At its very core lies a nucleus which, radiating outwards from the centre, imbues this mass with its own colour of unity; so much so that I always express myself with the same sense of self and am always sensitive to the same impressions. And it is clearly this same colour, this same unity, that endows consciousness—whether in action or in inactivity—with personality. To deny this unity is to deny the will, to deny the ‘shalisiye’. It is to deny character, consciousness and even the self itself. To return to an example used by Bergson, let us consider a work of art. It demonstrates the unity within that intention—which governs the artist whenever he calls upon the assistance of events to confirm the single intention hidden within the work of art at every moment of its creation. Unity of intention and resolve, unity of character and unity within the individual itself, prove the existence of a self that shapes our destiny by opening up possible future paths that guide all our choices. And it is always possible to predict in advance that a particular person will make a particular choice under certain circumstances. The specific elements chosen are irrelevant. To prove the existence of an unchanging self, one

73 *Ibid.,* p. 131.

74 *Ibid.,* p. 131.

It is sufficient to recognise the unity of intention that influences a person's choices. It is this unity that brings the 'reasons of the heart' and the 'reasons of the mind' into conflict. Our entire past as individuals will be realised by our original 'self', which is spread across space and time. We inherit this from our ancestors. But were the elements of our inherited self prepared within them, or were they determined in our ancestors? We do not believe this to be the case. As we transition from the inherited self to our own self, the organism plays its own role. And the emergence of our own self is, in a sense, a genuine act of creation. Through birth, in the transition from one consciousness to another, from one body to another, we do not yet know enough about the changes undergone by the nervous system and the cells to reach a definitive conclusion or to establish the laws of heredity. It is a fact that the greater the change, the greater the act of creation. However, our science must admit its inability to grasp the mystery of this. Can we hope that one day all the laws governing organic structure will be laid bare; and that the science of biology will recognise the nature of the mechanisms that give rise to a particular living cell or determine a particular nervous system, thereby enabling us to grasp, to some extent, the traces of spiritual life within the very heart of organic life—from which consciousness never severed its roots throughout its entire development?

If there is a self that is known prior to the existence of all these different elements—which come from every direction and melt and blend together in the crucible of the personality— a self that is known prior to the existence of all these different elements—a self that makes choices amongst all these elements—then its first act will either be to surrender itself to being determined by external conditions, and thus become aware of its own determinism, or it will gain its freedom. Since creation takes place within consciousness, Bergson would never have accepted determinism. Freedom is a fact. One must believe in the existence of freedom
. For whenever one attempts to define freedom, one immediately falls into an even stricter form of determinism.
'Every definition of freedom lends itself to determinism,' he would say.
We, however, shall be content with a blind affirmation. At what cost

15 Id., ibid., p. 168.

, we shall endeavour to define the true nature of freedom.

CHAPTER THREE
WHAT IS FREEDOM?

FROM DETERMINING FREEDOM TO DETERMINED FREEDOM

The problem of freedom remains unresolved in the debate between *intellectualism* and *empiricism*. Both Spinoza, who regards freedom as a delusion born of pride and ignorance, and Bergson, who, by considering it within a state of pure indeterminacy, reduces it to a simple spontaneity—in other words, both of them, even if Bergson were to deny it, arrive at the same determinism. *Monistic* idealism and radical empiricism are both floundering in the same quagmire. How is one to extricate oneself from this?

Determinism and freedom are, in fact, two interdependent concepts. It is impossible to define one without the other. If you eliminate freedom, what remains is a state of spontaneous emergence in life and a mechanisation of behaviour. If you eliminate determinism

If you do so, what remains is a form of freedom that can easily be reduced to mechanical movements. It is impossible to understand freedom on its own without the aid of determinism. Indeed, if freedom is a force, it must determine its own direction. If, on the other hand, it is not a force, it is reduced to mechanical movements.

Freedom cannot be grasped without determinism, and this is, in the true sense, impossible. Freedom consists of replacing external determinism with the determinism of the self—that is, an internal determinism. And the power of this internal determinism demonstrates the power of our freedom. The influences that determine our actions have been chosen, decided upon and, in a sense, determined by us. The question is to ascertain, quite clearly, whether the self is free, whether it is free in its choices and determinations, or whether, as Spinoza maintained, it is merely an instrument that perceives reality without ever transcending knowledge of it. The awareness of possibilities indicates that there is already a possibility of freedom within consciousness. Might this awareness of possibilities stem from our ignorance of what necessarily exists? This is something that must be eliminated
Is this a necessary ignorance? To eliminate this consciousness is to annihilate the phenomenon of creation. In fact, creation is a reality, and all reality has emerged from the phenomenon of creation. However, in consciousness there exists only the possibility of freedom. And within freedom there is a multitude of possibilities. When this multiplicity attains the unity of movement, freedom inevitably emerges.[7] 'The elements that constitute thought form a multiplicity that is contradictory in itself and amongst themselves. It is precisely this multiplicity that creates thought. Within this multiplicity, the life-force flows just as it does through the trunk of a tree. This life-force, in order solely to nourish the trunk, neglects the rest of the branches. Thus, the unity of the trunk takes the place of the multiplicity of elements. The unity of thought seeks to become movement. This will happen sooner or later. And the movement—

76 Maurice Blondel, *L'action* (1893), p. 112.

Once it has emerged, it spreads out like a tree sending out branches in every direction. The tree of movement can extend its branches as far as the other side of the ocean. Each of the branches of movement paves the way for a new movement. To truly understand the power of movement, which scatters its fruits and flowers throughout the entire universe, one must reduce it to the unity of its direction. 'This is the intellect in motion; this is true intellect.'[7] It is born of motion and prepares a new movement. Motion is 'a transition from intention to action'.[7] 'And "intention is sincere and complete only to the extent that it is put into action".'[7] 'But intention cannot encompass the entirety of motion. In the transition from action to thought, and from thought to action, there is a continuous process of creation. The freedom of thought is both determined by action and transcends it. This is a determined freedom. The freedom of action, on the other hand, is determinative. It is in this sense that it is said that 'action is the essence of man'. Whilst it brings this human being into being on the one hand, it also continually determines him on the other. 'It is absolutely impossible to say that a willed action would be meaningless' or 'that it would not change us to a greater or lesser extent'. 'Through movement, the soul finds the body, and the body finds the soul; the essential link here is movement'.[8] 'A human being only becomes truly free after movement. For movement has changed us; a human being is no longer what they were before movement, and upon realising the true measure of their powers, they come to know themselves better. A person can only come to know themselves through their own movement. Even the problem of freedom reveals itself within and through movement. We are not attempting to create a theoretical freedom that would be possible only to a certain extent and under certain conditions. Freedom is not the fruit of speculation or pure theory; it is brought into being right at the heart of movement and by movement itself. Movement's

77 *Ibid.*, pp. 112–115.

78 *Ibid.*, p. 117.

79 *Ibid.*, p. 128.

80 *Ibid.*, p. 179.

81 *Ibid.*, p. 186.

To say that one has brought the problem of freedom to light is to say that one carries it within oneself. It is left to thought to explain the value and nature of this freedom, its source and the reason for its existence. As it unfolds, human freedom must lead the individual 'towards a new way of life'°. To be free is to be reborn after an act; it is to embark on a new path at the end of an old one, to transform things and to transform oneself by one's own hand. Thus, it is a matter of dismantling the old form and constructing a new one from the meaning gained.' Even in one's passivity, that is, even in the manner of receiving external impressions, one is in a state of hiir. For to receive external impressions is, in a sense, to act. One cannot act without impressions. In movement, there is a significant element of perception; however much it may be volitional, there is a state of complete determination. And it is precisely for this reason that movement is intelligent and enlightening. Were it not for the reception of these external impressions, movement would remain blind. Movement is determined in every respect and absolutely. This is an intelligent and volitional necessity. Undoubtedly, the power of spiritual intensity cannot be measured in the same way as physical magnitudes. But does this mean we have no awareness of it at all? If it were to emerge, are we not aware that whilst a certain cause can determine a certain movement within us, another cause cannot? Thus, a person can determine the reception of impressions for themselves. Is there not, so to speak, a measure—or a calculation—of future actions within consciousness? Is the judgement formed in the mind, based on possibilities, not the determination of those actions? Although the choice between possibilities may sometimes defy simple calculation, the mind shapes itself through its own judgements. Nothing in a person's actions is left to chance. It is simply that we cannot keep up with the calculations involved. Nothing in the actions of a person we know well is surprising to us. However, we cannot know within what limits this person we know might act under such-and-such circumstances, or to what extent their own efforts would influence such-and-such a choice,

82 *Ed., op. cit.,* p. 356.

83 *Ibid.,* Part 4, 11.

We can never say that it might be of such intensity. For, as the movement emerges into the open, it transcends all measures; it may extend to infinity, or may wish to do so. However, we can determine who is capable of moving in this manner. Thus, crises of consciousness, internal conflicts leading to sudden leaps, and even instances of conversion to another faith are predetermined; they are all, in one way or another, expected events; provided the conditions arise. This is where the determinists' fallacy lies. They begin the debate by stating that a particular person was predetermined to act in a certain way. Yes, it was predetermined. But we ask: why? Why was Spinoza's behaviour predetermined to rebel against the Jewish and Christian communities, whilst the behaviour of another person—let us suppose—who lived under almost identical conditions was not predetermined in the same way? There is something here that cannot be reduced to a simple matter of predetermination. To put it aptly, the essence that constitutes a person's creative personality is absolutely free; their actions are determined by this essence. A person's actions are their own creations. And these creations cannot be explained by a theory of pure original synthesis, the elements of which are incomprehensible. This view falls far short of explaining the vast distance that distinguishes human actions from one another and people from one another. Creation is not, as Bergson claims, the fruit of a pure spontaneous emergence, a formation within duration. Consider the disproportion that often arises between a violent movement and the external conditions that, on the face of it, cause that movement. Bergson uses pure poetry as a springboard. He states that we do not know all the elements of the moving self, and that, because it is in a state of constant becoming, the self cannot recognise itself. What, then, is to be said about changes in personality and crises of conversion? In such cases, the personality is no longer the result of a transformation within time; on the contrary, it is in conflict with its past, with its own life story, and is rebelling against its former self. Pure time is not creative; consequently, it is not a force that transforms faith.

nor does it possess such power. In order to situate our actions within the universal order, we must look to nothing other than ourselves. Thus, universality is the natural order of the movement. Over time, a purely self-centred existence serves no purpose other than to bind us ever more tightly to ourselves, to our own narrow circle. Such selfishness is alien to the movement. On the contrary, human beings cast themselves into nothingness, losing themselves in it in order to dissolve into its infinite being. Ultimately, the will to the infinite emerges to embrace the whole of the universe. Without shedding their very individuality, the very elements of their own self, human beings will never be able to go further than themselves or step outside themselves. Therefore, to truly act is, in a sense, to step outside oneself, to rebel against oneself. Through their action, human beings rebel against themselves in order to become something other than themselves. "Individual will can only rediscover itself within an infinite complexity in which it occasionally vanishes and reappears. Thus, with a sense that life imparts to us regarding the infinite and dark distances through which it passes, movement acquires a quality we might call the 'ethics of movement'." Here, there is a kind of transcendence in movement relative to the individual. For to step outside oneself, to find oneself there once more, and to journey towards the universal order in order to unite one's own existence with the infinite existence of the universe

means 'to take'. 'The will that never wishes to remain alone in order to attain greater unity' yearns for the universal.

What conclusion shall we draw from this first section? We have laid out Spinoza's theory of freedom before our eyes, deriving it from the geometric framework of his own system. With this understanding, it would be accepted that everything is given within the substance, that nothing can now be added to the world of motion, and that there is nothing in human action that can now be completed from without; indeed, if this were the case, all human actions

84 *IN., ibid.,* p. 280.

85 *Id., ibid.,* p. 252.

It would have been strictly defined, and nothing could have escaped this necessity; the world, meanwhile, would have come to resemble an endless cycle, its sole aim being to attain a state of perfection and to remain in that state for eternity. Any other explanation that is incompatible with this necessity is doomed to fall short. Behind every explanation of freedom lies an element that makes this freedom possible and truly determines it. Yet human freedom is a fact. It manifests itself in the creative process of the universe. Building on this idea, Bergson sought to prove the existence of freedom. Yet whenever he attempts to define it, he appears to have fallen into the embrace of a more rigid form of determinism. In his view, to avoid acknowledging determinism, it is better to leave freedom indefinable as a continuous process of spontaneous emergence. In fact, the idea of pure duration is an evasion. However, whenever one attempts to define something in terms of pure duration, one inevitably arrives at determinism. Creation ex nihilo could not be the result of any synthesis. Every synthesis must remain comprehensible in a certain way, in proportion to its own elements. An ocean cannot be created from two drops of water. In motion, there is something other than a synthesis. Movement is not proportional to existence. The freedom we have attained to make movement possible transcends the scope of a simple event. This is a sublime Being added to our own existence, without which we could not truly recognise movement; nor could we attain the fulfilment of every desire. This sublime Being manifests itself from the very outset in the living organism as the concern for life. From the smallest to the largest—be it a social revolution or a movement of conversion—every movement arises from the collaboration of our existence with this sublime Being.

"Action is a synthesis of man and God; neither God alone nor man alone can alter it, bring it into being, or destroy it. Man's natural state is to remain unchanged. And to remain unchanged is the inescapable death of his destiny."

86 ***Id., ibid.,*** pp. **371–372.**

Consequently, human action will consist of ‘changing the world and changing oneself with one’s own hands’. Is this not, in the truest sense, a rebellion against the realm of beings and against one’s own self?

Action is a rebellion. This is the rebellion of the God within us against ourselves. He who has never rebelled has never acted. Every single act is a rebellion. To arrive at rebellion, we began by defining freedom. What we shall investigate is the process that leads us to this rebellion; thus, we shall ultimately reveal the true nature of rebellion.

Before embarking on this investigation, it will be both useful and necessary to define what it is that humanity rebels against—in other words, the nature of its bondage.

PART TWO:
HUMAN SLAVERY

CHAPTER ONE

THE MEANING OF PLEASURE

The condition of true movement is that it be universally desired. For a movement to be desired in this way, it must first have been denied, resisted and rejected, so that it may subsequently be desired in this manner. Before the will has gained its own freedom, indeed even before it can gain it, it is a prisoner; before it fully wills itself, it wills its own captivity. For us, captivity means the will's attachment to a particular object; it will thus be satisfied and, through this very satisfaction, be destroyed. In order not to desire its own ruin, the will must desire non-existence; that is to say, it will desire no particular object, but after having wandered through the entire world of particular objects, it will remain within itself and for itself alone, and will desire itself. This is what is meant by 'disinterestedness in action'. A person must be attached not to this or that object acquired through action, but to the action itself. This is, in fact, the case; true happiness lies in the will—

It cannot be so. Life is not desired for its own sake; it is nothing more than a means to action. This problem often arises in the following form: Is life worth the necessity of having lived it? And each time, this is set aside as a false problem. Whilst acting, a person does not ask themselves this question, nor do they seek a solution to this problem. If a solution is sought, it will be found within the realm of action. Among the Epicureans, this issue has been posed incorrectly. Following Aristippus, Epicurus would also say the same thing: "Pleasure must be the end for all beings; for every living creature, from the moment of birth, takes pleasure in what nature requires without the intervention of reason, and rebels against pain".[1]The end is "to avoid physical pain and to remain untroubled in spirit... We do everything with the aim of avoiding suffering and not disturbing our mental tranquillity'." This idea contradicts a law of nature. For nature has not bestowed the experience of pleasure upon every living being as its supreme aim, but rather the perfection of its own form and its own specific species. All animal species compete with the aim of realising their own forms. This is the first universal law of biology. Consequently, the result must be this: nature subordinates pleasure to action in every living being. However, the ethics of happiness *(eudemonism)* reverses this law. The principle it defends is at odds with the law of life. The ethics of happiness will find the highest Good 'in the absence of pain and suffering, in inner tranquillity and repose'. Thus, the problem has been resolved within the realm of life itself. Yet life is not rejected because it is desired for its own sake and is therefore useless. Here, the issue is transferred to the realm of motion. Action is something other than merely aiding life. The proof of this is that it transcends life. Apart from the sacrifice involved in both, every action is in itself a sacrifice, for it transcends even a simple calculation. A person acts out of a certain necessity. That is to say, his

1 M. Guyau, *The Ethics of Epicurus,* 1904, p. 21.

2 *Ibid.,* p. 52.

3 Ibid., p. 52.

It must move; it is compelled to do so simply to go further afield and, perhaps, to overtake others in the realm of motion. This compulsion to move may well have been imposed by life itself. Yet, at the same time, movement transcends the narrow horizons of life. Life is merely the condition that makes movement possible. Pleasure must be regarded as a restorative for the elements worn down by life. In this sense, it is legitimate, even necessary. However, to make pleasure the aim of movement is to halt it at the very point where it begins, rather than imparting to it a pace of development towards infinity; this would amount to the annihilation of movement at its very source. Life is the source of our joy. This is a very base form of movement. This pleasure and joy cannot be fruitful as long as it remains tied to life. And satisfaction ultimately serves no purpose other than to destroy it and to leave one with regret. Pleasure and joy are derived from life; because of this contribution to life, they become a state of wretchedness and weakness in existence; this is human frailty. Every satisfaction leaves behind a helpless sense of regret. The excessive indulgence of a life of lust gives rise to an incurable sorrow. Prosperity often brings with it a weakness of will. Pleasure is not truly desired; it is rather the product of a lack of will. When life cannot find the necessary means to act, it turns in on itself. And, like a parasite upon itself, it feeds on its own essence. All that experience teaches us is that it is beneficial to preserve desire, for desire becomes more productive because it nourishes the will to act. As Freudian theory has clearly demonstrated, life's impulses, transformed in the sense of *sublimation*, become imbued with spiritual richness and complexity. The intensification of the anxiety of life only propels movement further afield and drives us to seek out new, thoughtful forms of civilisation.

There is no longer any need to ask whether there is a connection between virtue and happiness. To become the master of oneself and, so to speak, of the universe, one must exercise the will to act for all eternity

It must be extended. There, happiness and high virtue become one and the same thing. As long as happiness is regarded as a pure and simple pleasure, and virtue as a self-sacrifice aimed at achieving a goodness unrelated to my own character and external to me, there is no reason to establish a connection between these two concepts. For in this situation, the two concepts remain alien to one another. They are phenomena of a different kind. Kant has explained this difference in nature, which escaped the notice of both the Epicureans and the Stoics.[4] Action does not seek reward. The salvation of the soul is not a gift obtained as the price of a person's good deeds. 'One must therefore cast one's action into the infinity of being and await the response that will come from that same infinity. Action is a call from infinity, an echo: it comes from there, it goes there.' Duty can never move a person unless it manifests itself as the call of this infinity that lies deeper within. Pleasure, like action, is subject to the command of movement. These are 'merely further developments of movement; they are passive states compelled to remain bound to the activity of inclinations'. Consequently, to accept pleasure as the aim of human actions amounts to losing one's activity within the passivity of life. This, from the perspective of movement, constitutes a regression. This admission of passivity is, strangely enough, contagious. For, on the path of movement, life remains ever vigilant. The morally corrupting hidden element arising from pleasure, as its own inevitable consequence, leads to the death of movement.

At the outset, he sought the pleasure of nature not as an end in itself, but as a compensation for, and a remedy to, the weariness of life. Yet pleasure once again became a hindrance to the development of life. The consciousness born of the passivity of vital pleasure was compelled to transcend it. Whenever consciousness grows weary of pleasure, it must then come into conflict with it and oppose it

4 Kant, *Ursprung *der* **Menschheit*;** Picavet, Book II, Chapter II, pp. 200–207.

5 M. Blondel, **L'action**, p. 82.

6J. Paliard, **Intuition et* Raison*, 1925, pp. 24 and 27.

he will break free from it in order to rebel. In this way, even pleasure becomes the source of life that provides the energy necessary for action. Pascal's dissolute life, as he prepared himself to change his faith in this manner, must be excused; one cannot become clear without the water becoming turbid. Thus, it is only by occasionally making use of this bondage arising from our primitive nature that we shall find our deliverance.

Following this first form of bondage associated with pleasure, two further forms of bondage have emerged: solidarity and domination. These, too, were originally desired; they are two obstacles demanded by life itself, and are the fruits of a spontaneity that characterises life.

What is the nature of these shackles or obstacles, and what totality will grant us our freedom in the face of them? The remainder of this study will endeavour to shed light on this issue.

CHAPTER TWO
SOLIDARITY

Human solidarity is a fact. It is a fate from which man cannot escape, for he cannot live on his own. For man cannot survive by the labour of his own hands alone. When he breaks away from the group, he faces dangers, even death. At the very least, when a person confines their will within themselves, for the sake of what they themselves desire, the reason for their existence has ceased to exist; or rather, they no longer even exist. For, in a universal realm, a person is whatever they will themselves to be. Their first act is to transcend themselves in a certain way—a form of self-negation.

We have described two forms—or, to put it more accurately, two degrees—of solidarity. In the first instance, a person accepts solidarity with others simply for the sake of living; this is a passive, submissive and resigned form of solidarity. In the second, however, a person creates solidarity for others by generating new sources of strength and support.

Human beings are born into bondage; they gain their freedom by creating their own action, and this is done in order to link the fate of other beings to this action.

Those who focus on the first form—that is, the first degree of solidarity—accept it as a reality to which the individual is compelled to submit. They consider the benefits it affords the individual and the duties it imposes, without taking into account the individual's fundamental role in desiring solidarity and creating it as a fact. However, they forget that, before it becomes a reality and is realised, solidarity is an ideal for the individual; it is the expansion and dissemination of individual action.

But once solidarity has been established by the individual, it imposes itself upon him. It is a reality that must be examined in its own right, in accordance with its own nature. According to Bourgeois, solidarity is the foundation of justice. Amongst people, there exists a primal and natural solidarity which does not establish justice, but which must serve as the foundation for social solidarity. It is necessary to investigate how this solidarity can give rise to social solidarity—that is, solidarity aimed at establishing a justice that is the product of reason. This social solidarity is, beyond a biological phenomenon of mutual dependence, a moral cooperation and a unity of labour. This primary solidarity, which presents itself as a phenomenon, must become a duty of solidarity. Conflict and competition must give way to unity and peace. 'We must replace the injustice found in nature with the phenomenon of social justice.'

The social contract can establish this justice. "It is a complex contract in which all human beings participate and which concerns the realisation of justice in the reciprocal provision of social services". And this contract is "the rule of freedom, limited by the will, rather than the rule of power or authority

7 Leon Bourgeois, *É. d'Urville, *Philosophy and Social Issues**, 1902, pp. 9, 13, 16, 17, 36.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

is defined as ‘solidarity’. To tell the truth, there is no freedom at the outset; just as solidarity precedes justice, so too does it precede freedom. ‘Neither freedom nor justice can be defined without taking the phenomenon of solidarity into account.’ [0] Individual freedom is the goal; that is, ‘those who claim rights acquire them provided they fulfil their social obligations’. [1] ’

According to Bourgeois, solidarity is both an obligation and a duty for the individual. It is an obligation from which the individual cannot escape, and a duty without the fulfilment of which justice is impossible. The individual will consent to the social contract in order to benefit from the services provided by others, and will enter into solidarity with other people. Bourgeois examines social solidarity solely from the perspective of duty; however, this eliminates all freedom regarding the fulfilment of that duty. Thus, natural solidarity—which is a necessity amongst people—manifests itself within social solidarity. In reality, the latter—that is, social solidarity—is no less inevitable than the former, namely natural solidarity. In our view, it is an extension of this natural solidarity and a form of solidarity to which one is compelled to submit. This is a necessary evil. In this system of solidarity, the individual is, in a sense, a prisoner twice over. Firstly, he is a prisoner because, driven by the pressure of his pleasures and needs and with the aim of a happier life, he enters into solidarity with other people. To tell the truth, the individual has been driven into this situation without realising it; he has entered into solidarity before he was even aware that he had a choice between solidarity—where he could find an environment in which to develop his pleasures and natural instincts—and solitude. Thus, the acceptance of this solidarity is an admission of the individual’s initial captivity; that is to say, the individual is here a prisoner of his own nature. Thereafter, he is also a prisoner of society,

9 *Ibid.*, p. 47.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 42.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 45.

is to become a prisoner a second time by embracing their duties. For, in a world built on solidarity, everyone is indebted to everyone else. The individual repays their debts through the duties they have undertaken in return for the rights they possess.

On the other hand, however, society threatens the individual twice in order to bring them into its own system of solidarity. Firstly, society is armed against the individual who wishes to step outside its bounds. In doing so, it condemns some on the grounds that their behaviour will merely set a bad example to others and lead to the weakening of society. Secondly, society also threatens the individual's freedom when they wish to act freely in relation to other people; for in doing so, the individual's freedom expands and inevitably transcends the boundaries of their own individuality. Even to realise their own freedom, the individual must fulfil the duties imposed by solidarity with others. The individual's freedom is only possible in this sense and within a framework of mutual cooperation (as part of society). In order to win over others, a person must make sacrifices of their own. To win over society—to win over the realm of action—a person must sacrifice themselves.

For the individual, bondage in the form of solidarity is both a matter of fate and a necessity. Solidarity generally manifests itself in the form of the division of labour. According to Bougle, the division of labour is not limited solely to the sphere of exchange; its scope is even broader. "The division of labour exists even in areas where individuals are, in the strictest sense of the word, unaware of exchange… it emerges as an entirely social institution and, in a sense, precedes the individual." In fact, according to Durkheim, the division of labour encompasses all the functions of social life. It is not limited to the economic, agricultural, industrial and commercial spheres. "Political, administrative and judicial matters are increasingly being separated into specialisms. This applies to scientific and artistic activities as well

12 Bouglé, *Qu'est-ce que la sociologie? Les formes de la division du travail.*

'It is the same here'.[3] Durkheim distinguishes between two forms of solidarity. The first form of solidarity, in the past, bound individuals to one another through mutual aid on the one hand, whilst isolating them and severing their ties to one another on the other. This was a form of solidarity that might be termed 'mechanical'. 'Organic' solidarity arises from the division of labour. The latter 'increases in direct proportion to individual personality', whereas the former increased in the opposite way; that is, it diminished as the individual gained personality. Organic solidarity 'even exerts an influence on consciences and creates a principle of wholeness through the assistance of others'.[14] In our view, this unity and integrity, which is realised in parallel with the ever-increasing complexity of social functioning, exerts an increasingly heavy pressure on the individual. The individual's duties towards their group increase in proportion to this complexity. In today's societies, every individual is subject to virtually the entire community. Under this pressure, individual freedom is seriously threatened. This pressure stems not, as Durkheim believed, from 'the individual's failure to be in harmony with his own duties', but perhaps from the fact that the individual's duties are, to a certain extent, determined by a will other than his own. This 'general will'—a will alien to the individual's own—suppresses individual will. The institutions representing this general will, although created by individual freedom, oppose that very freedom in order to keep it under pressure and thus threaten its freedom of action.

This extreme complexity in the world of work awakens in individuals a sense of alienation from social benefit and a desire to return to a simpler life. The abuse of democracy, accompanied by an increase in the number of oppressive forces, gives rise to a longing for a monarchy in which a single individual can truly be a despot, and the individual finds himself,

lS Durkheim, *De la division du travail*, introduction, p. ?.

14 *Id., ibid.,* Book I, Chapter III.

15 *Id., ibid.,* Book III, Chapter II, paragraph I.

in fact, freer when facing one person than when facing many.

This pressure arising from the division of labour is borne entirely by the individual. There is no other form of pressure capable of defining what Durkheim termed a 'social' phenomenon. If the individual feels under pressure in every sphere of their life, this stems from the fact that all the functions of their life are shared by outside forces—wills that are often contrary to their own. Their destiny is determined by the will of others. Alongside this pressure, there is no room for any other, more or less mysterious form of pressure to which the individual might submit of their own free will.' "Duty goes hand in hand with goodness; for its fulfilment carries with it a promise of goodness."

Solidarity has two harmful consequences: on the one hand, it infringes upon the individual's freedom; on the other, it paves the way for a parasitic existence. On the one hand, the will under threat annihilates itself in order to place itself at the service of the powerful wills under the command of despots, and finds the path already cleared for it to continue its existence without contributing to the collective effort with its own hands. This is the exploitation of man by man; and on the other hand, since oppression affects the entire social structure, and since it can come from all sides, an individual who seizes power over a section of society can extend their dominion over the entire social structure and threaten it. Herein lies the source of despotism, where all the material and spiritual powers of a society are exploited by one or a few individuals. Within a system of solidarity of its own making, humanity is destroying itself. A solidarity-based movement is only effective when it is linked to selfless intentions. Yet, above all else, solidarity is a reality for the individual; it is something that is forcibly imposed upon the individual.

16 Durkheim, *I, *The Rules of Sociological Method**, Chapter I, 'Definition of the Social Fact'.

It is a reality. We have seen that it is impossible for human beings to free themselves from this bond. So, if we cannot free ourselves from the solidarity movement, must we desire it; and if so, in what form should we desire it?

Everyone answers this question through their own movement. Movement strives towards the universal realm in order to fulfil itself. From the individual to the cosmos, all beings are the intermediate stages through which movement must pass. Thus, solidarity is necessitated by this inherent requirement of movement. Society is willed by the individual, and its origins lie in the history of the emergence of individual will. The first act of individual will is to desire another in order to affirm itself; and as civilisation develops, individual will spreads within an increasingly complex structure. The pressure on the individual also grows ever heavier. In order to endure this pressure, the individual needs to increase their own strength. If social complexity in society reaches vast proportions, it must be said that individuality also increases in proportion to this in order to secure its own rights. "What distinguishes the modern citizen from the citizen of earlier times is the concern for personal independence. Liberalism appears to be a prerequisite for the life of modern societies."

Personal independence does not in any way imply a severing of ties with society. Rather, it refers to the individual's influence on an increasingly complex social structure. In reality, rather than the individual constituting a part of the social structure, society is a part of the individual. In this sense, rather than us being in society, it is within each and every one of us.

The expansion of individuality to the point where it encompasses the entire social structure inevitably requires an expansion of individual responsibility to the same extent. Sociological research has shown that responsibility was initially collective; that is, it rested with the group as a whole rather than with the individual. The role of individuality in social action is so vague—

17 Bouglé, **Du sage* africain *au siècle moderne**, 1922, p. 204.

that it was scarcely noticed at all. The transition from society to the individual has revealed a sociological law. Responsibility is, in fact, becoming increasingly individualised." Consequently, it is by no means diminishing. On the contrary, the full weight of society is being placed upon the individual's conscience. Individuality has emerged from social solidarity, enriched and made more complex, extending beyond the individual's own personality into a broader sphere.

The science of sociology, by defining solidarity as a reality to which the individual is compelled to submit, recognises it merely as a phenomenon of solidarity. In doing so, it neglects the action that gives substance to solidarity and constitutes the essential part of its analysis. Indeed, human beings first recognise the phenomenon of solidarity, which has been prepared by the actions of previous generations. Human beings are the heirs to this form of solidarity. They nourish their volitional powers through it, and their own actions, added to this boundless work, both expand and revitalise it. Sociology treats the phenomenon of solidarity as a condition of human life. It remains for every solidarity-oriented movement to endeavour to examine, in one way or another, the nature of this movement that creates solidarity. This is an investigation into human will and individual action.

We have portrayed solidarity as an obstacle standing in the way of individual action. Yet solidarity has been brought about by this very action. By desiring solidarity, man has also desired his own enslavement. To embrace the material world, he has stretched out his arms beneath its crushing burden. He will reach out to every part of society and hold himself accountable for every kind of action reflected from there. And, to the extent of his capacity, man will endeavour to shape his own actions within the whole system of social movement. His freedom will only be possible and realised to the extent that he creates an ever-expanding responsibility for himself.

CHAPTER THREE

18 Paul Fauconnet, **La responsabilité**, 1920, vol. VIII, p. 330.

SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty is the continuation and indispensable complement of solidarity. For the solidarity movement to be possible, individual wills must converge, unite in a certain way, and individuals must find common ground in their own aspirations. A force responsible for uniting individual wills and setting them in motion constitutes the structure of the state. What should be the nature of this power? Rousseau had sought to find 'a form of society that, through the bond of allegiance, protects and safeguards the personality and property of every member with the full force of the collective'. He had envisaged that 'through this form of community, each individual, whilst uniting with everyone else and, at the same time, obeying only himself, would remain as free as before'[1].

For the time being, we shall set aside the examination of despotism—which can be, and indeed is, the inevitable consequence of either voluntary or imposed sovereignty—and turn our attention to the actions that give rise to sovereignty.

JJ. Rousseau, **Du contrat social**, ed. Ed. Dreyfus, p. 51, Book I, Chapter VI.

We shall then see how this movement inevitably brings with it servitude.

Rousseau proposes a social contract through which every individual can safeguard their freedom. The contract entails 'the individual's complete transfer of all their rights to a community in which everyone is on an equal footing'.°

It is certain that the contract was not drawn up by the individuals who make up society. Perhaps it has simply been proposed to them. Individuals inevitably submit to it in order to live in solidarity. In other words, the community to which individuals transfer their rights does not actually exist. The social contract is an artificial construct. Sovereignty is a power that imposes itself upon the individual by force. The individual consents to this in order to remain within the community. Just as he desires solidarity, he also desires sovereignty at the expense of his freedom. Let us see how this works.

What we wish to demonstrate is that individual liberty cannot be safeguarded under any form of government, not even in a democracy. Democracy has been termed 'government by the people'. However, this designation is incorrect. Government always rests on the sovereignty of an individual or a group exercising its own will.

It was hoped that, through the separation of powers, tyranny could be kept at bay. Montesquieu had envisaged a system of separation of powers that would supposedly grant freedom to all citizens.°[1] However, it is clear that in a democracy, the separation of powers changes nothing. For if the powers remain separate and independent of one another, the affairs of state can no longer be conducted. Conversely, if the powers work in harmony and cooperation, then their separation does nothing to diminish their tyranny. This is the objection Montesquieu raised against his own theory. He responded to his own objection by stating, 'A remedy must be found for every form of corruption in the state—

20 *ibid.*, p. 32.

21 Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws, on* the *separation of powers.*

He offered answers such as “it is impossible” and “the principle of the separation of powers lacks the strength and effectiveness to ensure this”. What Montesquieu overlooked is that the state can exploit the entire social structure in such a way as to use it against each and every one of the individuals who constitute it. For the general will, as represented by the state, implies that individual wills are surrendered into the hands of the state. The state, having become tyrannical, pits this collective will against the individual or individuals who oppose it. Thus, the individual left to face the state’s tyranny finds himself in conflict with the whole of society as represented by the state.

It is here that the flaw in the theory of representation becomes apparent. An individual cannot be represented by a power that is not equal to their own and over which they have no authority. The general will threatens individual wills. In fact, the individual is not represented within the state; on the contrary, he has ceded all his rights to the state. And from the moment of that cession, he no longer possesses any freedom; in Rousseau’s words, it has come to an end. The general interest of a society does not correspond exactly to the will of the individuals. This is a will that has been forcibly imposed upon individuals and which they are expected to submit to. The individual submits to it to the extent possible, and in return for a promise of benefit that will counterbalance this pressure. When this balance is disrupted and the will of the state becomes a threat to the common good, tyranny breaks out. Essentially, this tyranny exists to a certain extent at all times. Tyranny stems from the inability to represent individual will, from the fact that what is called the general will is alien to the individual, and from the fact that its nature differs from that of individual will. The source of the law is not the people. In fact, even if the representative of the individual or group were , there are authorised persons who provide the people with certain benefits in return for what they demand from the social structure and individuals, and for the burdens they impose upon them. This is an implicit agreement, a contract, between two distinct types of will. Consequently, it is as though all individuals, having relinquished their own rights, come under the authority of the state, and the state, in turn, consists of a number of institutions acting as its organs.

it becomes a social welfare organisation.

As the society in which it exists grows, so does the power of the state. To the same extent, individuals, who increasingly become mere playthings in the hands of the state, lose their power and significance. Spencer had pointed this out as follows: “In proportion to the increase in the power of the rulers, the resistance of those being governed diminishes”.°' The more varied the state’s bureaucracy, the more positions have been created. Anyone bound by this necessity, driven by the need to live and be happy, must remain within the established norms in order to progress securely and appropriately. Thus, the state becomes detached from the people and turns against them.

Spencer stated that ‘every form of socialism carries within it the seed of servitude’. A slave is ‘someone who, instead of working for his own master, is compelled by force to work to satisfy the desires of others’. And a democratic regime brings nothing but an increase in the number of masters. According to Spencer, ‘the great fallacy of today’s politics is to assert the divine right of parliaments.’ The ‘holy water’ poured during coronation ceremonies in the church ‘was taken from the head of a single person without any precautions being taken, and distributed jointly to both the consecrators and the hundreds of heads of the nobility’.” In his view, the task of true liberalism is to “limit the power of parliaments” [6].

In our view, the growth of state power is a consequence of social complexity. As the social structure expands and becomes more complex, the state becomes both more independent and more oppressive in proportion to that growth. Spencer acknowledges this. That being the case, how can we limit the powers of the state? Exploiters within the social fabric,

22 Herbert Spencer, **The Principles of Political Economy**, trans. G. Schell, 1892, p. 43.

23 *Id., ibid.,* p. 50.

24 *Id., ibid.,* pp. 50–51.

25 Id., ibid., p. 116.

26 *Id., ibid.,* p. 158.

They collaborate with the state to secure legal protection for their material and spiritual exploitation. Thus, the individual is doubly enslaved in the face of the state. Firstly, because—along with all other individuals—he submits to the law, to a will that is not his own; and secondly, because he submits to all other individuals by virtue of social solidarity. His freedom of action is doubly threatened and doubly impeded. Solidarity with the state amounts to the individual being crowned and armed by the law, which implies exploitation by everyone. The individual's socialisation signifies the first wound inflicted upon their personality and freedom. Indeed, the education provided by state institutions—and even family education—instils in the individual the habit of acting and thinking like everyone else. The aim of this education is to eliminate the individual's personality as far as possible. The state is a machine of exploitation. This is an inevitable evil. Can one even wish to do without it? Can it be said, alongside the anarchists, that the individual can—and indeed must—live outside the state, without the state, by entering into individual contracts? Is it at least possible to claim that, like the Ahîs, by remaining outside 'the tyranny of the state', the individual's moral authority can be exercised in the personal relationships they establish with those they regard as brothers? It would be desirable for individual relationships to be founded on love. However, this is not enough; it does not eliminate the necessity of the state. In reality, the state cannot be dispensed with, either as a fact or as a right. It cannot be dispensed with, nor should it be. It cannot be abolished. To abolish it, one must first abolish solidarity, for sovereignty is a necessary extension and complement of solidarity. Every action that brings about solidarity is, by necessity, directed towards establishing sovereignty. Individual action spreading throughout the world inevitably takes the form of—

27 Ahîlik is a Sufi order that emerged from Islamic mysticism and spread throughout Anatolia in the 14th century. According to Ahîlik, which is centred in Bursa, the state is born of domination and tyranny. The aim of a person's moral life is to live in brotherhood with others; salvation must therefore be sought therein.

leads to solidarity and, for the same reason, brings with it authority. In the solidarity of individuals, matters are resolved only through a judge or arbitrator (expert). The state is, in fact, this judge or arbitrator.

Is it possible for the state to be reduced to merely a public order service that ensures security? This force of public order, by arming individuals, could one day become a force capable of rising up against the other members of the public.

However, there is a desire for the state to exist, yet also to be something different. Its reason for existence is not like that of a parasite. Nor is it merely a force for maintaining public order. The individual does not desire the state merely as a force that protects him or her from the attacks of other individuals. Rather, he or she desires the state because it is an idea that serves as a mediator between his or her own actions and those of other individuals. The state must not merely ensure that justice prevails; it must, above all, teach it. The state must be the conscience of the movement for solidarity. The duty the state has taken upon itself is both human and universal. Its task consists solely of harnessing the productivity of individual action and providing it with sufficient strength and energy to become universal.

The oppressive state or tyrannical state from which humanity suffers is nothing but a parasite; one that exploits and teaches exploitation.

It is a matter of power. What is at stake is the individual's liberation from this bondage; and this is achieved by aspiring to full and genuine sovereignty and establishing it within one's own individuality. It is not enough for the individual to consider themselves responsible only for the acts of solidarity that arise within the framework of their own actions. To move from solidarity to sovereignty, the individual must take one further step. They must hold themselves accountable for all actions within the reach of their reason and conscience, and seek to establish their sovereignty over them. They must establish their sovereignty over their own actions. It is within such a universal ideal of responsibility that the individual's liberation from bondage will be realised.

PART THREE:
THE IDEAL OF RESPONSIBILITY

The responsibility for human action arises from a state of bondage to human nature, to solidarity and to domination. Since life is desired in one way or another, these obstacles have been created by human beings themselves, to be overcome through their own actions. Human beings cannot step outside society, nor do they wish to. To step outside it is contrary to their own will. And human responsibility is a return to their own will, which grows a little more with every action. This feeling is the measure of their power to act. It is like a voice emerging from action, suggesting that there is still much to be done. This voice gradually becomes more commanding, transforming desire into duty, duty into a noble mission, and ultimately into an inescapable obligation from which, no matter the cost, humanity cannot free itself.

The ideal nature of responsibility has not been examined by moral philosophers as it ought to be. They have treated responsibility as an objective, legal phenomenon, one that most often arises from law and sanctions. Theories of responsibility have emerged from the answer to the following question: Is a person deserving of punishment for the harmful consequences of their own actions, or not? Views that accept human freedom regard punishment as justified, whilst those that deny it also reject the legitimacy of such punishment. Philosophical views are not as far removed from those of legal scholars as might be thought. Legal scholars regard acts as affecting the social order

They have taken their starting point from the consequences that concern them; moralists, on the other hand, have taken the act itself as their starting point and have sought to examine its relationship with the moral agent. Both sides set out from the action—some proceeding to its consequences, others to its source—and all seek to prove whether the agent can be held responsible for their own actions, whilst all strive to identify the very fact of responsibility arising from the action itself. We believe that moralists who follow this path are straying beyond the bounds of their own field of activity. In Spinoza's system, since all beings and all their *essences* are bound to a single essence—namely, the divine essence *(Zāta)* which determines all other essences and determines itself—and since human action is absolutely determined by God, there is no room for human responsibility. In the Bergsonian view, which accepts freedom as a fact, we are astonished to witness that responsibility has vanished. It is clear that, for Bergson, no such problem exists. For responsibility is not based on *intuition (intuition)*. Consequently, there is no place for it in Bergsonian doctrine. Since movement is a self-creation, then what is called the 'self' is something like a sculpture shaped by movement. To interpret this idea, one might say that we do not exist; only movement exists. Therefore, movement exists, and there is no one outside of it who moves. Creation exists, but there is no creator. The problem of moral responsibility does not arise within intuition, as it does in rational reasoning.

'Following the Spinozist and Bergsonian perspectives, a third approach may be considered to resolve the problem of moral responsibility.' This is the view expressed by Lévy-Bruhl, which represents a significant portion of contemporary thought. According to this, the concept of moral responsibility is a

1 Admittedly, this view predates Bergson's in terms of chronology.

2 Lévy-Bruhl, *L'idée de responsabilité*, 1884, p. 171.

It is a remnant of this. Responsibility is still conceived, sometimes in this way—that is, 'within the framework of an intrinsic relationship between the will and one's own decisions'—and sometimes in terms of 'the relationships between actions and their consequences'. Gradually, this first conception—which expresses a kind of cause-and-effect relationship between actions and will—is giving way to the second, the legal conception of responsibility, and is disappearing. 'Today,' he says, 'the concept of legal liability seeks to reject any subjective or moral element. The concept of moral liability is vanishing, shrouded in a veil of mystery, and rejects any positive conception. 'Thus, these two things are being separated.' This concept of legal responsibility stems from the acceptance of the fact of complete objective interdependence between an action and its desirable or undesirable consequences.' This theory reduces responsibility to punishment and penal sanctions. The question of moral responsibility is no more significant in Levy-Bruhl than it is in Bergson. In contrast to these doctrines, which more or less summarise tendencies leading to the denial of moral responsibility, there is a series of theories that regard human beings as free enough to be held responsible for their good or bad actions. These latter theories maintain that human beings are free to act or refrain from acting in one way or another. Since human beings are capable of foreseeing the harmful consequences their actions may entail, they are therefore deserving of punishment. Punishment serves as a form of reparation and redress for wrongdoing, or, at times, as retribution for the harm it has caused.

Finally, there is also a wholly subjective understanding of responsibility, which is linked to the feeling of remorse that arises following a wrongful act.

Now, in order to examine the elements of responsibility, all of this

3 Id., ibid., p. 172.

4 *Id., ibid.,* p. 172.

5 Id., ibid., p. 30.

doctrines, it becomes apparent that these theories either involve compensation arising from a contract under social compulsion or a feeling that emerges after the act, namely a sense of remorse; a feeling which, following the act, compels the person experiencing that remorse to acknowledge their own powerlessness and simply expresses to the will that it cannot act as it wishes.

What, exactly, is there in an act of coercion or retribution—or in a sense of revenge or personal powerlessness—that is truly moral, that is to say, that pertains to human will? In fact, what moralists seek to do is merely to examine the legitimacy of legal liability and to endeavour to prove, in their own view, that punishment is just and moral. However, as Guyau puts it, 'punishment does nothing other than add yet another injustice to an unjust act. Punishment may serve as a prior threat aimed at preserving future social trust, or as a form of education for the very person who deserves the punishment. This has no moral content whatsoever. Social coercion, the education of the individual, and reparation arising from a contract—all these lie outside the realm of morality *(amora)* and are entirely legal and judicial matters. Thus, moral responsibility is being conflated with legal responsibility, and those moral philosophers who reach this conclusion align themselves with Lévy-Bruhl. The question of moral responsibility emerges from these centuries-old debates still unresolved. In truth, it is necessary to distinguish such legal responsibility fully from moral responsibility. The former, that is, legal responsibility, contains no elements that are specifically moral. My breach of a contract—one from which I cannot escape and which has been forced upon me in one way or another, and which places my actions under pressure from all sides—can never be regarded as immoral. For this is certainly not an act contrary to the individual's own will; this action does not signify that he is a prisoner.

6 Guyau, **E. squisse d'uıt moral. suns ohliga,f,ion ni san‹tion**, 1896, p. 202.

The education of the individual can be simply expressed as follows: either to weaken their will so that they do not engage in such actions, or to strengthen their sense of solidarity. Here, there is a sense of protecting society that has nothing to do with the individual's own conscience. Thus, moralists, drawing on the idea of freedom, stand alongside jurists in the social sphere and encourage them in this difficult task. A sense of responsibility that is entirely internal and arises after the act, such as a pang of conscience, merely demonstrates—as we have previously stated—that the will alone lacks the power to bring about moral action. Such a feeling is, in the full sense of the word, no more capable of establishing moral responsibility than the idea of protecting society. Where, then, does the latter differ from what we have just rejected?

A responsibility that can be described as moral must be found in the conscience of the person who actually experiences that reality; it must not be the result of a judgement passed on them by others. Thus, moral responsibility is clearly distinct from legal responsibility, which involves the assessment of an act by a judge. Moral responsibility never arises from the nature of the action itself. A transgression may be moral, and the person who commits it may be held responsible by their own conscience for failing to refrain from it. Their transgressive act may legitimise its morality by affirming their freedom. Responsibility, if one can speak of a categorical imperative here, is a categorical imperative that compels the individual to act against bondage. It precedes the act and increases after every act. It is the will that is responsible. The power of the human will is the measure of responsibility. For responsibility is the determinant of free will. It is this element that defines our freedom, renders it indispensable, and makes it absolutely undeniable. Freedom, which permeates us in the form of responsibility, takes control of our actions, compels us to act, and accuses us in such a way as to condemn us to desire it itself. We are responsible before we act, but we are only free whilst we are acting. Responsibility is what makes our freedom stem from ourselves

‘It is that which creates by bringing into being. We are free only because we are responsible. In this way, “freedom is not a condition of responsibility, but perhaps its consequence. The reason for human responsibility is not that one is free, nor that one’s desires are not logically determined. ‘Perhaps it is because they are responsible that they consider themselves free.’ This view, that responsibility precedes freedom, does not entirely accord with our perspective. For, here too, whilst the concept of responsibility precedes action, it is derived from the realm of law and merely gives rise to a sense of freedom to act in one way or another. It stems from a sense of restraint, a formal prohibition. Whereas we have altered the nature of the issue. And in our view, responsibility has become a definitive command for action. The idea of a sanction following an action lies outside the moral sphere. What is the true nature of moral responsibility? To resolve this issue, a critical analysis of the consciousness of responsibility is required.

7 Paul Fauconnet, **La* responsabilité*, p. 392.

CHAPTER ONE
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY

1. THE WILL TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY

Responsibility appears to us as the continuation of a vital concern. Guyau identifies life's tendency towards productivity and expansion as the cause of action. According to him, duty leads to 'the fulfilment of a certain inner force, which is of a superior nature to all other forces'. In this sense, immorality constitutes 'an inner deficiency and impairment'. Moral obligation coexists with 'the idea of an action that is possible but not necessary'[1]. For the realisation of life is something that arises entirely of its own accord. It arises spontaneously. The expansion of life, the movement—

8 Guyau, **Morale sans obligation ni sanction**, p. 95.

9 *Id., ibid.,* p. 106.

10 *Id., ibid.,* p. 108.

11 *Id., ibid.,* p. 121.

tends to be. In this theory, movement is regarded, almost as Bergson understood it, as a form of pure spontaneity. Guyau's expansive spontaneity corresponds to Bergson's creative spontaneity. There is a distinct difference between our understanding of anxiety—which we accept as the motive for movement—and Guyau's idea of vital expansion.

Anxiety, which comes into being through development, is intelligent and free. Far from being a blind, spontaneous phenomenon, anxiety is a state of consciousness within us, or, to put it more accurately, a resolute will. This will within us holds us accountable—and even compels us—if we do not act as it desires. Herein lies the explanation for why, quite often, people act contrary to the natural course of life, independent of any vital interests. Passion, which is a tendency opposed to the normal development of life and never comprehends its necessities, and self-sacrifice, which tramples upon life and stands in opposition to it, cannot be regarded as the spontaneous unfolding of life. There is this fundamental difference between expansion and anxiety: whilst the former creates no internal pressure in consciousness and no freedom of movement, the latter, on the contrary, is an element of pressure for the individual and leads them to freedom. In the theory of vital expansion, 'goals are the customary driving causes of a person's attainment of self-awareness… The realm of purpose is intertwined with the realm of causality'. Goals, causes and action are also intertwined. We also accept that the cause of action lies within the action itself, but this is not a matter of spontaneity; on the contrary, it is a necessity within us. And it is this very necessity, arising from within us, that renders the action inevitable. Thus, in our view, responsibility can only be understood and acquire true value through the bond of causality, which cannot be reduced to spontaneity. The unfolding of life gives rise to a spectator-like state corresponding to a relaxation of consciousness. Conversely, the movement caused by anxiety corresponds to a tension in the human moral life. This tension must be overcome

12 *Ibid., op. cit.,* p. 87.

A reflection on obstacles is also an awareness of our responsibility. It is only this awareness that can spur us into action. This tension corresponds to a pain that extends to anguish, a genuine sense of distress *(angoisse)*. In the exercises practised by the sages, the body is subjected to torment, and all manner of pain is induced within oneself; the aim of these is to create, through the pain that gives rise to the responsibility for action, a state of anxiety by exerting pressure on one's own existence. Thus, to be moulded by pain means to create one's own passivity, and to be free even within that passivity. The internalisation of the passivity of pain is liberating and creative. Pain presents itself to us as intertwined with organic elements. There is no pain unconnected to the body. This is an impression we receive from the entire living body, from living cells and the body's internal organs. It is the self, embodied in the living body, resisting the events it perceives. It follows, then, that suffering is a struggle that seeps into consciousness from the entire living body, heralding freedom. Movement will emerge victorious from this struggle. The error of rationalism—which reduces morality to pure knowledge and virtue to science—becomes apparent here. According to Plato, goodness is identical with truth. The true and greatest virtue lies in the recognition of absolute reality, which exists in and of itself, beyond all thought. The conflation of action and knowledge—perhaps due to the absence of a profound psychology at the time—is found in Spinoza. Whilst Spinoza attributes all human movements to the unity of the divine substance—which he himself has defined as the sole cause—he invites us to seek a cause that acts and determines this movement without any determining factor behind this defined cause. The divine substance, which is perfect knowledge as he understands it, will be sought to be bound in a necessary manner to such a substance, which is perfect motion,

For the Stoics, however, morality consists simply in detachment from oneself; this does not mean bringing about an action, but rather becoming aware of the detachment that has been attained. Virtue is the absence of any desire—

It is a pure form devoid of any reality. Quite apart from the value of such a virtue, even its existence is questionable. For the intention that is separate from the action itself has no moral reality whatsoever. An idea, as an idea, is a mere assumption; it has no connection whatsoever with the will or with freedom of action. There is no such thing as a 'pure intention'. The intention of an action is intrinsically linked to the action itself. Kant's error lies in his attempt to move from good intention to the will to act. His understanding of the unconditional, that is, the categorical imperative, is an appeal to the will from the realm of the mind; yet this appeal can only lead to a dead end. According to our understanding, can responsibility—which is the self's resistance to external events and finds its expression in the form of suffering—be reduced, contrary to the view we have just rejected, to the turmoil of instincts or to a pure emotion? In Renouvier's view, free movement emerged only in moments of crisis, amidst mental confusion. In our view, however, freedom is an inner light that, beyond the darkening of the self, spreads through suffering right down to the very depths of the living body. This dizziness or confusion, which would obscure the clear realisation of one's own existence, can only bring about self-forgetfulness and self-denial by eliminating the freedom of movement within one's entire being. Thus, this denial, through action against oneself, leads to insincerity towards one's own self. In this way, a sense of dizziness in the life of consciousness can lead to immorality by condemning movement to death, and one's desire to be to the state of not being. The feeling of remorse is proof of our insincerity in acting against ourselves and against our will. 'Remorse,' said Fouillière, 'is a powerful, emotionally charged idea that arises when one becomes aware of it in the realm of sensitivity and will'.[13] If it merely provided us with information about the failed action, if this information—which serves as confirmation of our insincerity towards ourselves—did not in itself lead to yet another failed action, if, at the very least, we were to seek at least one reason to excuse that initial insincerity—

13 Alfred Fouillée, **Morale des idées-forces**, p. 301.

Had it not arisen, remorse would have been a useful emotion in this form.

To tell the truth, there is no will to do evil. Immorality is the annihilation of volitional action; it is a person's self-denial. One might say that it is impossible to be fully in control of oneself. On the one hand, our ancestors have shaped us into what we are; on the other, education has moulded us; and finally, social life has placed us under pressure. It follows, then, that in reality, there is no such thing as a complete and authentic self. What is called the 'self' is a mixture or the result of all manner of influences. And the individual is not fundamentally distinct from others. In truth, this is what is observed at first glance, but the individual's ideal is never to conform to this pure and simple observation. On the contrary, this ideal entails assuming responsibility for the actions of our ancestors and society. Our ancestors are not responsible for us; rather, it is we who wish to be responsible for them, perhaps in order to inherit the legacy of the work they created. The individual who voluntarily takes upon themselves the responsibility of social action and solidarity both desires and creates society. To break free from bondage, one's own individuality alone is not enough; one must also reach out to others. In truth, there is no such thing as an individual's solitary liberation; it is the universal movement that seeks to free humanity from the bondage in which it finds itself. A person does not merely suffer from their own bondage; they feel anguish at the bondage of everyone else. As the movement expands, the individual broadens their own identity to become universal. Social responsibility, however, advocates the opposite of this idea. It seeks to reduce the individual's responsibility by distributing it amongst the members of a group. In this way, the weight of social pressure on the individual is lessened and becomes bearable. Since we live in solidarity with one another, it is only natural that we should be individually responsible for our own actions. This understanding offers the individual both consolation and protection, at the cost of sacrificing their individuality and embracing docility. For, since others will also be held responsible for my actions, I must act in accordance with the common desire and the common will. This, however, amounts to the crippling and denial of individuality under the pretence of offering protection.

The claim of the advocates of equality is based on the following argument: for equality to be realised, the individual and his productive activity must be eliminated. Both communism and statism aim to dissolve the individual within their own systems

These are the tendencies of a class that usurps the individual's autonomy. When responsibility is removed or diminished, the individual ceases to exist. Since the cause of the individual's action lies in their integration into a society that dissolves them, they have no choice but to submit to the will of their master. In fact, on the contrary, the individual has sought and created society by desiring solidarity as an extension of his own actions. If, in the end, he has become a slave to this society, his ideal is to free himself from this slavery and bondage—by aspiring to a better society and holding himself accountable for transcending the limits imposed by society—thereby expanding his freedom and individuality. Indeed, society owes its existence and evolution to such individuals: from this, a happy conclusion may be drawn which, when the time comes, will serve to vindicate this idea. A people who have established a civilisation in some part of the world have always defended it with all their might, even at the cost of their members' lives. The children of this people, whose history is bound to this place and this land, have not merely defended it but have breathed life into it; they have also inherited the duty to act in a manner that will develop and honour this history alongside their own. Foreigners who arrived on these lands one day, seeking to exploit them like parasites within the body, have led them to ruin and destruction, as they were never accountable for a legacy that did not belong to them. Thus, ancient civilisations have always been destroyed in the same manner. The reason for the downfall of the Egyptian, Mesopotamian and Greek civilisations—all of which were destroyed by foreign intervention—is, if investigated in depth, the absence of a sense of responsibility in the consciences of those who founded them. These civilisations were sustained by the concern of individuals to keep these works, which belonged to them, perpetually alive. Turning our gaze to the modern era, let us turn to Anatolia. From the Balkans, to bring the children of Anatolia to the lands of this country,

The arriving Slavs began by weakening and numbing their consciences, and by erasing their sense of responsibility towards this country and its history, which were their own creation. It is in this way that these Slavic children sought to lead Anatolian civilisation into decline and ruin. It is for these very reasons that this country has been under serious threat in recent centuries. Herein lies the salvific role of the historical tradition that revives civilisations and ensures their continued existence. There exists a will to act responsibly that, by aiming at the universal order, becomes the protector not only of civilisations but also of consciences. Is not the ideal of immortality, perhaps, the extension of this will—which bestows its true value upon human life—towards eternity?

2. JUSTICE AND MERCY

With our understanding of responsibility, which has attained its ideal value, we are now approaching the question of justice and mercy. Indeed, what is the relationship between a responsibility defined in this way and justice and mercy, and in what respect does this understanding differ from justice and mercy?

Justice is based on the principles of equality and reciprocity. This principle, in turn, stems from solidarity. According to the contract that gives rise to solidarity, the conditions are the same for all individuals. Consequently, justice simply entails compliance with this contract—which is based on a consensus and is motivated solely by the concern to safeguard the social order. Justice itself possesses no power of enforcement. As a prerequisite for a well-established solidarity, equality relies on justice to ensure its own existence. Here, justice is not a genuine action, but rather a calculation that safeguards the interests of all individuals. Justice is guaranteed by law. However, formal justice and pure, simple equality run counter to human conscience. The law may be ‘contrary to morality and justice’. Let us dwell on this phrase, ‘contrary to justice’. This means that formal justice is not true justice. Beyond the justice sought by the weak from the strong—that is, beyond the justice that is distributed and granted—it is the justice that establishes it, or even simply

and there is a movement that transcends even the limits of a simple equation. For justice is not established by the law. The law merely distributes justice amongst individuals. In fact, the law—which is a tool in the hands of the most powerful—can be unjust and despotic; indeed, it may even seek to be so. If there is such a thing as justice, humanity owes it to those who, together with those possessing a sense of universal responsibility, tirelessly oppose rulers and tyrants who, as slaves to their own desires, seek to exploit other individuals. This means that one must take into account not only the phenomenon of justice itself, but also the movement that establishes it. This movement sometimes goes beyond mere equality and even transcends justice. It can lead to the emergence of moral transgressions and the rejection of so-called virtues and actions that are merely formally just. This movement transcends a simple calculation and acquires a flexibility that responds to the individual's conscience. In short, there is a movement of the will to responsibility that goes beyond and above a rigid and formal justice—a movement that establishes it and even transcends it.

Faced with moral truth, Socrates' sense of responsibility—from the perspective of his own conscience—had driven him to rebellion against the laws and justice of the city that must be transgressed. What, exactly, is the nature of this responsibility, which establishes justice yet transgresses the laws that violate justice? Is this perhaps an innate impulse of compassion within human beings? Spencer locates the source of the sense of justice in a kind of instinctive resistance against actions that disrupt the workings of life. But is this not, in fact, a case where even life itself seeks solace in compassion? Spencer has thereby limited the scope of justice whilst expanding that of compassion. Indeed, the impulse of compassion is far broader than the concept of justice. Compassion is an innate instinct in human beings; it is also found, albeit in a selfish form, in animals. According to Pascal, compassion takes on a 'supernatural' character in human beings. Pascal places greater value on the soul than on the body, and on compassion than on the soul; and above all else, he regards compassion as the very essence of the human being

14 Spencer, *Jtts/irq*, trans. Costelot, 1893, p. 29.

'He regards himself as a gem that will enable him to transcend himself infinitely.'" Building on Pascal's idea, we shall accept responsibility not as a form of compassion arising from instincts, tied to life, and whether selfish or altruistic—not as an emotional impulse—but as compassion that has become a passion and a force, an intelligent and universal compassion, a compassion that has become a universal consciousness.

It is precisely this concept that brings justice to light and defends it. This concept transcends all the characteristics of emotion and all acts of mercy. It is broader than mercy. Compassion is a preparatory, partial, transient and, to a greater or lesser extent, passive form of responsibility. The true raison d'être of the state is not merely to administer justice. The state must foster compassion and responsibility in its broadest sense. The forms of government best able to fulfil this function are absolutism and oligarchy. In a society, a revolution can only be possible and fruitful if it can instil a sense of responsibility in people's consciousness. Every revolution must be prepared by a spiritual transformation. A social revolution is nothing other than the work of individual consciousnesses that have transformed their primitive nature and are now ready for action.

There is, therefore, a mode of thought that becomes active in order to attain the affirmation of its existence as wholly belonging to the individual, identified with its own subject. This is a mode of thought that can be universal within real and concrete existence. We call this 'faith'.

15 Pascal, **Les Périses**, ed. Gazier, 1907, p. 220.

PART FOUR:
IMITATION AND
BELIEF

Is thought, in relation to action, something like the sediment left at the bottom of a bowl? Or is it a reflection on the action that has taken place, or perhaps a means of controlling that action?

Far from reducing thought to a residue of movement or attributing to it a mere function of controlling movement, we believe, on the contrary, that it is a continuation of human movement. It arises from movement, without ever being separated from it. In fact, human movement is intelligent even before it is thought, and without being thought. Its light extends beyond itself, reaching further afield to delve deeply into regions it has not yet explored. This light, which extends beyond movement, will sooner or later summon movement. And the movement that comes into being will send new lights even further afield. It is evident, therefore, that intelligence is by no means separate from movement. This is precisely what we might call 'knowledge through responsibility', arising from the fact that intelligence is dependent on action. This is the anxiety that compels the individual's consciousness to act upon the known subject. Human knowledge, by its very nature, imposes responsibility upon the individual. In this way, the known entity belongs, as it were, to the subject who knows it. Within this framework, knowledge is a form of ownership. Likewise, for the same reason, since the entity (object) is a part of the self, it serves to confirm the self more fully. When we consider the roles of the one and the other in the act of knowing, the problem of knowledge, as we see it, is now merely a discussion of the reciprocal relationship between a subject (self) and an object (thing, entity).

It is not merely that. We shall ask ourselves, 'What is knowledge?' For a simple relationship that lies outside the mental activity of consciousness will teach us nothing about the essential nature of knowledge. This is precisely where the error of the empiricists and intellectualists lies. Empiricism, which assumes that consciousness is like a mirror in which the object is reflected, can never explain the phenomenon of knowledge. Nor can intellectualism, which takes refuge in a kind of a priori (pre-experiential) knowledge or an assumption of intellect, explain it any better. To the empiricists we say this: knowledge is not an object, and the reflection of an object in a mirror does not constitute a phenomenon of its own kind (sui *generis)*; to the rationalists we say this: knowledge is not a mere construction of the mind, and the object that confirms it does not lie entirely outside of knowledge. This is a form *of assimilation by* thought, a process whereby thought makes things its own; it is a kind of mental operation. And just as movement has a consciousness, so too does thought have a movement. It is not a state of reciprocal relation. It is a volitional act, a genuine movement. In this movement of thought, we shall distinguish several stages corresponding to various forms of knowing. This movement will, in a sense, attain a definitive form through the object's appropriation by the subject and its assimilation by the subject. This is the genuine, true knowledge which we shall call 'belief'. Belief spreads through imitation. It is often assumed that either one of the preparatory forms of knowledge or its imitation constitutes knowledge in the true sense. We shall now endeavour to show that the various forms of knowledge consist merely of belief and its imitation.

1 The relationship between thought and movement was examined in two articles published by Maurice Blondel between January and June 1906 in **Annales de Philosophie** under the title 'The Starting Point of Philosophical Research' ‹•' was examined in two articles published there. The three stages of the thought process (the assimilation of the object into the subject, secondly, abstraction and differentiation from the object, and finally, the subject's appropriation of the object) are also summarised in a letter written by the same author to *La société d'études philosophiques de Marseille*. However, this letter was published in issues 2–3 of December 1929 (pp. 84–87) of the aforementioned journal.

CHAPTER ONE
FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE PREPARING THE WAY FOR FAITH

Two forms of thought prepare the ground for belief. At the first stage, thought denotes the mind's assimilation of the object. This is a primitive sensation signifying the fusion of the subject and the object. The second stage corresponds to the separation of the subject from the object. This, in turn, constitutes clarity and distinctness in thought. Within this aspect of knowledge, there is, as it were, a mutual independence and indifference between the subject and the object. The mind, separating itself from its object, places itself opposite it in order to examine it more clearly and lucidly. These two successive phases of thought prepare the ground for the act of belief. We shall explain the distinctive characteristics of these two forms of thought, before moving on to the examination of belief.

1. INTUITIVE THOUGHT (PENSÉE INTUITIVE)

Impression and Affectivity (Impression et affectivité): The simplest element of knowledge is an impression. An impression actually precedes knowledge of the object and makes it possible. An impression is the reflection of the object's image in our mind. It is because the image of the object exerts an effect on our mind that an impression is a state of affectivity. An impression is a combination of reflexes and inclinations. It embodies the affirmation of growth and the manifestation of the harmonious development of living beings and life. According to Paliard's formulation, the ensemble of reflexes and tendencies creates a 'sentimental harmony' at the very heart of life as it grows and develops.° There exists a pure state of emotional response, unadulterated by intellect or imagination, which forms the foundation of both imagination and intellect. The formation of life, or its spontaneous development and growth, continuously organises a state of emotional sensation that transforms into a kind of subconscious in the living being. This state of emotional resonance appears to arise spontaneously. In reality, it is the expression of an activity within the brain that is unaware of itself, taking shape in the form of impressions and thus emerging *implicitly*. For the impression summarises and presupposes the existence of a force that unites vital tendencies. This integration is an instantaneous formation within the impression. Its continuity gives rise to sensation.

From *Sensation* to *Reason*: It is to pause for a moment within the spontaneous unfolding of life, to perceive the object, and thus to set foot on the threshold of reason. Sensation itself is entirely imbued with mental elements; yet, in terms of its source, it is not a product of reason. Rather, the intellect embraces sensation in order to utilise it immediately after its emergence and to elevate it to the higher realms of spiritual life. There is a stage of purity in sensation that follows the moment of perception. For the time being, we shall examine sensation within its own original purity, setting aside the workings of the intellect within it.

JPaliard, **Intuition* and *Reflection**, ch. I.

Sensation is the transition from a state of feeling to the act of thinking. In spiritual life, the moment of sensation resembles the moment of suggestion. Sensation cannot be expressed. It is a kind of tension and reaching-out of life towards an object. It is precisely within this tension that life opens up to thought. Sensation facilitates the transition from the unfolding of life to the activity of consciousness. It is neither mixed with thought nor entirely indeterminate; it is neither consciousness nor pure vitality. It is distinct from consciousness precisely because it is not mixed with thought and is therefore not entirely clear. It differs from an impression in that it is not a fleeting shadow—a momentary absence—but rather a continuity, a suspension of the moment and the folding of life in upon itself. The cessation of life's development and its becoming fixed gives rise to the awakening of a volitional activity that had hitherto lain in the subconscious. It wills itself by deciding upon objects in the external world. Sensation expresses a certain fusion, a blending of life's subconscious will with objects, a kind of tension directed towards them. The absence of this volitional activity in sensation is merely apparent. This passivity of will in sensation can only be explained as the quasi-hidden activity of a will that plays a role within the living being. Sensation, then, is the culmination of this activity in the object. The sense of effort in a living being, or the feeling of tension accompanying this movement, indicates the presence of an intention formed within life itself. However, the consciousness of a will within a living being lies entirely dispersed within the object. This is the moment when the phenomenon of sensation occurs. Sensation is the blending of subject and object — of consciousness and the material world. This is a state of confusion within consciousness. At this moment, which corresponds to a kind of trance-like state, we imagine that the will within consciousness has been pushed aside and eliminated by the object that governs the senses. In reality, this is merely a preparation for the movement of consciousness and, as it were, means following the flow of things in order to subsequently exert voluntary control and influence. The hidden will of sensation prepares the conscious mind's overt movement. Thus, effort or will is already evident within sensation itself. Sensation is not given directly. 'Whoever attempts to grasp the given as if it were direct, the conscious mind…'

Life, in its simplicity, is subjected to a series of upheavals: each of these upheavals constitutes a fact, in that it has the capacity to give rise to a judgement. However, this fact has no substance beyond its outward appearance; that is to say, none of them suffices to suggest or determine the existence of the others; each stands on its own and is unique. 'Only its distinctness can be deduced from its outward appearance; it would be impossible to understand what it is by looking at the data alone'. [3] The misconception that sensation is direct stems from the subject's fusion with the object, from a kind of self-forgetfulness on the part of the subject in order to affirm the object. In fact, sensation expresses a movement of the will characterised by a tension or intention directed towards the object.

Spontaneous Intuition: In E. Husserl's philosophy, there is the idea of a tension or an intention directed towards the object (thing). Intention is a subjective state, a state of consciousness. This is an intuition. In our view, intuition is the first thought. It is identical to sensation. However, in reality, sensation is presented to us completely intermingled with mental elements. The activity of intuition consists of reducing this impure sensation to the purity and original truth of its source. The simplicity of love also stems from this. In studies of intuition, the dichotomy between volitional action and spontaneous formation is generally striking. Where does this dichotomy come from? Is it the result of the activity of the intellect creating an automatism at work in intuition? According to A. Spaier, 'every volitional activity is based on acquired automatisms'.[4]Bergson sees intuition as consisting solely of a pure selfhood. To reach the direct given of intuition, it is sufficient to attain the purity of the subjective elements. Spaier distinguishes between the *reflective* consciousness—upon which scientific activity is based and which operates through deduction—and the intuitive consciousness, which is grounded in sensation and precedes *reflection*

3 Léon Brunschvicg, **La modalité de la pensée**, 1897, p. 122.

4 Albert Spaier, **La pensée concrète**, 1927, p. 246.

5 Bergson defines intuition as follows: 'A kind of mental sympathy that impels us to penetrate into the very essence of things, in order to bring us into union with elements that are unique to it and, for that very reason, inexplicable'.

(intuitive) consciousness is being conflated. A kind of automatism created by the intellect governs the activities of the scientist and the technician. As we said earlier regarding sensation, there is a will at work, albeit hidden, within intuition. The so-called spontaneous *(sportane)* nature of Bergsonian intuition is merely an illusion. We have defined sensation as a tension of the subject towards the object to be known, and as their fusion and intermingling. This is the subject losing itself in the object through fusion with it. Unmixed sensation gives us intuition.

And since such a sensation does not in fact exist—all sensory data being intermingled with the intellect and thus no longer pure—there is no intuition within ordinary sensation; for its existence, an effort is required to reduce sensory data to the purity of their source. In fact, this effort is employed against the intellect in order to protect sensory data from its influence. In intuitive minds, there is a skill directed towards defending themselves against the deceptive spell of the intellect, its generality and its impersonality. This resistance expresses the effort of intuition. It is possible to know through intuition without allowing the intellect to encroach upon the realm of sensation. The fallacy of spontaneous formation arises from the perception that this sensation is produced by the subject within the object. In the eyes of 'those who compile and compare numerous psychological analyses', the effort of intuition may take on the appearance of a habit. For this, a long and intimate companionship with inner reality is required. This friendship with a reality that remains veiled to the eyes of others instils a sense of superiority in the person who possesses it. The person who intuits feels that they are privileged, have attained a secret, and are enlightened. In truth, the light of intuition stems from the fact that it is a perceptible inner enlightenment. Here, inner enlightenment refers to the purity and lightness of the soul, as well as acquired habits—

6 Bergson, *'Itilrod', in* *Revue de métaphysique et de *philosophie**, 1903, p. 36.

It means freeing oneself from one's passions, liberating oneself from the interests and influences of life, and, finally, purifying one's thought of assumptions and the premises of reasoning. However, this particular clarity of intuition must never be confused with mystical thought: 'In a state of mystical ecstasy, a person finds the fulfilment of what they have been awaiting, the purpose of their anxieties, and the definitive peace of their soul. In each of these states, very powerful inclinations are satisfied; significant changes occur in life, and their repercussions are profound. However, the quality of these feelings that envelop a person in this state depends, if not more so, at least as much on the content of intuition as on that person's moral *(ethical)* constitution." The state of mystical enlightenment described above, which is often confused with love, transcends intuition and requires the power of a volitional act that goes beyond the realm of intuition in order to be compared with it. We shall discuss this in relation to faith and mystical belief. Whilst intuition is the identification of the self with the beings in the universe, mystical thought, on the contrary, perceives things as a unity belonging to the self that encompasses the realm of beings. Mystical enlightenment means attaining God—the Being to be known—through the spiritual path. The solutions obtained without any difficulty through intuition burst forth in the consciousness as inner flashes of lightning and shake the soul to its core. Contrary to what Renouvier assumed, there is no will pursued with passion in it. The speed of these flashes gives the illusion of a synthesis aimed at uniting the object with the subject, the knowable with the knowing being. (Herein lies one of the sources of the misconception regarding the direct nature of intuition.) In reality, as we have previously stated, this is a mixture or, to put it another way, a fusion, but it is not a genuine synthesis occurring within intuition. In the intuitive act, consciousness *perceives* the state of the object to be known. Bergsonian intuition is characterised as the identification of thought with being, precisely because the spiritual provides a kind of norm for reality. This means a kind of fusion of the spiritual with reality

7 Spaier, *To §ɐıtsâe coıtwrle*, p. 277.

This is precisely where this understanding of intuition lies. Although the development of life requires an initial movement—a movement that appears as a tension directed towards being—intuition, which is a passivity of thought, is the product of this fusion. Indeed, intuition is brimming with states of emotion.

Art and Intuition: Dear thought, first and foremost, it is an aesthetic transformation. For it is the purification of sensation from all forms of purposefulness and self-interest; likewise, it is the eradication of every form of rational will within sensation, so that it may submit to the hidden will of life. An orientation towards a being merely confirms the existence of a hidden will that plays a role in the unfolding of life. Thus, if sensation were given to us stripped of all self-interest and the notion of purpose, our first knowledge of the world would be of a loving nature. Did Bergson not express this idea in exactly the same way? 'If reality,' he says, 'were to strike our senses and consciousness directly, and if we could establish a direct relationship with things and with ourselves, I believe that art would be superfluous, or rather, we would all be artists; for then my soul would be constantly stirred by its union with nature.' This initial knowledge would be of an aesthetic nature and would manifest itself as a state of emotion. However, this is not the first knowledge given. 'Only certain people are endowed with this capacity for psychological analysis. In our view, this analysis reduces sensation to its primary truth. It is for this very reason that the sensations employed by the artist differ from ordinary sensations, which are, in this sense, unreal. It is also for this very reason that the artist is distinct from a person possessing a greater or lesser degree of sensitivity. He belongs to another realm. In a sense, the artist plays with sensations that are alien to the person of ordinary sensitivity. No notion of self-interest is compatible with the absolute purity of his sensations; true art is, without a doubt, free from self-interest. And, essentially, art is for art's sake. We regard it as a specific mystical inclination

8 Bergson, **Le nde**, 1916, pp. 153–154.

We shall bring it closer; yet, without any purpose imposed upon it from without, it will always remain what it is. Even if it is of a mystical nature, it will still remain art; we shall say, 'mystical art' or 'art of a mystical nature'. The artist recognises the form for the sake of the form itself. Yet within this passionate devotion to the pure form, we find the expression of a belief, a genuine aspiration, an attitude of anticipation of eternal existence, and an inclination that lies at the very heart of intuition—one which forms the foundation of the artist's intuition and brings clarity to it. Thus, intuition will follow a leap into mystical faith and will be grounded in that faith. In this way, the question of 'why and how does the self reach out to nature and dissolve and spread there; how can the artist possess pure and unadulterated sensations?' will be resolved; perhaps the mystery, to which even the artist is a stranger, will cast off its veil. In truth, there is a mystical faith within intuition itself, residing in its depths and explaining it. We shall discuss this further later. For now, it suffices to point this out. Let us return to intuition.

We were speaking of intuition; it is a purified form of perception. From this, we gain the courage to assert that nothing is more realistic or more authentic than a work of art. 'Art,' says Bergson, 'is undoubtedly merely a more direct discovery of reality'.[9]It is, in its essence, realistic; its primary function is to lead us to what is real. However, once we have recognised the real, we will wish for it to be something else, something in keeping with our desires. It is for this very reason that art recognises its own artistic value, and it is art precisely because it is idealistic. Yet even when it is idealistic—and especially when it is idealistic—it never ceases to be adorned and nourished by elements drawn from the world of reality. So, where do these skills, these various methods, which the artist uses to express the one reality, come from? The art of art is a method aimed at bringing us into direct contact with pure reality.

9 Id., ibid., p. 161.

Whilst immersed in ordinary perceptions, we are unaware of this reality. Every craft and every artistic method, so to speak, consists merely of placing us in a state of mind in which we can attain pure perceptions that enable us to grasp certain aspects of true reality. To achieve this—that is, to express the state in which he finds himself—the artist is compelled to use our language, which is entirely steeped in notions of self-interest and utilitarianism. Consequently, he does not use the very words and phrases that express this reality for us, but rather certain symbols that point to what he wishes to convey to us. In this way, even within our own language, he transports us into his own realm of reality and detaches us from our own distorted realm of reality. In this way, we acknowledge the validity of symbolism. In this sense, every art form is symbolic. A symbol is a sign; it is an allusion to the reality expressed through art. Through the movement of symbols, we gain affection and, like the artist himself, establish an intimate relationship with nature. To feel love is for nature to permeate us. This is what Rodin meant when he said that nature had pierced him with its arrows. Art, by its very nature, is the dispersal and diffusion within nature—or the appropriation by nature—of the self, or rather of the hidden inclinations that constitute this self. It is through these very means that the artist will consent to the penetration of natural entities into his being. Above all, intuition—which is an artistic state of being—is, as it were, a method that prepares us for nature's influence upon our spirit. Nature takes hold of the spirit, and the formation of spiritual inclinations harmonises with the formation of natural entities. Our deepest and darkest inclinations are brought to the surface so that they may be taken over by nature and form a kind of eternal union with it. Herein lies the secret of the inner melody; and it is for this reason that the artist knows and analyses himself better than other people; it is for this reason that a work of art fills us with wonder through the depth of the analysis of life it expresses.

10 Rodin, *Entreliens, by Paul Gsell,* 1911.

Our state of being at one with nature, which we call 'aesthetics', is a kind of absolute tranquillity, a liberation of the soul from the constant burden of life's anxieties. "Every poem is a window opened onto another world
' says Edgar Poe; in this sense, art is a salvation, a refuge in eternity. Its purpose is to transform us, to make us temporarily forget our own selves. It seems that, at the very least in terms of its source, its raison d'être must be sought in this salvation of the soul. A work of art, by immersing us entirely in reality, serves as a kind of distillation and ensures the salvation of our entire being.

Through this liberation that makes one forget oneself, the artist lives the life of nature; he lives amongst beings with a profound sense of spontaneity, in which creativity becomes the essential function of life, and with an extraordinary ease of attitude. The analytical mind regards artistic activity as a 'skill' and an 'artistic endeavour', yet for the artist, it is a genuine spontaneity.

Lamartine expresses this sense of melancholy in the artist as follows:

I was singing, my friends, like a human's breath,
Like the wind's sigh, like the birds' lament,
Like the constant murmur of flowing water...

What we call aesthetic knowledge—this first impression or knowledge of nature gained through the senses—does not encompass the entirety of art; it merely explains the artist's first flutter of wings within their own world. Intuition will only attain the status of true faith amidst the multitude of things in nature. In other words, the state in which the self is subjugated by nature will be reversed; the self will grasp nature, and nature will be recognised within the self. The life of faith we shall address in the following section concerns this very subject. As we have said before, intuition requires the act of faith even to come into being. Indeed, in order to fathom nature's secret, the self must first submit to the forces of nature.

Before moving from intuition to faith, there is something that simultaneously revives and enriches both intuition and faith, lending them clarity and certainty—

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2. DISCURSIVE THOUGHT (PENSEE DİSCURSİVE)

Intuition and Intellection: Intuition ultimately requires conformity to the demands of expression and abstract intellect in order to become definitive and explicable. Art becomes possible and communicable only with the aid of a technique and a science. This science and this intellectual skill are already present within sensation. Sensation is intertwined with intellect. In this sense, perceptible data are, as far as possible, constructs of the mind. Intuition consisted of sifting out the intellect—which distorts sensation—from within sensation itself. However, the artist resorts to a specific method to meet the need for clarity and expression.

In the act of intellect, the subject separates from the object in order to exert an influence through abstraction and differentiation. This attitude is indispensable to spiritual life. For it is expression that makes the universalisation of the self and its beliefs possible.

Methodical Thinking. Beyond this universalisation, abstract intelligence provides us with the element that enables us to establish a connection between movement and entities. It is logic that makes possible the concept of any kind of relationship and comparison between an object and the changes it undergoes. It expresses this through an impartial judgement that applies to everyone. Logic is founded upon human knowledge, yet it is something distinct from that knowledge. Thought does not fall into categories; indeed, to be precise, there are no categories for concrete thought. Kant's categories (quantity, quality, relation and modality) express abstract relations stripped of all forms of movement. Knowledge, however, is something else; it is not merely a simple relation between objects, but rather the influence of the self upon entities in the universe.

Knowledge through Causality: The phenomenon of change observed in natural objects leads us to conceive of a relationship of causality between these objects. Consequently, a habit forms in the mind, and following this, the relationship between one object and another

It is considered within this framework. Causality is the driving force of thought. “By linking every moment of our sensory perceptions to one another, causality ensures the continuity of thought in terms of knowledge; so that, rather than thought itself being scattered in the form of fleeting flashes, it imparts the qualities of its own continuity to the object of which it is the subject”.’[1] “Thus, an ‘objective continuity’ arises between sensory perceptions.

Experiment and Science: The mind ascends from the idea of causality to science. The task of science is to organise nature and establish rational relationships within it. Science is the organisation of nature into schemata; in this way, it ensures the order of sensory data. In order to organise the data of sensation and arrange them into schemata, science transforms them into ‘rigid’ and ‘inert’ forms and places them at the service of experiment. Experiment can only operate with these rigid and inert forms of living reality.”

Science is purpose-driven. Its direction is determined by the future of humanity. Every scientific discipline has its own specific application, defined by its subject matter. Science organises the data of the senses, thereby giving them a precise form of expression. It is here that its universality must be sought. Its functioning is, to a large extent, akin to automatism or mechanical activity.

The Movement of Thought: In the intellectual movement, which consists of a succession of ideas directed towards a practical or vital purpose, the functioning of the mind is based on the judgement of relation. An idea is, in turn, the result of a judgement. It expresses not the act of thinking itself, but a concretised form of the mind. Mental functioning creates the idea. Thought resides upon this creative force; it is the life of our beliefs that shapes the personality of the thinking self.

A) Perception and Certainty. As they are the result of past and impersonal experiences,
, ideas and judgements bring tranquillity and

11 Paliard, *Intuition et Réflexion*, p. 134.

They bring peace of mind. Descartes' clear and distinct (innate) ideas and Spinoza's knowledge of the third kind (deductive and certain) are the only forms of knowledge whose truth we accept as certain.

To be certain is to eliminate doubt from the mind. Doubt is, to some extent, a personal matter; it is, in a sense, a matter concerning the self. In scientific certainty, on the other hand, there is a clarity that is universal and, consequently, impersonal.

Let us say it once more: knowledge is, in itself, personal, and it does not in any way arise from universal clarity. This is the influence and action of a self upon things. Science utilises only the results of human knowledge in the form of established formulas and established relationships. Above the enlightened individual stands the believing individual—one who thinks whilst acting, for whose very thought is real action. However, the realm of belief must never be restricted. Belief enters the world of science to a certain extent, and perhaps even intuition is only possible and complete through belief.

We shall now turn to faith, which is the true form of thought.

CHAPTER TWO: WHAT IS FAITH?

1. FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

Behind the clear and distinct ideas of Cartesian philosophy and Kant's categories lies the movement of belief, which is superior to these ideas and categories, prepares the ground for them, and constitutes the influence of our thinking upon the reality of things.

We used to obtain sensations about objects through the fusion of the self with things. And, in our view, intuition consisted of the purification of sensation from foreign elements. In belief, however, the method by which sensations are obtained is reversed. This time, the self exerts an influence upon objects, as it were, to dominate them and possess them from within. For people to have faith, they must possess intuition—that is, purified perception.

Faith is the opposite of a fusion. Yet it is not a pure and simple act of distinction either. It is to live within another whilst, at the same time, remaining entirely oneself; rather, it is to embody other beings directly

It is to keep it alive within oneself. It is the assimilation of beings into the self, their acceptance by the self; it is that ‘separation within unity’. Faith is concrete and unifying. It is active and is realised only whilst in motion; it is knowledge in motion.

Understanding faith in this way is a far cry from understanding it as joining in the testimony of others or placing trust in the words of others. Olle-Laprune explains faith on the basis of testimony and authority. ‘However long the chain of testimony may be, it is always linked to knowledge of a first fact. I agree with what you say because I trust you; for I do not trust in the thing itself—since it is beyond my reach—but I trust in you, and in your testimony alone, and in the affirmation that is bound to it, for affirmation is an act of faith. What is at issue here is not knowledge in the true sense, but faith. This means that to see the cause in its premises and in its consequences is to see it in that which it brings about and which bears it within itself, and this is, in the full sense of the word, to know; “However, to perceive an object solely through words and to see it in the words that affirm its existence is neither seeing nor knowing in the true sense; it is believing, for it is to grasp the object through a medium with which it has no organic connection.” The cause of faith and that which gives rise to it is the reliability of the authority of the witness. “The speaker deserves to be believed; it is not so much what he says as his authority that prompts one to believe him.”

The most intellectualists (rationalists) object that this distinction between knowledge and belief may seem contrary to reason, and that reason might turn its back on belief.

We do not in any way seek to separate the realm of knowledge from that of belief—

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Our understanding, in fact, equates belief with knowledge,

12 Leon O’He-Laprune, **De la certitude morale**, 1892, p. 85.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 94.

but also differs from the view of pragmatism, which recognises it as a sense of habit. According to pragmatism, belief is a system of knowledge that determines the subject of our expectations and appeals to the expectations of our most trusted inner forces. An idea is true to the extent that it succeeds in influencing our world of belief. What makes a belief true is its success in practice. It is the task of the will to select the assumption that is most useful in practice. There is no truth that exists independently of us. Truth is dependent on our interests.

Thus, in the view of pragmatists, an idea is nothing more than a belief chosen or created by the will. The will is not inherent in belief; its role is merely to choose belief for the sake of practical benefit. In our view, however, the opposite is true: the will is inherent in belief; that is to say, they are inseparable. Moreover, belief cannot be tied to any purpose. Belief is sufficient in itself. Its purpose is not to give rise to an action. It is not merely a force that sets an action in motion, but is itself a genuine action. Without the self's action upon things, neither the self nor things would exist. The self's action was already present in the sensory event as a tension and a direction. Faith embodies this action to the highest degree and in the clearest manner. To illustrate the subtleties that distinguish them from our understanding, we shall examine certain conceptions of faith.

2. FAITH IN PASCAL AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HIS AND OUR UNDERSTANDING

According to Pascal, there are three ways of believing: reason, habit and
inspiration.

One must seek and find the middle ground in matters of reason. The role of reason should neither be exaggerated nor underestimated. Pascal criticises both the dogmatists *(atheists)* and the sceptics. '"Man

14 William J es, *oolonle de* emre, ch. I.

15 De la Valette Monbrun, **Manuel de* vie*, **Critique et discipline de Pascal**, 1914, p. 189

"It is the mindset that leads to greatness." One must know how to harbour doubt where necessary, to inspire trust where necessary, and to submit where necessary; the error lies in the complete denial of the opposing truth.

However, reason is not the only way to recognise the truth. "We recognise the truth not only through reason, but also through the heart; it is in this way that we recognise the first principles, and it is futile for reason—which has no part in this matter—to seek to attack these principles."

Pascal acknowledges the validity of logical reasoning. However, in his view, this 'geometric mindset' is rigid and resistant to change. 'The ultimate act of reason is to acknowledge that there is a multitude of things that transcend its own power.'

The heart possesses what Pascal calls 'subtle thought' *(l'esprit de finesse)* — the 'eye of the heart', also referred to as 'intuition' or 'feeling'. However, this should not be confused with sensitivity. The heart, or subtle thought, is at once intellect, will and emotion. It provides us with the clearest knowledge, the loftiest perspectives and the most certain convictions." "The heart has its own reasons (arguments) which reason has never recognised. "Yet, although Pascal accorded the heart a great deal of importance,
, it has in fact never sacrificed reason. Reason must pave the way for 'feeling', which encompasses the whole of the soul
'—'Every act of reasoning on our part consists of submitting to feeling', and this, in some respects, is still reason."

According to Pascal, the second path to belief is custom and tradition. In his

16 ***Les Pensées*, *ed.* *Brunschwig*, p. 459.**

17 *De la Valette Monbrun, ibid.*, p. 192.
* Hilmi Ziya Ülken is of the opinion that this ability, which Pascal termed 'L'esprit de finesse', corresponds to al-Ghazali's 'eye of the heart', and that he learnt of this from al-Ghazali via Ramon Martini. See I, 'elsrfye f', p. 75 (Trans.).

18 ** *Les Pensées*, id., ibid.*, p. 457.

19 *Ibid., ibid.*, p. 193.

20 De La Valette, *Manuel de Éthique*, p. 202.

In my view, custom is the application of religion. It is, at least in part, one's habits that make one human. He is of the opinion that if the same idea is continually brought to life in the mind, it will eventually pass from the mind to the heart and be transformed into emotion. Thus, habit becomes a path to belief.°[1] However, for custom and tradition to be worthy of submission, they must be guided by reason.[2]" Custom and tradition "compel the mind to obey the automaton it drags along without thought." They remove the obstacles arising from intellect and reason without one even realising it. Habit takes control of all our powers of belief and convinces us more effectively than even the most powerful minds.0'

According to Pasca1, the third and most effective way of leading me to faith is inspiration. By inspiration, a supernatural, salvific grace is meant. This is a 'divine grace'. Through His grace, Allah leads us to faith.[2] Divine grace, as a supernatural aid, comes to fill the void in the human heart created by the weakness of human nature.

For Pascal, faith is the path to moral and religious truths. Pascal approaches faith not from the perspective of knowledge, but from that of truth. He begins with the truths he has categorised into three distinct groups. He distinguishes between the truths of the body, the mind and religion. There is a gulf between each of these three groups of truth. One ascends to religion—the supreme truth amongst the others—through faith. At this point, he no longer investigates the value of faith or its soundness as a superior form of knowledge in the general sense; rather, he endeavours solely to demonstrate the efficacy of a faith that concerns a very narrow sphere of our inner life, namely our moral and religious life. In our view, faith, on the contrary, lies at the very foundation of thought. Without faith, it is impossible to think in the full sense of the word.

21 *Id.*, op. cit., p. 203.

22 Ibid., op. cit., p. 206.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 206.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 210.

The distinction Pascal draws between the heart and reason is not of the same nature as the distinction we draw between belief and methodical reasoning. Although the heart occupies a significant place in reason, he does not hesitate to present them as distinct and to set them in opposition to one another. In our view, faith is the entirety of thought; it is present in every field of knowledge, and it constitutes the very nature of true—that is, personal—knowledge; it is an event arising from human action in relation to other beings. The starting point of faith is not the supernatural realm; it may ultimately reach there, but its roots lie in the human world, in human action.

Custom and tradition cannot be the source of a belief; at best, they serve as a means of practising that belief. As for divine grace, it may perhaps complement human will, or it may be indispensable to humanity; but when it comes to the source of our beliefs, we must demonstrate the role played here by the will or individual action, which confers their true value upon them.

3. BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE IN KANT

The distinction between believing and knowing is also present in Kant. He, too, places belief above knowledge and within a separate sphere: that of moral truths. Pure theoretical reason can only be applied to empirical events; when it comes to the realm of practice, it is hindered. It is at this point that pure reason gives way to practical reason. This is the realm of belief. 'I was compelled to set aside knowledge in order to make room for belief'.° To elevate reason from the theoretical realm to the realm of practice, the intervention of the will is required. Believing is a duty for reason; it is not theoretical knowledge; on the contrary, there is no obligation to recognise the truths of theoretical reason. Freedom is a moral matter, and the necessity of belief in moral truths stems from the very nature of freedom.

Thus, in Kant, practical reason is not a form of knowledge, but rather a

18 Kant, *Critique *of* Pure Reason*: §u«, trans. Barni, p. 28.

is presented as a duty. 'Only knowledge of events (phenomena) is possible.'[2] 'Yet practical reason leads us to believe in realities beyond the sensible world. Knowledge of the supersensible cannot be acquired; rather, one acquires beliefs that arise from and for practical purposes, and which can never take on the character of science.'[°*]

Whilst distinguishing one from the other entirely, Kant subordinates pure reason to practical reason. As practical reason is superior to theoretical reason and precedes it, it rightly exerts an influence upon it.[°8] Faith will therefore take precedence over knowledge. But does belief, when placed outside the realm of pure reason, transcend the limits of any form of knowledge—be it through participation in the testimony of others in one way or another, or through trust in others? Kant's view is by no means that. According to him, belief requires certain truths that are not given to the senses but are given to the mind. The distinction he draws between knowing and believing is not absolute. A transition from one to the other is possible. 'Thus, what he calls faith is merely knowledge of which the existence is known—and indeed, whose distinguishing nature from the rest is sufficiently known—but into whose full depths one has not penetrated.''Kant seeks the basis for the acceptance of transcendental reality in nature.' As with Pascal, he too holds that faith has causes beyond knowledge. In Pascal, these causes stem from the heart, tradition and inspiration. For Kant, the source of this faith is the moral law, which imposes itself upon the conscience in the form of a categorical imperative. However, reason does not turn its back on faith; it is connected to faith and subject to it. Thus, according to the Kantian understanding, faith comes close to reason to a certain extent. Yet at the same time, it possesses within itself that which is necessary to explain the concrete unity of thought.

19 *Critique of Pure Reason, Analytic of the A* • ₖ₋₅ Ch. 111.

21 Critique of Judgement, p. 87.

28 *Critique of Practical Reason,* Part I, Book II, Chapter II, Section *Z.*

29 Ollé-Vanne, *On Moral Certainty*, p. 168.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 211.

Far removed from any understanding that might seek it, it continues to remain as a participation of the mind in the transcendent.

4. THE WILL TO BELIEVE ACCORDING TO FICHTE

Fichte's philosophy is closer to the understanding we are seeking. According to him, the world, which is the object of our consciousness, is the product of the activity of the practical self. Reality arises from our reflection on things. Fichte distinguishes three stages in the activity of thinking; the starting point of our knowledge is 'a will, an activity that is unconscious and productive'. In the second stage, there is 'the impulse resulting from this activity and spontaneously giving rise to consciousness, that is, the non-self' *(son-tnoı)*. In the final stage, 'reflection on the non-self thus brought into being begins; whilst this act of thinking encompasses our knowledge of the world, it also produces self-consciousness, which is consciousness of itself as a thought.'[30]

Thus, the will lies at the source of the act of thinking. Action reveals being. The moral act—which is more complete than any other form of action, and entirely more human—reveals reality, the reality of the acting being, better than all other forms of action." This inner movement inspires the self as a conviction. This is precisely what Fichte calls 'belief'. It is also what gives reality to things. The realm of our convictions is fundamentally distinct from the realm of science. 'My convictions,' he says, arise within a realm closed to reasoning; these convictions have roots so deep that they cannot be torn from me by reasoning, nor can they be shaken by it. My way of thinking, my perspective—all of these belong to me alone: when it comes to them, my sole concern is the self. If my will is right, if it is resolutely directed towards the good, then truth will undoubtedly dawn upon my intellect. Conversely, if I do not use my will well,

31 Xavirr Léon, *La philosophie de Fichte,* 1902, p. 188.

32 *Ibid.,* p. 188.

33 O1lé-Lo/rutir, *On Moral Certainty,* p. 208.

‘If I were to claim to live by intellect alone, surely everything I gain in this way would amount to nothing more than the zealous endeavour to set in motion a few subtleties within the void of abstractions.’ In that case, it would be easy to eliminate any pseudo-science that ‘prevails over one’s faith’. The task of establishing the truth is not a characteristic unique to thought alone. ‘Any action that is not linked to faith, but relies solely on science, is, for the same reason, inevitably incomplete and deceptive. ‘All truth springs from the conscience’[3], he says. The conscience, in turn, is linked to the will. This is a freedom of choice. ‘I believe in what I believe not because I am compelled to do so, but because I choose to believe.’ (3) All human knowledge is founded upon this will to believe. And all the acceptances of the intellect are based on belief.[3]‘Fichte attributes the characteristics of this instinctive belief and feeling to this volitional and free belief.’[8]

As can be seen, in Fichte too, belief reigns supreme across all fields of knowledge. However, in terms of its source, it arises from the realm of moral truths. One arrives at belief through its denial or accusation. The act of the will, which, like an instinct, drives us to believe in the reality of things, elevates us in a single stroke to a reality beyond the world. This is a boundless will. In the individual, it exists in a wholly subjective and personal manner. Thus, although Fichte assigns a significant role to the act of the will in the phenomenon of knowledge and extends belief across the entire realm of thought, he refrains from explaining belief as something that provides the principle of reason. In other words, he refrains from explaining sensible and supersensible truths, as well as moral and scientific truths, on the same plane.

34 /d., *ibid.*, pp. 177–178.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 178.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 179.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 180.

38 *U., ibid.*, p. 210.

5. FAITH ACCORDING TO HAMILTON

For Hamilton, faith is 'the first condition of reason', and 'the foundation of faith' is not reason. 'Faith is a conviction that precedes the knowledge on which it is founded.' It is, therefore, an authority superior to that knowledge; it is the primary fact, and knowledge derives from it: knowledge is based on faith. Natural beliefs are the sole guarantees of all our knowledge. Knowledge is a foundation of certainty that lies below natural belief." All knowledge is relative to us, and we can possess no knowledge whatsoever concerning the infinite and the absolute... Yet we can possess the fullest and most firmly established certainty regarding things that are knowable, and this certainty is not merely equivalent to, or superior to, the certainty we possess regarding the truths of our knowledge; it is also of the same nature as that knowledge.' [2]However, the sphere of influence of belief even extends beyond that of knowledge. We do not believe in the premises, but recognise the conclusions derived from them as knowledge. The first phenomena of consciousness are 'presented in the form of belief rather than in the form of knowledge': 'Ultimately, consciousness—or, to put it another way, our first experience—is an act of faith.' Whilst in everyday language belief is distinguished from knowledge, what is meant by 'knowledge' is a complete and unassailable conviction, whereas 'belief' refers to a narrower and incomplete conviction. However, for Hamilton, beliefs stem from intuition, and both those connected to it and those derived from it together constitute our knowledge."

Belief is inherent in the very structure of consciousness. Memory requires belief in the past. 'Memory, which is far from being direct knowledge of the past, is, at best, merely indirect knowledge of it. It is not knowledge of the past at all, but knowledge of the present and, yet, a belief in the past.' Thus, we see that a belief

39 Stuart Mill, **The* Principles *of Logic**, trans. Cazelles, 1869, p. 70.

40 *Id., ibid.*, p. 69.

41 *Id., ibid.*, p. 71.

42 *Id., ibid.*, pp. 71–72.

43 *Id., ibid.*, p. 72.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 73.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 130.

‘We possess an awareness of our consciousness, of a past event, of a distant reality, and likewise an awareness of the existence of the Infinite and the Absolute. We possess an awareness of these realms of faith, an awareness of distant things, an awareness of past events, and an awareness of the Infinite and the Absolute.’ [6]

“Belief necessarily entails knowledge; we cannot believe without some awareness or knowledge of belief, and consequently without some awareness or knowledge of the object of belief.” As can be seen, Hamilton confuses belief with knowledge. The objects of belief become the objects of knowledge. “We can arrive at judgements of the same degree of certainty regarding what we believe as regarding what we know,”[4]he says. Despite this confusion, he does not shy away from distinguishing between knowledge and belief. He distinguishes them on the grounds that ‘knowledge is a certainty based on an inner recognition, whilst belief is a certainty based on emotion’. ‘One is clear and objective, the other obscure and subjective. In any case, each is dependent on the other. ‘A certainty is called either knowledge or belief, depending on whether one or the other of these two elements predominates’.” [(9)]In everything we know with certainty, there is an element of belief alongside an element of knowledge. All our certain judgements stem from both an inner recognition and an emotion; they possess both objectivity and subjectivity. ‘We must believe the whole of what we know, and we must know the whole of what we believe,’ says Hamilton. Ultimately, knowledge and belief converge: belief in something necessarily requires knowledge of that thing.

In his theory of belief, Hamilton regards the element of belief as an integral part of ‘the concepts constituting the subject and predicate of a proposition’; that is to say, he regards it not as part of the proposition itself, but as part of what constitutes the proposition

46 *Id., ibid.,* p. 140.

47 *Ibid.,* p. 142.

48 *Ibid.,* p. 141.

49 *Ibid.,* p. 143.

50 *Ibid.,* p. 143.

51 *Ibid.,* p. 397.

considers it inseparable from these concepts.

We have come much closer to Hamilton's theory—an understanding that elevates faith to the status of a principle of reason—than to Fichte's view, which remains a metaphysics of natural law. Before setting out our understanding of faith, we wish to highlight the points that bring Hamilton's theory and our own understanding closer together, as well as those that distinguish them from one another.

What brings Hamilton's theory closer to our psychological understanding of faith is the idea that faith remains 'the first condition of reason' and that reason is tied to faith. He reduces the principles of knowledge to an 'act of faith'. According to him, knowledge arises from belief. This is precisely where his view diverges from ours, which consists of transforming true knowledge into a true and complete belief. According to Hamilton, belief is the acceptance of the reality of things from which the concepts of our judgements are derived. Alongside belief, we possess knowledge of things. Belief and knowledge are distinct; they complement one another to form knowledge within their own integrity. Belief is a 'feeling' that differs from knowledge as a 'certainty based on inner knowledge'. The former constitutes the subjective aspect of knowledge, whilst the latter constitutes its objective aspect. For Hamilton, knowledge of a thing arises from the cooperation of mental functions and belief; this consists of the coming together of the two aspects of thought. According to this understanding, knowledge is a complex phenomenon. It can be said that in every instance of knowledge there is a duality which we shall endeavour to resolve in subsequent stages.

6. **BELIEF AS** TRUE KNOWLEDGE

In our view, faith is the action and influence of the self upon things. It is true, complete and lived knowledge. This is the self's possession of the object, its union with it. Faith is not merely the self's ordinary participation in the life of the object, but rather the self's actual possession of the object; it is the life of the object living within the self, that is, within the human being. True knowledge, personal and unimitated knowledge—this is what faith is.

The role of individual will in faith is far greater than is normally assumed. A person can only approach the truth—in body and soul—through the 'totality of being'. This experience concerns the whole self, the 'entire being'. The various forms of perception stem from the differences that distinguish individuals from one another. Each individual's judgement regarding an object or an event depends on their own personality and personal history. It could be said that, in human knowledge, judgement plays a broader role than a concept formed on a single occasion. The observation of an object invites us to draw upon previous experience regarding that object; consequently, our confirmation at that moment is not genuine knowledge, but rather a comparison with and a mechanical repetition of prior experience. Is not science, in its essential activity, reduced to a universal mechanism?

True knowledge, which we call 'faith', is the proof of existence in the self's contact with the world. This is the submission of the will before nature and its own destiny. Human beings find within their own thoughts the judgement directed at themselves by their own actions, and it is again through their thoughts that they can take action to change their actions and, consequently, themselves. The movement of thought necessarily brings with it suffering. Without it, there is neither free movement nor true thought. Suffering is the harbinger of truth. 'He who does not suffer for a thing neither knows nor loves it'.[52]

Faith is never a confusion or ambiguous knowledge within consciousness. Nor is it a clear vision that enables the distinction between objects, but rather a clarity within which the unity of beings is realised. Faith is the discovery of the inner relationships that bind beings together; it is the union of the self with beings and 'separation even within unity'.

52 Maurice Blondel, *Léon OHV-LaQru,ne,* 1923, p. 72.

53 Blondel, *L'action,* p. 381.

The activity of the self is tangibly present even in the act of recollection. For every perception requires a prior perception or a complete grasp—that is, a belief in the reality of the present perception. It is this belief that acts as a medium between the object and our perception, and which makes its perception possible. The conception of external reality is nothing other than a belief in its past or present existence, or—in the future—in its merely possible or desirable existence. Thus, the judgement of reality demands from me a belief that accepts its existence as reality. As for the act of reasoning, here personal intention or belief is both creative and constructive. This occurs through the creation of the middle term; in fact, reasoning is the work of the individual and of personal belief. In this way, truth is a composition brought forth within the purposeful movement of the mind." "Error and truth are merely a difference in degree that develops progressively in the natural formation of our beliefs." To believe is not to affirm 'without objective and necessary reasons'; it is not merely to affirm through external causes; nor is it 'the recognition of a power in the will that can, if it so desires, transcend the capacity for understanding'; to believe is perhaps to bring inner causes to life.""[6] In our view, belief lies within these very causes themselves; without them, there would be no knowledge, for there would be no knower. Understood in this way, to believe is not merely to accept certain possibilities or to harbour doubts about them, but perhaps to transcend the boundaries of the probable or the possible and to enter the realm of the most solid reality that permeates our entire being. Indeed, it is precisely because faith engulfs our entire being and perfects human existence by equating it with its own movement that faith is a spiritual sincerity. Our beliefs are on a par with us; they are our very selves. A disruption in a person's system of beliefs brings with it the fragmentation of their entire personality. The emergence of personality disorders

54 This concept is examined in JSegond's article entitled 'La raison et l'activité intentionnelle de l'esprit'.

55 *Ibid.*

56 Blondel, *Cotte-Laprune*, pp. 68–69.

This is his argument. In all mental illnesses, there is a fundamental element whose disruption leads to the abnormal development of mental functions; only the element of faith can ensure the integrity of spiritual life. Just as in mental illnesses, so too in profound crises of consciousness, beliefs are seen to come under pressure and be shaken; the facts of inner experience bear this out. The disturbances in the self, which Main de Biran observed with great precision in his *Jahâi Güa/ü#*, reveal the stages of the self's struggle against the influences of the external environment, other people and even nature, which threaten the natural order of beliefs. As we conclude our examination of belief, let us add that the subject matter of art is also a matter of belief. The artist's knowledge is an uninterrupted, deepened, enriched and, at the same time, exclusive belief; it is a genuine faith in the objects within the multitude. An aesthetics of intuition cannot explain itself aesthetically. Intuition is, at best, an expression bestowed upon the artist through selection from the multitude of sensations. It is never self-generated; it is a quest—perhaps even unconsciously—aimed at reaching the tension of all existence. This quest determines the freest and, on the surface, the most sincere inspiration. The element that constitutes the driving force of this exploration is the artist's dominant and deeply-rooted belief. Thus, intuition is subject to belief; it cannot exist without it. The artist proceeds from a belief, and the deeper the belief, the more fruitful the intuition. However, the fact that only a rare few possess the gift of intuition stems not merely from the existence of their personal and more or less deep-seated beliefs, but also from their ability to purify their ordinary perceptions—which are mingled with foreign elements—in order to attain pure, unadulterated and untainted sensations.

We are not yet within the realm of art through faith; to discover it, we must enter the realm of faith. Before moving on to that subject, we shall examine the imitation of our beliefs and their dissemination within the social environment

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CHAPTER THREE
THE IMITATION OF FAITH

If faith were not communicable and were to remain forever confined within the individual in whom it was born, there would be neither human society nor civilisation. Our entire humanity would consist merely of the history of a few individuals capable of believing. The part of humanity incapable of forming beliefs of its own would, in such a scenario, remain almost unnoticed by the 'value creators'—who would live out their own beliefs solely for themselves, without being recognised or understood by others.

Imitation enters the spiritual world like a miracle; it gives rise to society and civilisation. At the same time, it ensures the universality of humankind and enables the will to endure in spirits for all eternity. The universal spread of faith is possible only through imitation. In truth, what is imitated is a belief. 'Imitation

‘What is done,’ says G. Tarde, ‘is always an idea or a desire, a judgement or an intention; to a certain extent, one finds in it an expression of belief and desire.’ Likewise, this thing is the very spirit of a language’s words, the prayers of a religion, the elements of a state’s will, the provisions of a law, the duties of a moral code, and the essence of an industry’s activities and an art’s methods.” As we have said, it is the movement of belief that gives rise to society. “Societies are formed through the harmony or conflict of beliefs that mutually reinforce or constrain one another; their very structure is characterised by this. Societies function through the competition and rivalry of desires and needs. Essentially, religious and moral beliefs, as well as legal, political and even linguistic beliefs, are the formative forces of society. Economic and aesthetic needs, on the other hand, are the driving forces of societies.”(5) ‘Is imitation, perhaps, inherent in the very nature of belief? To imitate a belief means to believe as another does. Humanity—or rather, humankind—has been called upon to believe as certain heroes who live out their own beliefs do, and the conscience of humankind is nourished by their beliefs. Nothing outside this invitation can explain it. “Why do the saints have such followers, and why have great men of virtue drawn crowds in their wake? They ask for nothing, yet they obtain everything. They have no need to compel; their very presence is enough; their existence is an invitation”.5'

Faith, like a call, seeks to be imitated and to flow through consciousness. For this call to be heard and answered, the very consciousnesses that imitate it must, to a certain extent, possess faith, the seeds of faith—in a word, a will to believe as others do. Before imitation binds people together through bonds of faith, and indeed

57 Gabriel Tarde, **Le lois de l’imitation**, 1895, p. 157.

s8 *Id.*, op. cit., pp. 158–159.

59 Bergson, **Les deux* sourires de la *morale. .1, d . la rel.i,gion,* pp. 29–30.

people must be united by a will to believe hidden deep within them. Thus, imitation is subject not only to the belief that is imitated, but also to the will to believe. In this sense, it can be said that there is no imitation without belief.

G. Tarde explains mimicry through the concept of universal repetition. Repetition is found everywhere in the world—in the physical, biological, astronomical and other fields. Repetition prevails throughout the universe. Mimicry is merely a specific manifestation of this universal repetition. It "plays a role similar to heredity in living beings or to oscillation in inanimate objects." In the social world, repetition manifests itself differently from the physical and biological worlds. In societies, behaviours can recur at very great intervals in terms of time and space. 'Imitation is an intermittent phenomenon,' he says.°' But can imitation amongst people be reduced to mere repetition? This repetition, which explains all events, cannot explain itself. To us, however, it is not as obscure as it appeared to Tarde. Upon entering the human world, one cannot speak of a mechanical repetition similar to that which prevails in the realms of matter and life. For here, the will reigns supreme over all events originating from the individual. It is clearly something belonging to the individual or, at the very least, to humanity, and it exerts its influence at every moment. According to Tarde, 'social life consists of a kind of suggestion from person to person'." Thus, he regards 'the social human being as a true hypnotised subject'; from this arises a similarity with hypnosis. 'The social state, like the hypnotic state, is merely a form of dream—a directed dream and a dream in motion. To harbour suggested ideas and to believe them to have occurred of one's own accord: this is characteristic of both the somnambulist and the social human being.'

60 Gabriel Tarde, **Les lois de l'imitation**, p. 12.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

62 *Ibid.*, p. 82.

63 *Ibid.*, p. 83.

"This is the fallacy." "Ultimately, the social being, having become captivated by magnetism, resembles a human being, carrying out every command of its master; obeying him blindly."[64] If the social being is capable of change, this is because it is "natural, sensitive and open to the influences of communities that are as alien to it as the external natural world." According to his view, the social human being cannot change of its own accord. All forms of change and development are brought about by the will of certain individuals who drive society forward. In this situation, the social human being would behave almost like a sleepwalker. Such a view would not be accepted by a psychology that recognises the universal nature of human nature. For in that case, it would be necessary to divide people into two groups: those capable of belief and those who are not, and the transition from one group to the other would be impossible. Yet it is unclear how these people of faith could be understood as worthy of being followed by the masses. For that which can lead humanity cannot consist of mere prestige without deep-seated reasons. As Bergson quite rightly observed, these great men of faith—even if they do not wish to, and even if they do not exert an influence on the spirit of humanity—are discovered by humanity, which seeks them out and finds them. Therefore, there has always been something of their spirit within humanity. Thus, imitation in man is, to a certain extent, willful, whilst repetition is the repetition of a belief that has been willed by the individual. It must also be noted that strong beliefs have been imitated by weaker ones. For a belief to be imitated, it must correspond either to a similar theme or to the desire for such a tendency. 'Value creators', in order to draw the masses in their wake, must first draw inspiration from the needs of the crowd; with the aim of reducing the diverse voices to the unity of their own designs, they must listen to all the voices emanating from it and reflect them in this way.

64 /d., *ibid.*, p. 85.

65 /4., *ibid.*, p. 85.

66 *Ibid.*, p. 86.

Did they not know how to bend over him? What we wish to demonstrate is this: just as faith, in order to take shape in the individual, presupposes imitation at its source, so too is there faith within imitation itself. These men of faith began by admiring exemplary figures—that is, by imitating those who served as their models. All it takes to set them in motion is a tiny spark. Undoubtedly, 'a sign is enough for those who are already prepared.' Yet this very sign is necessary. Therefore, there is imitation in faith, and faith in imitation.

Is this how it is in cases of complete imitation? Generally speaking, three distinct types of imitation can be distinguished. There is a primary form of imitation which manifests itself in a people's way of thinking, their history and the psychology of the populace. A group of people from different families and different regions, with different behaviours and views, gather in an assembly. In this assembly, a man speaks and, by unanimous consent, succeeds in forming a group of people who think in the same way. They were different just a moment ago, but now they resemble one another. These people have imitated the beliefs of the person who instilled their own way of thinking in them.

A second form of imitation consists of examples observed in everyday life amongst people in a society, such as in the way they eat, dress and speak. This form of imitation gives rise to customs. People living in a society imitate one another.

The third form of imitation involves certain semi-conscious or entirely unconscious behaviours that spread from one person to another by contagion. A person laughs involuntarily because they hear others laughing.

The first form of imitation explains what is known as social dynamics, that is, the shaping and development of society and its institutions. What constitutes the essence of society is the dissemination of individual beliefs through imitation. In what respect might this imitation bear any resemblance to a hypnotic state? It should be noted that what is at issue here is not any kind of spiritual

It is not an element, but a belief that is imitated. This means that, from the perspective of those who imitate it, a certain degree of belief is involved. Imitation is a reflection of a belief. Undoubtedly, belief is, for the most part, not strong enough to remain alive for long in the imitators. In most cases, it gives way to conformism and recedes into the background immediately after its formation. Sometimes, however, it persists and develops within the imitator; it undergoes a transformation stemming from the imitator's personality, and it is precisely from this that the richness of belief arises. According to Durkheim, since this new state that arises in the imitator bears no resemblance to any of the previous states, there is no imitation here. In our view, however, imitation does in fact exist, and it is the imitation of a specific belief that corresponds, to a greater or lesser extent, to the beliefs of the imitator; and this belief undergoes changes stemming from the imitator's personality. This is no longer a case of hypnosis. Nor is it, as Durkheim claims, a mystery.

The second form of imitation explains what we shall again call 'social statics', that is, the current, established and settled form of a group. If a custom is imitated, it is due to the necessity of practice, and this often occurs without any conscious thought. Although this does not explain the entire phenomenon, the element of conformity plays a greater role here. Belief may play no part at all here. For here, one can no longer speak of a truly human idea or action; rather, it expresses certain necessities of life. And this is precisely what constitutes conformity.

Finally, the imitation of laughter requires a psychological and physiological explanation that is of no concern to us. In the first two cases that concern us, there is an element of both belief and imitation. Which comes first? They probably occur together. As soon as a belief finds its expression, it gives rise to a tendency towards imitation within the environment it has created. On the other hand, imitation in humanity can go as far as blind obedience, and this is often the case. It is necessary to assume that a belief lies at the root of imitative behaviour. Obedience sometimes sustains it, and more often than not

eradicates it within society. This decline in the belief's standing leads to crises and inevitable rebellions, aimed at restoring its original vitality and inspiration. Thus, the social institution that has come into being and subsists on the imitation of a belief becomes the destroyer of that very belief, which has been entrusted to the hands of people who cannot always preserve it in a living form; and the institution that destroys beliefs becomes a centre for the exploitation of human action and thought. The duty incumbent upon the individual within the institution is to instil in it a sense of responsibility for the spirit that created it.

Our study should have demonstrated that social life is the result of imitation and the spread of individual belief. Just like human action, belief, by its very nature, tends to spread throughout the world. Imitation gives rise not only to the collective but to humanity as a whole. Furthermore, in our view, collective conceptions can be reduced to certain forms that have been generalised and disseminated through the imitation of individual beliefs.

We thus reach a point where we might say that sociologism stems from a denial of the individual's spiritual life and inner life. Wherever the individual's responsible thought ought to be applied, sociologism substitutes society as the individual's protector—and indeed, at times, as their despot. The individual, in order to be protected, has denied his own existence and has come to feel the tyranny of society directly upon himself. Sociologism is a disease, a weakness and a regression of thought. As the fruit of a delusion in which one finds solace, sociologism serves no purpose other than to exacerbate the crisis in people's souls. We have thus also demonstrated that there is a remedy for escaping social conformity; this remedy consists, for the individual, of turning inwards and recognising what one truly is. Let us therefore continue our endeavour to recognise our true selves. We shall advance our study of faith towards belief, and in so doing, we shall arrive at rebellion.

PART FIVE: MYSTICAL FAITH

At the outset of this section, which will explore faith, we must first clarify what we mean by the terms ‘faith’ and ‘mysticism’, and then explain how far we have taken these concepts in our spiritual life.

In our view, ‘faith’ is, first and foremost, the continuation and extension of belief within the human being. We have defined belief as the supreme form of knowledge, consisting of the self possessing an object of recognition and the internalisation of that object, and the unity of subject and object. There is no difference in essence between ‘belief’ and ‘faith’, only a difference in degree. For a belief to become faith, it must take root in the human soul and come to dominate one’s life. Faith is a belief that develops by encompassing the entire realm of the soul on its own, either by overwhelming all others or by, to a greater or lesser extent, relegating them to the background. Faith is distinguished from a simple belief precisely by this characteristic of encompassing the soul on its own. In the sense of surrendering oneself to another with all the powers one possesses, faith is identical to love.

Why is faith cast into the mystical realm? For two reasons. Firstly, because it stems from the self’s turning in on itself within the being in which it comes to life, its search for itself, and the spiritual activity reaching back to the source. Essentially, faith requires self-knowledge. How does one move from recognising an entity to self-recognition? In faith, the self’s possession of existence finds its culmination in faith itself; thus, the only entity that remains is the self, to which it is bound to an infinite degree

. This sole existence—which is the faith of all faiths and which, even in its most intimate union, remains ever distinct from the self—strives for oneness with it, whether in imagination or in reality, so that the self itself may attain salvation—

It is an essential being in which one takes refuge. Self-knowledge is the result of this endeavour to 'become one with it'. This identification never requires passivity on the part of the self towards its object. On the contrary, the self creates its own object and, with all its might, strives to identify with the model it has created. What, then, is this 'single, necessary' ideal hidden behind the entities of the universe, which the soul strives to resemble? It is a profound religious attitude that emerges in every experience of faith. Whether acknowledged or not, this 'single, necessary' reality underlying all forms of aesthetic and religious faith is the necessary being sought for our own existence.

The second reason why faith exhibits a mystical quality is that it transcends the familiar limits of reason; indeed, it goes further still by dragging reason itself to the very threshold of the transcendent, and succeeds in providing a vast inner illumination that overshadows and overwhelms the light of external reason.

The mysticism of faith, as we understand it, is far removed from fideism and has no connection with it whatsoever. For example, in Newman, fideism emerges as a need of the heart, first as 'an attitude, then a doctrine, and subsequently a psychology'. 'Faith in Newman is "more a trust than a belief",' says Baudin. However, this is by no means a trust in the authority of others. For trust is founded not 'on a truth' [3], but on an idea; it is the heart's trust in the unqualified affirmation of personal feeling. '*The* irrationality of reason is very closely linked to the irrationality of its own subject'

1 E. Baudin, *La philosophie ne for cho Newrınan,* p. 33.

2 *Id., ibid.,* p. 66.

3 Newman, *The *Consent of the Faithful**, p. 148, trans. Mme Clostan, Paris 1907.

"are interconnected".[4] Consequently, reason and faith are opposed to one another. "Faith, as an intuition and a capacity for action, is opposed to reason, which is a capacity for analysis and pure theory. It does not employ the same methods of proof as reason. When reason demands clarity, faith is content with the bare minimum; for this reason, they are opposed to one another."' Similarly, Brémond writes: 'The fundamental difference between faith and reason lies in the fact that one (reason) is more exacting than the other; that one (faith) is content with certain proofs, whilst the other is unwilling and unable to be content with them. This difference stems from the fact that whilst one approaches the matter without any prior preparation to accept this or that solution, the other, on the contrary, is fully prepared to accept the truths to be believed only after having obtained certain specific things." According to this definition, faith requires prior preparation in order to believe. On the contrary, our mystical understanding of faith requires no mystery whatsoever; it emerges not as a necessity, but as a result attained by the whole being of the human person—with their soul and body, their intellect and action. We do not, like Newman, set out from a philosophy of human nature—examples of which we shall later find in rationalist psychology— for we shall ultimately oppose that psychology; on the contrary, relying once again on psychology, we set out from a concrete psychology that draws its lifeblood from human action, with the aim of ascending to a philosophy that, through intellect and courage, transcends the limits set by the abstract, imperfect and deficient mind. As we have previously defined, faith is the most perfect knowledge of reality. For it embraces it. Let us state once more that intuition is merely a starting point for knowledge of reality; far from being the source of this knowledge, science presupposes it, enriches it, and merely makes our utilitarian engagement with this reality possible. The premises of every science are foreign to science itself. In faith, the irrational

4 E. Baudin, *La philosophie de la* etc., p. 71.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 24.

6 H. Brémond, **La psychologie de la force Newmati**, p. 125.

There is nothing. It is the highest act of the mind. Faith that leads to belief takes on a mystical character. Mystical knowledge contains a dual knowledge within the fundamental unity. It is both man's knowledge of himself and, even amidst the multitude of beings, a concrete transcendent that has been intended, namely the 'necessary unique'.

It is knowledge. The manifestation of both the Supreme Being and one's own self within a single and identical state of mind—this is what mystical knowledge is. This mystical knowledge does not pertain to 'a message conveyed from the darkness..., not to some sort of distant play of appearances within our inner selves, but rather to an extremely positive and highly methodical manner in which spiritual life and inner illumination are defined; that is to say, mystical knowledge requires the prior and reciprocal utilisation of intellect-based and intellect-possessing inclinations, as well as a highly conscious and personal desire. It elevates reason and faith to a state of complete perfection, and at this level, through a unique act of God, the designed forms of our personal lives find their culmination in a supreme balance; 'that Allah, whilst being supernatural, is neither opposed to nature nor, in any sense requiring limitation or explanation, devoid of nature'. There is neither mystery nor darkness in mystical knowledge. 'The glow of your visible sun, which seems to fade and recede, is the light of our customary ideas.' Mystical knowledge utilises all our powers of 'feeling and acting' to the full. It is a form of knowledge that embodies 'oneness with nature—connaturalité' and concerns the whole of human existence. It is present both in the believer's faith and in the artist's intuition. We have characterised faith as *monism*. For faith to be mystical, it must

"To attain an enriching 'transcendence of thought'[10], it must, for a moment, transcend the intuitive and deductive activities of the mind."

7 M. Blondel, *Qu'est-*ce que la* mystique?*, 1929, p. 9.

8 *Ibid., op. cit.,* p. 10.

9 *Ibid.,* p. 32.

10 *Id., ibid.,* p. 68.

We have extended this mystical faith to the realms of art and religion. Indeed, just as this mysticism in faith manifests itself in religion, it also appears within the highest forms of artistic life—perhaps as a preparation for it, or as a leap towards religion, even though it often fails to reach it. Just as we call religious faith 'faith in the One', we shall call this aesthetic faith 'faith in the Many', owing to the multiplicity of the entities through which we attain it. After all, both seek to reach the 'One Necessary Being'—the purpose of our actions, which we are compelled to seek, even if we are not consciously aware of it.

PÀṘT ONE ¨ ¨

AESTHETIC FAITH

Our intention is certainly not to arrive at a form of faith within aestheticism. Perhaps we shall even go so far as to deny this. What we wish to demonstrate here, above all else, is that there is a certain dimension to the highest form of artistic activity, and that the artist, often without realising it, aims for a mystical life. We shall not be speaking specifically or exclusively of art labelled as religious or mystical. Every artistic activity is a form of worship of the forms of the world, of *profane* things. The artist reaches the mystical faith we have mentioned by passing through these profane things. This mystical ascent of the spirit, achieved by passing through plastic forms, leads us to distinguish between several stages within the very process of art itself.

1. THE INSUFFICIENCY INHERENT IN INTUITION

In the preceding sections, we set out from intuition in order to enter the realm of art. And regarding faith, we stated that intuition is not sufficient to explain itself. Indeed, why

Do we not all possess intuition? Why is it that only the artist possesses a state of selflessness that seems strange to us in our everyday lives? Where does this capacity to perceive such feelings come from? 'Form for form's sake', 'art for art's sake'—these phrases mean nothing within the context of the meaning attributed to their forms. We have not arrived at art through pure spontaneity. Let us listen to ourselves a little more closely; if we are artists, we shall see that there is an inner and profound inclination to perceive emotion in existence, a predisposition to accept form for form's sake, and a prior readiness to seek form for form's sake. We, as readers or listeners, tremble in the presence of a work of art we encounter by chance. Yet the artist has not stumbled upon the passion that creates his work by chance. This passion, in this form, has been desired and sought out by him; this means that within him there are certain things that precede art, a love that existed before the love of art. From this, we may draw the following conclusion: Art lies not in the object, but in the human being. The essence of art certainly does not lie in the object's appearance as perceived by the human being—that is, in an intuition—but rather, perhaps, in the human being themselves, in the deep and, so to speak, transcendent movement of their will. Without content, intuition is empty; it is a sensation reduced to its purest form, and nothing more. If that were the sole source of art, art would be nothing more than a simple play of forms filling a void. This, however, is the so-called 'false' or 'artificial' art—art that is content merely to cut and shape forms to arrange them side by side again, without any deeper meaning, and which merely plays with pure form. But the true artist seeks something else in art; he believes that objects possess a redemptive influence in themselves. This is a kind of magic or a genuine faith which exerts its influence through forms that have no connection with reason. The artist endeavours to bring the objects of nature to life, seeking salvation for each of them. This will to salvation—this confession that precedes the artist's work—transforms us from intuition to faith, and acknowledges the existence of a mystical faith within intuition itself, which animates it in the human heart.

2. THE REDEMPTIVE DUALITY OF FAITH IN ART

Faith is the state in which the self, embracing its own subject with all the forces of existence and thought, swells and grows. In the growth of man's suppressed, resisted and imprisoned volitional powers, the self comes to the fore; objects remain merely a catalyst for the self's influence, a mirror in which the resisted and alienated will is reflected. The will, in and of itself, is incomplete, flawed and insincere towards itself. It first desires the entire universe; in a single leap, it transcends it and seeks the transcendent that will complete it. The will shall seek the one thing that can complete itself everywhere within the bosom of existence. Then, as a result of a complete delusion, it will attach itself to a being as if it were the sole entity capable of rescuing it from its imperfect state. From this 'saviour' arises love, which means the human being taking refuge in another with all their volitional powers. In other words, love is the transformation *(conversion)* of the self as it becomes its own object. The being that is the object will not fail to deceive it and to reveal that it is itself an equally deficient and powerless being. Finally, the artist, having realised his own delusion, will no longer rely on a specific subject, but on a tangle of fantasies that casts him in the role of a trickster, an idler, or a frivolous figure who amuses himself by mixing meaningless elements together; he will no longer seek union with his beloved, but merely her image. However, just as the artist once placed his trust in tangible realities, he now places his trust in the fantasies he has created; thus, he clearly realises that, with all his volitional powers, he is suspended in a void. Consequently, the subject of art becomes a choice between existence and non-existence, and the true world of art becomes, as it were, the equivalent of non-existence. This nothingness has been the source of the profound anguish of a Michelangelo, a Rousseau or a Byron. Paul Valéry has pointed to this experience of ennui and inner emptiness within the artist, which 'has no essence other than life itself and no second cause other than the clarity of living'. 'This absolute ennui—

'It is nothing other than naked life, gazing at itself alone, openly in the mirror.' Nothingness is something that exists only in relation to a will that crushes the soul. The soul, suffocating under the heavy burden of this will, turns to nature, turns to other people; yet it receives no answer to its anguished cry, neither from there nor from here. Then the soul accuses nature; it accuses people. In Baudelaire and Mallarmé, poetry is a hurling of curses at nature. Michelangelo, however, 'though pale with horror', never ceased to contemplate human life. Thus, after the artist has imbued every corner of the world of beings with love—as a sort of projection of the accumulated and burdened forces of the will—he witnesses the utter ruin of those very forces of the will that define his faith when united, and the ruin of worldly beings—that is, of unfinished, imperfect beings—in the abyss. The inner melody, at its fullest expression, takes on a state of oscillation between love and death. 'In Wagner, the full drama of human suffering—which the artist seems to feel has permeated the entire universe—finds its expression in *Parsifal* and Kundry's self-sacrifice in love and in the absolute renunciation of simplicity to which their hearts are drawn.'* 'The Child of Darkness', Mikel-Anj — for that is the name he gives himself — describes his profound suffering thus: 'I am accumulating dark thoughts within myself and groaning'.[1] He also says: 'There is no thought of mine upon which death has not laid claim.' Will he strive in vain to escape the darkness and death to which every love seems to arrive, as if reaching its sacred conclusion? His answer to this is: 'Everything finds peace in the embrace of darkness. Alone, at night, anguish keeps me on my feet. Lying on the ground, I wear myself away." This (artist), to whom even death, like a cure, cannot draw near

11 Paul Valéry, *Eupalions*, p. 35.

12 J Segond, *The Aesthetics of Feeling*, 1927, p. 143.

13 Emile Ludwige, **Trois titans**, trans. G. Bernard, 1931, p. 121.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 121.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 121.

is a patient. His inner lyricism is revealed in the fact that he is perpetually lost in his love for eternity, amidst the throes of eternal death. To put it more plainly, we might say that whilst love is the ever-visible face of reality in him, death is its other face.

We can readily apply Segond's words—which he extends to the entire realm of genius—to the artist as well: 'It is impossible for the genius either to step outside his personal world and inner lyricism, or to find peace and settle there... Nevertheless, the privilege of remaining there as he pleases lies in taking refuge in his own affliction, in accepting the mental illness through which he has transformed his countenance to soothe his own suffering and himself, in transforming his ceaseless misery into an ecstasy of possession that transcends the self, and to set aside concepts such as time and decay in the realm of the ideal and take refuge in eternity." "However, let us add that much more is required for him to enter the realm of eternity. Up to this point, we have endeavoured to show that art is not, as is commonly assumed—even if directly—merely a simple appearance of reality. Intuition provides us with a kind of unadulterated perception of things. Its sole function is to dispel the teleological speculations we have hitherto attributed to things in nature. Once this teleological illusion has vanished, and indeed, once intuition leaves a void within the things themselves, art arises from this void. This is the crux of the matter. In truth, a void only has meaning in relation to the expectation of a presence. The absence of art, however, reveals itself only in the face of a faith that can be defined only through domination. Art gathers together the disquiet of a faith scattered throughout our being and directs them, as a unified whole, towards a reality for which they yearn. This faith is a faith in salvation to come from another and from nature. Yet nature and people have betrayed us. It is precisely by becoming aware of this powerlessness that our desire for salvation increases infinitely.

16J. Segond, **Le problème du génie**, 1930, p. 277.

This will to believe cannot be destroyed. Will the artist never be able to free himself from this turmoil within his inner world? The artist is always remain the eternal slave of this landscape that unfolds within him, like a delirious fantasy? He has turned to art as if seeking refuge in an abyss that expands indefinitely, as though in search of his salvation. Nevertheless, one path remains: a path capable of leading those who have reached this end away from this deceptive path to salvation and to the threshold of true salvation. This is the path of mysticism, which, according to the thesis we wish to defend, will lead the artist into the realm of great art.

3. THE DECEPTIVE PATH OF SALVATION

What is the mysticism of art? In what respect does the artist at the highest level resemble the mystic of God?

Thus far, we have sought to demonstrate that art expresses true faith, which is the privileged development of the artist's beliefs. In this way, art takes the place of a psychology of faith. And we, in comparison to the artist, are doing nothing more than imitating, to some extent, the artist's beliefs as they have been transformed into a state of faith.

Now, with the aim of rising to the very threshold of religious mysticism, we shall demonstrate the mysticism expressed by this faith.

In art, there is a conception of mysticism that differs somewhat from our own. This is the view of Edgar Poe. According to him, 'in the being to which (poetry) transports us—a being we cannot perceive through our senses but recognise only through contemplation—there is something eternal that transcends our present existence. Therein lies not merely a simple sign that our life does not end with death, but perhaps an emotional assurance. 'That promise of immortality, which we cannot fully define but which we feel—this is what poetry contains and bestows upon us; it draws us right into the very heart of the mystical life.'" For Edgar Poe, poetry serves to connect us to 'the eternal and the transcendent' by transcending 'the life we live

17J. Segond, *L'esthétique du sentiment*, pp. 72–73.

'a love that transcends its limits and weaknesses'.[18] Insuch a love, 'it is no longer a false sensitivity expressed through outward appearances, but a truly profound compassion and a sorrow that has attained self-awareness'.[i] In Poe's view, poetry is a kind of game. 'A game of the intellect, not a simple game, but a truly spiritual game played with the full force of the soul'.[°0]

Building on Poe's understanding, J- Segond distinguishes between the mysticism of art and the mysticism of religion, or more precisely, between aesthetic life and religious

"reaches the idea of a *'correspondence'* or *'equivalence'* between life and art." According to Segond, in art "there is a mystical attitude… which finds its expression in the form of a play of the spirit; indeed, it is the very play of the spirit itself" and is equivalent to "religion itself in its purest source".[°2] The essence of art is distinct from religion. The artist is under no obligation to be religious. Just as there are great artists devoted to religious mysticism, such as Saint Francis of Assisi and Paul Claudel, [3] there are also very great artists who are non-religious and even "in the full sense of the word, atheists"[2]. For this reason, Segond concludes that 'there is only a similarity' between 'the spiritual forces that express themselves through pure poetry and the forces of religious life directly'. 'We believe that there is more to art than this, and that artistic mysticism is closer to religious mysticism. We shall therefore be happy to adopt a viewpoint close to that of Father Bremond.

18 *IYI.,* op. cit., p. 73.

19 Ibid., p. 77.

20 *Ibid.,* p. 80.

21 *Ibid.,* p. 74.

22 *Ibid.,* p. 83.

28 Ibid., p. 82.

24 *Ibid.,* p. 74.

25 *Id., ibid.,* p. 83.

In his view, prayer-poetry provides an explanation for mysticism in art. In his eyes, it is not the poetic experience that sheds light on the mystical experience, but, on the contrary, it is this mystical experience that can reveal the 'true nature' of poetry. "Shelley's experience does not help me to understand Jean de la Croix's experience well; on the contrary, Jean de la Croix's experience helps me to unravel some of the mystery in Shelley's experience," he states. In the words of R. P. de Guibert, what elevates us to both poetry and the mystical life is 'the supernatural character of our inner life'. Poetry, in the form of self-reflexive inspiration, enables us to penetrate a chain of mysteries, often without our realising it and in spite of ourselves, which permeates us with its very presence, 'into an inexpressible experience that the Invisible, the Indescribable, the Being of Beings will reveal to us'." Thus, through prayer, we have arrived at the mystics' concept of the Presence *(pTesence)* of God. The whole question boils down to determining whether this state of being is identical to the state that, in its essence, characterises religious mysticism. In order to reach a judgement on this matter, it will be necessary to ascertain whether aesthetic life presents a sequence of mystical events analogous to *the phároменology*—the sequence of events *that* leads the soul into the presence of God. We hope to encounter, in the artist's highest activity, certain events resembling those observed in religious mysticism. These include, for example, divine grace or forgiveness *(grace)*, vocal and silent prayer, moral purity, asceticism, inner turmoil, transcendence of the 'self', perceptible and imaginary contemplation, a state of ecstasy *(extase)*, etc.°"

Recording R. Bastide's testimony on the subject of mystical forgiveness—

26 H. Bremond, *Bire *et Poksie**, 1926, p. 87.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 87.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 111.

29 We have taken this diagram on the phenomenology of the mystical life from J. Marechal's work **Mi.st.ilıle.rı.tı, Ru/t* hitler Îü * /rıce/rrne*, p. 188.

We know: ‘Being abstracts itself from all forms of thought, from all mundane emotions; it ceases to maintain its customary existence. However, this does not mean losing oneself in absolute unconsciousness. Other emotions and other thoughts emerge; yet the mystic no longer regards these as his own; they appear to him as if they were alien to him. The mystic receives their influence from outside himself. The mystic is no longer himself; he is something else. He says he has become divine.

‘Some, such as Schopenhauer, M. Blondel and Delacroix, have believed that they found a similar state of mind in aesthetic intuition, in the contemplation of nature, in Rousseau’s *Rêveries*, and in the *Diaries* of Maine de Brian and Amiel.’[3] ‘As for prayer, we have observed an understanding that finds its counterpart in poetry (that of Bremond), and an understanding that finds its counterpart in nature (that of Segond). Indeed, does not Alfred de Musset regard his poetry as a response to the divine word? ‘God speaks; He must be answered,’[31] he said. If a work of art is identified with vocal prayer, the preparatory phase for the artist sometimes requires a silent prayerful discipline that fills one’s entire life. Moral purity, as in Poe’s understanding, is the result of this prayer, which provides the soul with ‘deep compassion’.

So, in what respect does the artist resemble the mystical, ascetic believer?

“Asceticism (riyazet) is a method, a struggle; the ascetic is an athlete”.’[2] The goal that the ascetic seeks to attain is an ideal of faith. “There can be no asceticism that is not based on the belief that there is a duality within human beings”.’"’ Here, the duality between physical and spiritual life

30 Roger Bastide, *I.rs PmhF.sies dc la iii.e iii,Jstiqne,* 1931, pp. 11–12.

51 Musset, *Trizlesse.*

52 Roger Bastide, **Les Pmb nes*, etc.*, p. 50.

33 *Ibid.,*

This is the case. One expresses selfish passions, whilst the other yearns for the divinity from which it has separated itself. Thus, asceticism is the path by which the mystic, by breaking down all the physical and volitional forces that hinder his journey along this path, unites the soul with the divine being. In the case of Michelangelo, we cannot claim that there was any explicit religious-mystical intention; at least not at the beginning of his professional life; yet we believe it is appropriate to point out that there is a profound similarity between his artistic activity and that of the ascetic. The defining aspect of this activity is, first and foremost, that it is a labour—or preparation for such labour—which transcends human strength and which, by his own choice, transforms his life into 'that of a prisoner condemned to hard labour' (4); within this regime of labour, he sometimes 'could not even spare time for eating or sleeping'.3' From a young age, he suffered from many illnesses, yet 'he would not allow any doctor to treat him'.[3] "This preparation for suffering eventually led him to loathe himself. He wanted to die. 'But he cannot die. Within him lies a terrible force of life that is reborn anew each day to endure even greater suffering… It is forbidden for him to cease moving.' We had previously noted the back-and-forth of the will between love and death. He felt himself a prisoner within the love felt for the beings of this world. 'His thirst for death stemmed from the fact that in death he saw the end of this maddening captivity.' In one of his verses, he writes: 'The fortune of one for whom death comes immediately after birth is the most beautiful of fortunes.' 'All the sculptures he created,' says Rodin, 'are the work of such anguish that they seem to wish to destroy themselves. All his sculptures bear the intense pressure of the despair contained within them

34 Romain Rolland, **Vie de Michel-Ange**, 1913, p. 20.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 21.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

37 *Id., ibid.*, p. 29.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 30.

S9 A. Rodin, **L'art**, **Entretiens réunis par Paul* Gsø/f*, 1911, p. 284.

they seem as though they were about to bow down. When Buonarroti grew old, he actually did break them. Art no longer satisfied him. He desired eternity." This will to nothingness, this passionate quest for death, is akin to the "young Jean de la Croix, who 'did not wish to exist' (1) and sought to annihilate his existence—tainted by empty and transient desires—in order to be reborn into eternal life."

Is there not a striking similarity between this and the 'will to life' of the young Jean de la Croix, who, 'not wishing to exist' (1), sought to annihilate his existence—tainted by empty and transient desires—in order to be reborn into eternal life?

This is precisely where the experience of all mystics lies. The mental disorders observed in ascetics largely share the same characteristics as those seen in artists. Consequently, the doubts, anxieties and restlessness in Michelangelo are the result of his mysticism in disguise. 'Here is a delusional, sceptical, troubled aspirant to mysticism'.[4] 'Would not an application of "mysticism, which appears as an exaltation of madness"' [S] be found in the same genius? The cause that defines this affliction is the same in both cases: this cause is the severing of the will from the entities to which it is bound in the visible world; whilst in the artist this bond is merely superficial and deceptive, in the mystical ascetic it constitutes a distinct severance. For this reason, the severance from the entities upon which the will's fundamental determinations rest leads to profound upheavals in the soul and even in the body. It is always mysticism that defines the illness, not the illness that defines mysticism.

As for contemplation, it is evident both in the artist and in the mystic. We find it as vividly in Mevlâna as in the Prophet Muhammad; for Mevlâna is a mystic, but a mystic who embodies a profound aesthetic life. Similarly, Anatolian Sufis such as Ahmed Yesevî and Yunus Emre displayed a blend of aesthetic life that complemented their essentially mystical activities. Thus, the play of aesthetic excitement

40 *Id., ibid.,* p. 284.

41 Jean Baruzi, L'Esprit *de la* Croix, 1931, p. 91.

42 Roger Bastide, ***Les Jrobkines de la* siz *m stique,* 1931,** p. 140.

43 *Id., ibid.,* p. 144.

They have equated this with the 'indescribable' nature of the mystical life; in reality, this is a game, the aim of which is the abolition of the will within the context of an apparent and temporary surrender to the beings and events of this world. Has not the mystical contemplation of Saint John of the Cross also been expressed in such a poetic and literary manner? As we have said before, the aim of contemplation among mystics is to eliminate the will. The symbol of darkness, which finds its expression in Saint John of the Cross's 'dark night', is striking. If the word 'darkness' is used to describe such vastly different things as 'attachment to our natural and supernatural pleasures, the death of our normal existence, the discovery of the heart's most secret corners, and the mysterious vision of the divine light", the reason for this is that 'even the fruitful darknesses still speak of our wretchedness'. This initial experience of darkness, which consists of absolute renunciation 'as much in the natural realm as in the supernatural realm', Through the symbol of night, "the concepts of darkness and dimness are harmonised within a synthesis that is both logical and lyrical".[46]

It follows, then, that De la Croix uses the symbol of night to express the transition from subjugation to absolute liberation from both the natural and the supernatural order.

The essence of the symbolism of night is the salvation of the soul, which finds peace in the presence of God. "Night signifies the annihilation of outward existence within true being; if we consider only the outward appearance, there are no objects, entities or thoughts, and night saves us."

In Saint John, the mystical darknesses—which, as you have seen before, serve as the setting for an inner struggle between opposing wills, each seeking to destroy the other and ultimately to be annihilated—are also present in Michelangelo's

44 Jean Baruzi, **Saint Jean et la Croix et le problème de l'expiation dans la mystique**, p. 303.

45 *Id., ibid.,*

46 *Id., ibid.,* p. 30t.

47 *Id., ibid.,* p. 315.

It manifests itself in exactly the same way. In the mystical darkness, a single will is real; it encompasses all the conflicting wills—this is the will to die. Did this will not govern the whole of Mikel-Anj's life? In this tormented man, who could never quite bring himself to seek his Lord consciously, the antithesis—the 'dark experience', the coming of the 'salvific night'—never came to pass.

Let us now turn to the phenomenon of *ecstasy (vecd)*. Just as in mystical ecstasy, so too in the artist's ecstasy there is a detachment from all forms of desire. This is the first stage of Buddhist mysticism. The fundamental characteristic of the second stage of the mystical life is the cessation of mental activity.[48] Along with emotional life, 'the soul also experiences a state of unparalleled joy'. In a third stage, the soul will be liberated from this joy as well. Finally, the 'sense of organic sensation' (synaesthesia) and the 'deafened consciousness of being' will cease to exist. 'Everything has vanished until one reaches the feeling of indifference. This is a state of absolute indifference, or to die before one dies.' This aspect of Indian yoga, which has also been observed in an artist such as Beethoven, corresponds exactly to indifference towards the external world and towards oneself. Romain Rolland has pointed out that in this artist there is a matter of 'seeing with the eye of the heart, without the eyes, yet with the whole body and the whole soul'. Even in the middle of the street, whilst out for a walk or in the middle of a conversation, when a sudden idea comes to his mind, he 'overflows with it', steps outside his own control, becomes one with that idea, and does not let it go until he has fully grasped it. Nothing can distract him. Beethoven himself describes this ceaseless pursuit in the following way: 'I chase after the idea, I press on, I see it fleeing and disappearing into the surging crowd. With renewed passion, I catch it again and never let it go. In a spasm of ecstasy, I must multiply it in a manner suited to every key. This has a hypnotic, yogic effect on the soul."

48 Roger Bastide, **Les Problèmes de la vie mystique**, p. 33.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 33.

Just like Indian yoga, once you have attained it, you carry it with you in all the activities of daily life—whilst walking, talking and working. It is beneath our skin, 'Like an essence infused beneath our skin'." It should, however, be noted that the aim of the ecstasy found in Indian yoga is the identification of the individual soul with the universal Spirit, the Atman. "Whereas the artist, whilst remaining indifferent to every being, every movement, and even to his own vanishing self within this ecstasy, is nevertheless identified with a particular state of sensitivity. The common ground between the artist and the ecstasy of yoga lies in the combination of an experiential negation and a *transcendent* passivity";'" this is also "the intense drawing of the soul towards the Absolute Being through love";"" this is an Absolute Being which the artist yearns for but can never attain.

Ecstasy is not the fundamental phenomenon of religious mysticism. It is merely one of the paths to attaining the state of God's presence within us *(presence divin)*. In this presence, mysticism reaches its goal, where the union of the soul with God is realised. Admittedly, this is a union within the framework of 'being together whilst apart'. 'When God elevates the soul to union,' says Saint Thérèse, 'He suspends its natural movement with all His power, with the aim of instilling His true wisdom more deeply into the soul. Thus, whilst it remains one with God, it neither sees, nor hears, nor understands...' 'And divine presence is inspired to it "not through any form of vision, but as a certainty that remains within me and which only God can bestow".' 'At this level of contemplation, the soul neither affirms nor denies, neither attributes nor rejects anything, but

50 Romain Rolland, *Beethoven*, 1928, pp. 301–302.

51 J. Maréchal, **Etudes sur la psychologie des mystiques**, p. 146.

52 *Ibid.*, pp. 242, 236.

53 *Ibid.*, pp. 242, 236.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 159.

'to behold Allah in complete tranquillity (Alvarez de Paz)'. The aim of the seeker of ecstasy is to be present within ourselves in a state of union. Thus far, we have followed the artist on the mystic's path. When the artist reaches the final point, we find him inadequate in realising divine union (vuslat), which is the essential movement of mysticism; he is in such a state of powerlessness that his condition stands in stark contrast to mystical union. At its highest level, art appears as a will of powerlessness; as a will that embraces the infinity of those wills, it lies crushed in the absence of those deficient, lost wills—which, to become truly powerful and truly desired, are in need of but one thing: the Supreme Will. The artist's voice gives voice to this call; to attain this Supreme Will, the artist must attune themselves to It and, to this end, reject all deficient wills through an act of grace; that is, to truly perceive the world of mysticism, the artist must utterly cast aside their passion for art, and perhaps free themselves from a kind of 'delirium of the imagination' that carries them to the very threshold of ultimate union. What the soul finds in mystical union with God is perfect tranquillity; but this is certainly not the tranquillity found in the joy of living—a transient joy awaiting another joy; rather, it is a tranquillity in which all anxiety comes to an end, much like the calm and boundless sea into which rivers flow, where all anxiety finds its final rest without awaiting anything beyond it. This ideal—yet at the same time a tranquillity that has been felt and experienced, albeit temporarily—instils in the soul the ever-growing anxiety of this quest for tranquillity. Michelangelo spent his entire anxious life constantly seeking tranquillity and spiritual peace. We shall briefly review this work to demonstrate how this anxiety, which ultimately attained a mystical peace, is expressed in his art.

First, let's go into the Sistine Chapel. We'll just look at the Ignudii

66 /d., op. cit., p. 160.

, these young men, with their childlike faces and their joy surrounding the creation of the stars and the world, seem thoughtless and soulless, as if to endure suffering. They are not even aware of the shackles on their feet; their countless gestures radiate a joy of living. Will this joy, devoid of thought, continue until the very end of the work of creation? Behind them, the prophets do not seem to confirm this. And the last of them, the prophet Jeremiah—who, in fact, represents Michelangelo from his scaffold—this man of suffering drawn from sacred history, this man of ecstasy who has reached a ripe old age, weeps for the joy of the living youths, for the fate of the young creation.

In Florence, Michelangelo will enter the Medici Chapel. There, under the guise of the will to die, he will fill not only the tombs but also the statues, both groups (day and night, dawn and dusk), the church's architecture, and the rooms left empty by the void brought by death—once again with his own sorrow and anguish. Like the Ignudi on the Sistine Chapel ceiling, bound by their feet with a movement passing over them, or like the slaves in the Louvre awaiting their liberation, they seem to be seeking a refuge in eternity, striving to break free from the heavy marble blocks to which they are bound. We can say this much: in every work by Michelangelo, there is a slave striving for liberation. And, whether represented in this way or that, it is always Michelangelo, always himself.

Mikel-Anj, who has devoted himself to religion, offers us the hope of salvation. He is sculpting a figure of Mary taking down Jesus from the cross as he lies dying before her. Two bodies, trembling like two shadows, intended to represent two souls in their entirety. The form is a failure, the technique a failure, the human an failure; was he perhaps seeking to represent, through such flawed, failed, crippled beings, the entity that heralds salvation to his soul? Once again, his final work took as its subject the Deposition from the Cross, located in the dome of the Florence cathedral. Here, once again, Michelangelo—freed from suffering, disillusioned and detached from unfulfilled wills and the passion of suffering—under the mysterious veil of the Prophet

embraces the body of the defeated divinity. In the descent from the last two crosses, every work of the imagination has been shattered, every
will has been annihilated.

As we conclude this section, let us endeavour to summarise what we have been
we have been discussing. In the artist, the existence of a wholly mystical phenomenology is revealed—
We worked on the cave. And yet, whenever we had to note a deficiency in the artist's mysticism, we were forced to pause at that point. Insufficient grace, unanswered prayer, imperfect purity, half-hearted contemplation and fervour, and finally the absence of the divine presence—the cause of all these shortcomings is one and the same; the artist's increasingly evident inability to renounce his own will and his attachments to material things in order to submit to the Supreme Will, the Determining Will. Thus, in agreement with P. de Grand Maison, we too are compelled to acknowledge that 'the poet's work is a natural and non-religious (foreign to religion) outline of mystical activity'. 'The poet,'—as Brémond also suggests—'was a mystic who had not reached the end of the path (a wayfarer).' However, we must avoid using the terms 'non-religious' and 'natural'. For, as we have shown above, art can take us as far as the threshold of religious mysticism, but it cannot bring us inside. If, for example, we take Michelangelo and Beethoven, it is because we have regarded them as particularly significant artists; the former was also involved in religious mysticism. And as an example of a mystical work, we have chosen sculpture, an art form that utilises the hardest material an artist can work with. Indeed, it should also be noted that art can offer us an interpretation of a mystical life; mysticism is a way of life, an inner experience. The religious mystic, of his own volition, renounces every form of expression and every interpretation of his inner state; the expression, which is necessarily incomplete,

56 Henri Brémond, **Prière et poésie**, p. 208.

condemns. The difference between the two worlds of mysticism is as follows: Firstly, the artist's faith, in appearance, is a faith in multiplicity, in that which is deficient and inadequate—a false faith, so to speak; whereas the faith of the devout ascetic is a faith in the One, in the sole Will towards which all wills are directed. Secondly, the religious mystic applies a method and commits his consciousness and volitional action to achieving his goal. The artist arrives at his own mysticism driven by an impulse arising from within him, yet one which he himself cannot fathom.

In short, what we wish to demonstrate is that, on the one hand, the artist and the aesthete are not self-sufficient; they are drawn to another life—a religious life—and that art, far from being merely a fantasy or a game of the imagination, is in fact nothing but a quest for salvation. The artist, too, is a ascetic in his own way; indeed, he is a kind of ascetic who engages with even the most secular of subjects, aiming both to acquire a certain knowledge of himself and an imperfect knowledge of God. On the other hand, our argument consists simply of acknowledging that art—which is regarded as a faith born of our beliefs—is nothing other than an extension of our own knowledge. For this reason, the aesthetic problem is closely and fundamentally linked to the problem of knowledge.

CHAPTER TWO
.
RELIGIOUS FAITH

In art, we recognise the existence of a will to believe that has developed to an exceptional degree amongst the many other wills that define human existence. In truth, art consists of the will to live out all the forms of life that the imagination can conceive; in other words, it is a movement of the will, a movement that transforms all wills to act into a vision with the aim of assimilating them into the self. Art is the transformation of the will to act—which can never find satisfaction in the finite world—into the power of imagination, in order to seek fulfilment in the dream of infinity. This is the will's inability to suffice on its own. Art, we say once more, is the search for the supernatural within nature, for the One within the realm of multiplicity; it is a misguided quest that leads us astray, generally ends in futility, and sets the will at odds with itself. To escape this state of contradiction, there appears to be but one path for the will: to submit to the will of the One, and by shattering the outer shell of the imagination, to turn towards the Light of Lights.

We see that wherever the imagination—which encompasses the entire universe—is deliberately suppressed, religion is born and finds new life. At the same time, art exists within us alongside the will that arises from the constant growth of life. It is for this reason that the mystic's practice consists, on the one hand, of reacting against the expansion of bodily life aimed at eliminating spiritual life, and, on the other hand, of a process of transformation that constantly reduces the newly arising forces of the will to their true source, which is the divine will; like an artist, the mystic uses his volitional powers—without even resorting to the imagination—to seek the Being who is the object of his desire, through all manner of ascetic exercises.

Nevertheless, a sequential relationship between art and religion can indeed be established. However, since the mystic of religion is accustomed to walking his own path and directing his volitional powers towards the will of the Supreme Being without allowing them to follow the path of the imagination, mysticism—both during its development and at its known source—is, for the most part, a renunciation of art.

In this section, our aim is to demonstrate, in the first instance, that religion is a matter of faith and that religious institutions are founded on the belief in the oneness of God.

(Here, of course, we are referring to the religions in the history of religions that span from the emergence of the belief in one God up to Islam. Primitive religions such as animism, **naturism** and totemism will, in our view, be regarded as a preparatory phase leading to the ultimate form of religion, which consists of faith in the One, necessary Being.)

In the second stage, we shall endeavour to demonstrate that the faith upon which religion is based is mystical faith, and that mysticism is the source of religion. It is not religious worship that explains mysticism, but mysticism that explains the believer's worship.

1. RELIGIOUS FAITH AS AN EXTENSION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE

Twofundamental characteristics express not only aesthetic faith but also religious faith
explains. Firstly, faith in the One arises as an extension of our beliefs and our true, lived knowledge; this faith is the crowning achievement of intellectual activity. It then takes the mind beyond its customary limits. Our faith requires no miracles. What is at stake, therefore, is the natural continuation of our knowledge
realm. The driving cause behind the tendency in our true knowledge to approach the unity of faith—and the completion of our natural beliefs in the supernatural realm—is the self-insufficiency of the will, and the fact that a Godless human being is insincere even towards themselves. The will feels the need to seek, within itself, through itself, and in spite of itself, the sole will that desires itself. Through this movement of the will, religion enters the realm of mysticism, as it inherently contains knowledge concerning both itself and God. Psychologically speaking, religion has arisen from mysticism.

2. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MYSTICISM AND RELIGION

This issue had been raised previously. When mysticism is compared with religion, the former takes precedence. Blondel, Massignon and Bastide had demonstrated this earlier. "Almost all religious communities," says Bastide, "have arisen from the embodiment of a mystical impulse: Buddhism followed the teachings of a person who had attained salvific ecstasy beneath the sacred tree; Islam arose from a revelation conveyed to the Prophet Muhammad by an angel; and Christianity, too, arose from the outpouring of the Spirit at the moment when Jesus descended among the Apostles, alongside a whole series of mystical events." And whenever religion becomes rigid and submits to lifeless forms, mysticism re-emerges. In this sense, "mysticism is a heroic endeavour to raise religion to its highest degree of perfection and to live a life of sainthood. Thus,

57 Roger Bastide, *Les problèmes de la pensée* mystique, p. 12.

"Mysticism lies both at the foundation and the pinnacle of every religion." Delacroix notes that "in some religions, such as the ancient Roman religions, mysticism is absent". According to our definition, mysticism is found solely in monotheistic religions, and religious faith itself takes the form of belief in the existence of a single God. Like all other polytheistic religions, the Roman religion, in our view, can only be regarded as preparatory to the mystical-religious life, which is the supreme form of religion. The essence of mysticism, and indeed of religion, lies in the soul's identification with God, in becoming one with Him even amidst difference. The path followed by both the mystic and the believer to attain the state of God's presence is the same. The rituals of a religion are acts stemming from its mysticism; these are a set of practices that have been refined and made accessible to everyone… In Islam, prayer and fasting take the same form as acts of asceticism, yet they serve a distinct purpose: they prepare the believer for the state of divine presence. Indeed, there are transitional rites sharing the same qualities between religious rituals and mystical asceticism; these are all directed towards the same goal. Night prayers, vow fasts, constant supplications, etc., are among these. The union of the soul with God is the reward for a religious transformation *(conversion)*. 'In truth, every religion appears to be a continuation of a transformation of the self.'[6] 'However, in "this transformation of the self", the mystic goes further and, moreover, "takes a path where extraordinary and astonishing states such as mystical revelation and ecstasy are experienced; he is driven by an inner power..."'

Saints and prophets are great mystics. Mystics are the revolutionaries of the realm of conscience. "In the Old Testament, these explorers of the moral world were called prophets. Our mystics today are their modern-day successors." "In religion, mystical states are exceptional and 'ina-

58 *Id., ibid.,* p. 13.

59 Henri Delacroix, *La religion et la foi,* 1922, p. 276.

60 Roger Bastide, *Les problèmes de la* vie *mystique*, pp. 1–3.

61 *Id.,* ibid., pp. 123–124.

62 Maurice Blondel, **Qu'est-ce que la mystique**, p. 106.

'For the vast majority of people, divine love is far from exhibiting such fervour and exclusivity. Indeed, these exceptional instances are not so much shifts in the nature of things as their ascents. Just as geniuses are the "superhuman" types of intellectual life, so too are mystics the "superhuman" beings of moral life.'

3. THE POWER OF MYSTICISM IN ISLAM AND ANATOLIAN SUFISM

We have thus seen that mysticism lies at the root of all religions, or at least of the more developed ones.

Contrary to what has long been claimed, Islam is no exception to this. It has recently been demonstrated that the religion of Islam itself, which arose from the mystical contemplation of the Prophet Muhammad, exhibits a strong mystical tendency.[64] This matter is of vital importance here. For we are dealing with the most developed religion in terms of its origins—the religion that is the culmination of all religions. Islamic mysticism originated from the Qur'an. Massignon rightly acknowledges that 'the true seeds of mysticism in the Qur'an are present in the form of nuclei capable of developing on their own, without the need for any external influence'. Likewise, he expresses the same view, stating that "Islamic mysticism originated from the Qur'an, which was constantly recited by heart, deeply contemplated and practised from its very inception and throughout its development." Massignon demonstrates that, when analysed very carefully, many verses of the Qur'an provide us with the inspiration for profound mysticism." The Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, himself became "a passionate lover of Allah" by leading a sincere and consistent life of asceticism. debauchery and

63 */d., ibid.,* p. 107.

64 Louis Massignon defended this thesis in his magnificent works *The Passion of Hallâj* and *The Sources of Technical Terms in Islamic Mysticism*.

65 Louis Massignon, **La passion d'Al-Hallâj**, 1921, p. 480.

66 Louis Massignon, **Les termes du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane**, ac, 1921, p. 84.

67 *Id., ibid.,* pp. 117–118.

"Stories promoting an attachment to worldly life were fabricated by the Muladdisun school during the second century of the Hijra".°‘ "It is therefore a question of condemning not the clergy in general, but corrupt clergymen; there is nothing in the Qur'an to suggest that this ascetic religious life is confined solely to Jews and Christians."'' The Qur'an commands the believer to fast, sleep little, pray, and, in a word, to lead a disciplined life of asceticism in order to attain divine wisdom."' It "serves as the foundation for a form of worship capable of uniting man with Allah. [1]Indeed, according to the Sufi mystic Hallaj, 'there is no fundamental contradiction between the Creator and the created (human being), nor between the human soul and the body; indeed, there is a potential closeness. The opposition lies solely between man's bodily wretchedness and Allah's transcendence of emotions."° Once the soul is freed from bodily desires, man draws near to divinity. At that point, he becomes the one 'towards whom all things bow'. He now desires nothing other than that which fulfils Allah's command; and thus, every movement of his is Allah's movement, and every command of his is Allah's command".'" This wisdom (hikma), which the mystic strives to attain, is for Hallâc "a spiritual reality, a divine essence that transforms the human being from one state to another".'(4) According to him, knowledge of this reality is attained within a 'mutual act of love' in which 'Allah and the soul recognise one another'. In truth, Hallâj's doctrine is based on the Qur'an. 'The entire thrust of his thought lies in a profound, deep, passionate and practically profound contemplation of the Qur'an, within a solitude that detaches one from all else—

68 *fd., ibid.,* pp. 121–122.

69 *Id., ibid.,* p. 123.

70 Massignon, **La passion d'Al-Halla'j**, pp. 501–502.

71 *Ibid.,* p. 504.

72 *Ibid.,* p. 527.

73 *Ibid.,* p. 515.

74 *Ibid*., p. 546.

75 *Ibid.,* p. 547.

It stems from this. 'Just as the Prophet Muhammad himself must have done, he began by repeating the spiritual experience lived by the Prophet himself—that is, by first listening to the echo of Allah's words within the heart.' However, it must be acknowledged that Hallâj's doctrine was prepared by the Islamic mystics who preceded him." In fact, in Islam, there exists a lineage of mystics who lived solely by the inspiration of the Qur'an for three centuries, from the Prophet Muhammad to Hallâj, and they transmitted this revitalising power to the mystics who lived after the third century of the Hijra, and in particular to the Anatolian Sufis. Like the Arab Sufis, these latter figures also base themselves on this doctrine established by the Prophet Muhammad himself. Both groups are bound by the nass (dogma) of the Qur'an. The influence of Sufism has spread far and wide throughout the Islamic world. This doctrine has, over the centuries, imparted its power to Islamic society and ensured its unity. It has not remained merely a theoretical (speculative) science and a form of deep contemplation, but has also become a system of customs, providing codes of conduct and principles of behaviour for people's practical lives. The ideal of justice, which was widespread amongst the people of Anatolia—even amongst the lower classes—has sustained the strength of this nation throughout modern history in the face of hostility from those who sought to exploit it. The tradition and unifying power of Sufism have ensured the tireless continuity of Anatolian history.

This doctrine, taught by an 'unadulterated Hindu dervish' of this century, is based on the principle of the 'immortality of the individual soul' and encourages people—even the uneducated masses—to devote themselves to a kind of 'holy jihad' in the spiritual realm through the virtues of fasting and-ban virtues, and to devote oneself to a kind of 'holy jihad' in the spiritual realm, reveals just how closely such a form of Hinduism approaches a religious ideal or an Islamic mysticism

76 *Id., op. cit.,* p. 465.

77 Massignon, *Les origines du lexique technique,* p. 279.

78 *Ibid.,* p. 7.

"lies therein." In our view, Gandhi—who rebelled not only against his own instincts but also against foreign barbarism and occupation—truly comes close, on this point, to the ideal of jihad espoused by the Prophet Muhammad, who waged a struggle against the self that hinders the individual's free movement, and against the powers and state forces that prevent such free movement from taking place on earth. Clearly, it is because of the abandonment of this struggle of self-denial that disintegration and decline began in Islam. Within the Islamic world, 'the internal signs of social collapse' began to emerge from the fourth century of the Hijra onwards, and this collapse, which continued for centuries, has been the true cause of the Islamic community's present-day disarray, alongside all military and economic events. Yet, for the salvation of the community, the early Muslims—above all those who endured hardship and the mystics—in the name of the One God, had waged holy jihad not only at the frontiers but also at the heart of the state; not only amongst the unbelievers but also in the depths of their own hearts, alongside Hasan, Ibn Wasi, Atabe and Shakik, Ibn Hanbal and al-Hallaj, in the name of the One God."[8] '

In our view, the only remedy capable of rescuing the child of Anatolia, whose conscience has been swept into the vortex of history, is this sacred jihad to be proclaimed within the human heart and throughout the nation. The sole force capable of bringing about this salvation—that is, the spiritual renaissance—will be the mystical religion, which will be revived and revitalised by the three-century-old tradition stretching from the Prophet Muhammad to Halâc. This force will instil a sense of unity in individuals and lead them to take responsibility for their history. Only in this way will the future of this civilisation—which has been shaken by profound crises—and of this unfortunate community be saved. The crises in the spiritual realm, as well as in the material realm—in the spheres of economics, morality, the family and the nation—will also be resolved by the religious-mystical movement that elevates the individual above their own existence—

79 *Id., ibid.,* pp. 69–70.

80 *Id., ibid.,* p. 286.

It will be resolved within the infinite grace of God. Religious action is not separate from, nor independent of, a person's other actions; rather, it is present in all of them. However mundane it may be, there is no action in which divine presence is not imbued, nor is there any action that does not give rise to worship. That vague sense that an inner infinity lies within each of one's actions draws one to spread this divine presence throughout one's entire life. Religious action is not, in and of itself, a separate action from the others. It reaches out to embrace all other actions."

It is thus evident how far we are from a conception of the philosophy of religion that claims 'emotion alone is sufficient to constitute religion, and that commandments and acts of worship should be nothing more than symbols that envelop and embrace that emotion'. 'This — the view based on emotion — is a theory that has been in vogue since Schleiermacher.' (2) Far from being something that can be reduced to a subjective emotion, religion is, by its very nature, a divine assistance to our actions; for God's action is inseparable from our own. The divine will is present in all the actions of the individual who seeks family, nation and civilisation, even in actions most alien to religion, in the form of a concern for eternity. 'God is not merely a contrived reflection or extension of my thoughts and actions; rather, He is right at the very centre of what I think and do; I circle round Him, turning from thought to action or from action to thought, returning from myself to myself, and at every moment I turn to Him'.8'

81 Maurice Blondel, ***L'action***, pp. **308–309.**

82 H. Delacroix, *Lu re/i ozi et *to/oi**, p. 407.

83 Maurice Blondel, **Action**, p. 346.

FROM FAITH TO REBELLION
FROM FAITH TO REBELLION

What drives the will to explore faith in the One is its own inadequacy within the world of events. Action seeks to fulfil itself in faith; this is a yearning towards its own completion. In truth, it can never be definitively attained; the power of this yearning for unity will always increase, and the anxiety it engenders will constantly grow. 'The moment it is judged that God is sufficiently known, He becomes utterly unknowable.'

Before seeking Allah, and whilst not yet desiring Him, the will tried to find everything in nature. Its own movement infinitely magnified its own inadequacy. At that moment, nothingness spread out before its eyes in infinite vastness: 'When placed within motion, the universe cannot fill it; to approach the goal is to move away from desire, and the will, which in a single stroke transcends all the apparent satisfactions it encounters, then finds itself faced with an even deeper void.' Within this inner conflict, the will becomes bound to a super-natural being. From that moment on, we witness the self-transcendence of natural motion and the presence of super-natural motion within the natural world.

To reject that which comes from the natural world is to refuse to acknowledge the will at the source of the realm of events; this is also to refuse to acknowledge the supernatural and God, to deny oneself within nature and, along with oneself, to negate God

1 Maurice Blondel, *L'action*, p. 351.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 328.

It means ‘to do’. Just as the existence of nature is incomplete without it, so too can the supernatural not exist without nature. Movement is a leap towards the supernatural. To renounce the supernatural is to be content with what is incomplete and unreal; this is, in the truest sense of the word, to refuse to accept what is real in nature.

What is perceived in faith is the duality between the self and God: the duality between the consciousness arising from the inadequacy of volitional movement and its leap towards self-fulfilment in a supernatural realm. This leap is God’s movement within us; God manifests Himself to us within this leap.

God’s action, which completes our deficient actions, serves as confirmation of this inadequacy, indeed of this very deficiency. God reveals to us our lack of sincerity. He rebels against us. This is the rebellion of the God-imbued self against the Godless self. Rebellion is God’s action within us. The self submits to God’s will within this duality. This submission of the self before God is, in fact, a leap forward that demonstrates the greatest activity. It replaces a definite and limited action with God’s perpetual, free action. True freedom, therefore, belongs to God; it is divine freedom realised within us to the extent that we have brought it about. Rebellion is nothing other than the affirmation of this freedom in our actions. Human rebellion is, first and foremost, a rebellion against one’s own nature, against one’s own inner forces, and against one’s narrow and selfish desires. Such a nature, to tell the truth, constitutes bondage, and is the source of all forms of bondage. The human being who frees themselves from the tyranny of their inner forces assumes universal responsibility and rebels against passive solidarity amongst people and against the domination of tyrants; they do so with a wholehearted will, seeking genuine solidarity and true sovereignty. Individual will, in truth, rebels against the oppressive and tyrannical society that seeks to annihilate it. Society is merely a stepping stone on the path to individual action and serves only to validate it; just as the action transcends the individual who initiates it, so too does it transcend society into the infinite.

It transcends in some way. As the movement strides towards universal unity in its suffering march, it reaches out to others as if calling them to aid.

We may also direct our rebellion against the opposite extreme; here, our rebellion will be directed against the godless individual, Stirner's anarchism, Rousseau's crippled, paralysed individualism, and Schopenhauer's futile pessimism. Thus, we shall rise above both social conformity and anarchist individualism; above both society and the Godless individual. We shall move from Godless individualism towards a *personalism (personalisme)* that seeks to realise God's movement within the natural world. To this end, we shall align ourselves with the rebellion of an Islamic mystic such as Hallâc, for this is the rebellion of God or of God within man, and together with him we too shall affirm the words 'I am the Truth' or 'I am the Divine' – 'ene'l-Haqq'.

CHAPTER ONE: STIRNER'S ANARCHISM

Stirner pits the selfishness of the individual against everything that comes from outside and seeks to restrict it. He rebels against nature and society, the state and humanity, morality and religion. These are mere phantoms, and everything that stands in the way of the sole self—which accepts no limitations whatsoever—must be eliminated. Thus, man will be free and happy, belonging solely to himself. The causes championed by both God and humanity are selfish; 'rather than serving these great egoists without gain, I shall be selfish myself'. Good and evil are empty words. I am concerned neither with the divine nor with the human; what concerns me is solely that which belongs to me, 'for that alone is as unique as I am. For me, nothing stands above the self'. [4]

3 Max Stirner, *The Ego and *Its Own**, trans. Robert-L. Reclaire, 1900, p. 3.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

In truth, humankind has always regarded itself as superior to the world by considering itself to be the Spirit. It is only through obedience to God that humankind has 'not only been freed from the yoke of parents, but also from every form of human authority'. According to the Middle Way, the 'Holy Spirit' is the most perfect spirit. Just as humanity's ideal is to free itself from the yoke of humanity, so too must it free itself from the yoke of the Holy Spirit and make its own self 'the centre of all things'. Man must set his own self against everything that is not himself. 'In the "world", there is no truth to be grasped outside the self; objects are in a state of contradiction with one another, and our judgements about them have no standard of measurement'. Whether it be the investigation of worldly truths leading to cosmology, or the investigation of divine truths leading to theology, both are equally fruitless and futile. In this world devoid of truth, the only thing that concerns me is the self. This genuine and legitimate selfishness is a selfishness that recognises itself. 'Only for the selfish person who is unaware of their own selfishness—that is, the involuntary Selfish One—can anything be sacred. This is a self-centred person who feels shame and struggles against their own self-centredness, yet does not wish to be self-centred merely for the sake of being exalted—that is, to satisfy their self-centredness."'

Thus, Stirner pits a form of selfishness disguised as open selfishness against a form of selfishness that seeks help from others for one's own good, and against a veiled form of selfishness that, when separated from others, expects help from nothing but itself. Did Gide not express the idea of the search for true and, in his own view, sincere selfishness with the following formula: 'Do not, under any circumstances, believe that your own truth can be found by another'

5 *Id., ibid.,* p. 9.

6 *Id., ibid.,* pp. 11–12.

1 Id., ibid., p. 12.

8 *Id., ibid.,* p. 25.

9 *Id., ibid.,* p. 40.

"In the same way, Stirner says: 'Every situation you find yourself in is your own creation.' The care shown and the love nurtured for others must be entirely self-centred; in this sense, one must love in order to nourish one's own heart with this love, and one must love another to the extent that they constitute a unique essence, just like oneself." What are the spectres that threaten the self and hinder its unimpeded, self-centred development? How can the self free itself from them? These are 'the Holy Spirit, Truth, the King, the Law, Goodness, Majesty, Honour, the Public Good, Order, the Fatherland, etc.'[2]'When the spectre of religion vanishes, the spectre of morality takes its place.' It is man who sanctifies all these spectres; in themselves, they possess no sacred aspect whatsoever, for they are entirely figments of the imagination; it is my thought, my will and my consciousness that sanctify them.' [4]Just like the Holy Spirit (the spirit of Jesus), the Spirit of Humanity is also a phantom; my Spirit is real, and it is the one that seeks to satisfy selfishness. The state, another phantom, 'is founded upon the slavery of labour. Let labour be free, and the state will collapse.' [5]Society, too, is a phantom; both socialism and liberalism are equally false and unjust. 'In one, it is merely the state that commands
"In one, the individual is the owner; in the other, only society is the owner." Consequently
"neither the right to command nor the right to property is recognised for the individual: one belongs to the state, the other to society." In a communist regime, "the worker submits to the supremacy of a society of workers, just as this society unquestioningly accepts competition"q8

Critical thinking, which is unique to human beings, dispels all these phantoms

10 *Id., ibid.,* p. 41.
11 *Id., ibid.,* p. 47.
12 *Ibid.,* pp. 47–48.
13 *Ibid.,* p. 53.
14 *Ibid.,* p. 82.
15 *Ibid.,* p. 137.
16 *Ibid.,* p. 138.
17 *Ibid.,* p. 139.
18 *Ibid.,* p. 146.

‘It must be overthrown. Theology must be dethroned by anthropology in order to leave the field open to the selfishness of the sole existing self; atheism must become universal.’°

It is not enough for a person to be free; more is required—they must also be a ‘property owner’. ‘True freedom consists of boundless individualism.’ ‘Instead of seeking freedom, one must seek selfishness;’ one must replace involuntary selfishness with deliberate selfishness. ‘The unacknowledged selfishness that reigns in the world is, in fact, a form of slavery.’ ‘The individual’s power must be directed towards freedom; this is true freedom.’ ‘When acting, a person need not act in accordance with the interests of others, nor should they be concerned with their own interests; they must yield to their own instincts and simply assert their own power.’ [6] In other words they must follow their own instincts.

The self is universal.°[7] However, it is not an absolute Self like Fichte’s; it is a transient, ‘mortal’ self.°'I am my own kind; I recognise no rules or laws, nor do I accept any model, etc.; in truth, very little remains for me... but even this very little is more valuable than a situation into which a foreign power might cast me—that is, being moulded by Morality, Religion, Law, the State, etc.'" ‘The only thing I possess is my power.’ [0] Nothing else—neither nature, nor God, nor

19 *Id., ibid.,* p. 176.
20 *Id., ibid.,* p. 171.
21 *Ibid.,* p. 186.
22 *Ibid.,* p. 188.
23 *Ibid.,* p. 196.
24 Art., *ibid.,* p. 197.
25 *Ibid.,* p. 199.
26 *Ibid.,* p. 202.
27 *Ibid.,* p. 215.
28 *Ibid.,* p. 216.
29 *Ibid.,* p. 217.
30 *Ibid.,* p. 221.

‘A law to be bestowed by the people will be alien to me; it will never be mine; to tell the truth, it cannot even be called a law.’[1] ‘The authority to decide what constitutes law for me belongs solely to me.’3[2] According to selfish law, justice will consist solely of what I desire.°’ This individual will is in conflict with the state.’[4] The state and the nation are the enemies of the self. There remains but one way to free oneself from these: to disobey the State, to disobey the Law, to resist the State and the Law with all one’s might, to demonstrate one’s power, and, in a word, to demand anarchy.3” “The name given to the power held by the State is ‘right’; the same power, when held by the individual, is called ‘murder’. Murder means the use of force by the individual; yet it is only through murder that the individual can overthrow the power of the state.”

“The seizure of rights by the self through the use of force is legitimate and necessary, for the self is a slave everywhere, but the right is ‘still far from being its own property and from being independent’.” True relationships are “independent of society”.’[8] Likewise, these relationships are independent of the family and the party.[39] Private property—the property of the ‘I’—is the only legitimate form of property. ‘The whole world belongs to me.’ The sole owner of property is the individual; ‘neither God, nor man (nor the human community).’[4] ‘The only thing that determines property’ is force, the sole source of law. Just as

31 *Ed., i, ibid.,* p. 227.

32 *Ibid.,* p. 226.

83 *Ibid.,* p. 228.

34 *Ibid.,* p. 233.

35 *Ibid.,* p. 234.

36 *Ibid.,* p. 235.

37 *Ibid.,* p. 259.

38 *Ibid.,* p. 261,

39 *Ibid.,* pp. 264–265, 282–284.

40 *Ibid.,* p. 301.

41 *Ibid.,* p. 302.

42 *Ibid.,* p. 304.

‘If a slave ceases to show respect to his master in order to be free, then one must also set aside respect for another’s property in order to become a property owner.’ ‘One must love people, and one must love each and every one of them with utter self-interest.’ For love is a possession of the Self.’ “It derives its source from personal interest.” ‘My joy in life determines my relationship with the world. “Relationships” are equivalent to “worldly pleasures” [4]. Apart from this, every ideal is false; a person is whatever they can be. A person now has ‘no duty or ability that distinguishes them from a plant or an animal’.” Thought is something other than the Self; it consists of a ‘view that I can change at any moment—that is, annihilate—and thereby destroy by appropriating it to my Self’.” Truths are words artificially produced by thought. [5]‘If there were no human beings, “there would be no such thing as truth”.’ Truth is “nourishment for my thinking mind... ‘There is no truth above my existence’.” In the eyes of the selfish critic, “the measure of truth is the self.” For me, no destiny has been prepared “outside my own self”. Man’s destiny is “a magical Christian circle”. ‘Likewise, Fichte’s self is a self that lies outside my own self and is alien to me’. It is not merely the sole self that simply means ‘I’. In truth, ‘I am my sole self; I am unique’. ‘Just as with divinity, “no concept can express or describe me; what is given as my essence’

43 *Ibid.*, p. 312.
44 *Ibid.*, p. 354.
45 *Ibid.*, p. 356.
46 *Ibid.*, p. 359.
47 *Ibid.*, p. 392.
48 *Ibid.*, p. 400.
49 *Ibid.*, p. 417.
50 *Ibid.*, pp. **426–427.**
51 *Ibid.*, p. 434.
52 *Ibid.*, p. 435.
53 *Ibid.*, p. 436.
54 *Ibid.*, p. 443.

‘Nothing can define my limits; these are merely names… Whether it be God or man, any being superior to me pales in the face of my singular and peerless existence, and fades away in the light of this awareness… I have not attributed the cause of my existence to anything.’ [55]

The stance adopted by Stirner is that of anarchism, which consists of the denial of all love and all dominant impulses, as well as every social and even spiritual and conscious impulse within the human being. Thus, all that remains is a wholly selfish self that recognises only itself, desires only itself, and expects nothing from outside itself. Ultimately, this self may consist solely of an internal compulsion of life, an instinctive impulse. Stirner’s instinctivism is not far removed from that of the later André Gide. In Gide’s view, too, the individual is endowed with the power to satisfy his pleasures the moment they arise, in such a way as to avoid any future regret for the past. The truth of man consists solely in the search for the self through the satisfaction of his desires; this is, at the same time, the self’s own wholeness. Like Nietzsche would later do, Stirner adopts a stance ‘beyond good and evil’ for this conception. Here, power reigns supreme and dispels every phantom that disturbs the self or hinders its self-development. The self, having shed all phantoms that conceal it from its own view and remaining entirely on its own, proceeds to deify itself.

From Stirner’s anarchist rebellion—that is, the doctrine of the self as pure selfishness—we shall move on to a point that is somewhat closer to our understanding of rebellion.

55 *Id., ibid.,* p. 449.

CHAPTER TWO: ROUSSEAU'S REBELLION

Stirner seeks salvation in absolute selfishness, in the self's complete severance from everything that conditions it. He derives the formulas of his anarchist rebellion through logical reasoning.

Rousseau, on the other hand, seeks his salvation in a concrete and lived experience. He first accepted the reality of life as it is. He loved this life—or at least wished to love it—and placed his faith in it. In this faith, in which he sought salvation, he found misery. In truth, human love, just as we have said regarding aesthetic faith, instils in us the bitter reality that the will is not self-sufficient, and that every free act leaves us inadequate in the face of the universe—and indeed, in the face of ourselves. In love, the fact that a person does not take refuge in anyone but themselves ultimately plunges them into the agonising anguish of a deadly void. To believe in the strength of another, and yet to believe that others are the product of the inadequacies in which one's own self is buried: this is what Rousseau's

All the misery lies here. “I need,” he says, “someone who will love me for my own sake.” “This is the most perfect expression of that will which transcends all our individual powers; it is this very act of seeking the aid of a single power—the only one capable of completing us, of realising what we wish to be, of truly affirming our existence.” Inevitably, this will to believe will reach an impasse within the natural order, where everyone is equally deprived of freedom and powerless. The dilemma to which Rousseau fell victim was this: to desire, yet not to believe. Undoubtedly, he was betrayed. His affliction was real and not without cause. It was nothing other than the tremors created by the constant blows arising from human weakness and the betrayal concealed within unending motion, all within a sincere spirit and an infinite will. This everyday betrayal—the betrayal to which people have grown accustomed—may, in the realm of the state or amongst the wise, lead to no rebellion, no crisis of conscience; but when applied to a soul and conscience like that of the experienced Rousseau, the reaction will be violent. The call of his soul will be met with the profound indifference of others. In the end, life’s experience has distanced him from human society, within which he feels, by his very nature, restless, stifled, insincere, estranged from himself—in short, strange and wretched. “I have never truly been a person suited to a civilised society where everything consists of restlessness, burden and duty; and I have always fallen short of conforming to the bonds required of one who wishes to live amongst people, given my independent nature”*; and he has fled from this society, which would have sided with the triumph of his pride. An individual’s reclusive life, characterised by excessive aloofness towards others, is a pathological condition: neither a doctor nor a sociologist can explain the cause of this condition. Rousseau stated with confidence: ‘They — that is, doctors — in my health’

56 Ernest Seilliere, J and '1-j Jacques Rousseau, 1921, p. 155.

JJ Rousseau, **Les Rêves d’un solitaire** (excerpts from *Confessions*, vol. III), ed. Ad. Van Bever, 1927, 6th ed., p. 230.

'They do not leave me in peace, nor will they grant my memory any peace even after my death.' These professionals, who accept that it is abnormal for a person to live outside the conditions of society, have indeed not left Rousseau's memory in peace. The polite conformists of society and the great scholars of clinics and universities have constantly accused him of madness. Not a single one of them attempted to recognise the genius in this man, who laid bare the threads of conformity and exposed the bondage and vulgarity of the social man. Moreover, one must rely on an extremely social logic to accept that all of Rousseau's friends were honourable people.

He knew himself so well that he was aware he had not been born like other people. He expressed this time and again: "I hear my heart and I know people. I was not created like any of the people I see; I dare to believe that none of those who exist were created like me. 'Though I am not more valuable than anyone else, I am at least different.'" This profound insight into himself, this faith he held in his nature and his superhuman dignity, was the source of the pride that filled the vulgar and unprincipled masses with dread. The meaning of this pride requires explanation. This pride arose from the will of an infinite power, from the pursuit of a perfect unity and sincerity—a redemptive vision in which the will believed itself to possess this perfection and power. Pride defines the personality and plays upon ambition. Rousseau says he would not even enter a coffee house 'without feeling a thrill'. It is because others do not acknowledge it that, due to this sublime pride, the will's collapse becomes inevitable in society: he will say, 'My passions kept me alive, and my passions killed me'.

Owing to the belief that the self constitutes the very essence of the universe and that everything else in the world is incidental, pride leads to the worship of the self—

58 *Id., ibid., I* re Prom, p. 161.

59 Rousseau, *Les Confessions,* ed. Ad. Van Bever, vol. 1, p. 5.

. According to this sort of 'religion of the self', the social condition that binds the self with conventions is a regression, a decline. For whilst there is freedom in the self, there is bondage in society. What, then, is the source of society, institutions and civilisation?

Rousseau perfectly grasped the truth that, in this civilised society, 'a feigned politeness misleads us as to our true feelings: there is neither sincerity in friendship nor hostility in enmity'.° "The development of the sciences and the arts has also contributed to the decline of human virtues. By its very nature, science has arisen from certain human frailties. 'Astronomy from superstition; rhetoric from envy, hatred, flattery and hypocrisy; geometry from avarice; physics from idle curiosity; all the sciences, even ethics, have arisen from human vices'."t '1 The arts, meanwhile, have taken the place of virtue and have corrupted this natural order. Finally, "luxury and ostentation, as they say, have arisen from people's idleness and pride. Luxury is inseparable from science and the arts; nor can they exist without it."' The sciences 'perpetuate idleness, yet they foster and cultivate luxury—which can only thrive through the extreme poverty of some and the extreme wealth of others—and, by refining your tastes, they degrade your character, destroying both military and civic virtues'." The primary cause of evil is inequality. "Wealth arises from inequality; luxury and idleness from wealth; the fine arts from luxury and ostentation; and the sciences from idleness." "In the natural inequality that exists amongst men, there is neither evil nor slavery: evil arises from artificial inequality, that is, inequality found in institutions—that is to say, established by the consent of men, or at the very least

60 Victor Delbos, *La* p/tifo›@/ıie /rnnçafse, 1921, p. 228.

b"1 J.J. Rousseau, **Les Sciences* et les Arts*, 1826, vol. I, p. 24, *Discours sur les sciences et les arts*.

G* J.J. Roisseau, *Discours sur les sciences et les arts*, 1826, vol. I, p. 24, *Discours sur les sciences
and the arts.

63 Victor Delbos, *J. «*Philosophie* [in* French, p. 229. G4

Rousseau, **Political Science**, Collected Works, p. 94.

"It is inequality that gives rise to evil." The institution of property lies at the root of evil. Evil came into being alongside the need for solidarity.°[6] In truth, solidarity is the first form of bondage, which gives rise to all other evils. Thus, alongside property, labour, bondage and misery also entered into existence. With the disappearance of equality, the agreement amongst people also vanished. Property was acquired through coercion, and the state was established to ensure the domination of the oppressors. It follows, then, that the state 'was formed through lies and for the benefit of the rich'. The meaning of these institutions is as follows: 'With the establishment of property, the inequality between the rich and the poor has been sanctified; with the establishment of courts, the inequality between the powerful and the weak has been sanctified; and with the establishment of arbitrary power, the inequality between master and slave has been sanctified.' All social institutions are based on the principle of slavery and the exploitation of human beings. Rousseau has correctly defined the universal slavery inherent in social solidarity. To be part of social solidarity means to be a slave, and evil arises from the act of solidarity enforced by coercion—from compulsion, whatever form it may take. "'As long as I act of my own free will,' he says, 'I am good and do only good; but whether it stems from compulsion or from other people, the moment I perceive the yoke, I become stubborn and even rebellious: then I become a nobody'."[6] He recognised the baseness of heads bowed before tyrants in social life and saw the filth on the hands of those who applauded the victory of some and the oppression of others. What is lacking in the social being is self-respect and self-worth. Man's social condition is, without a doubt, a regression and a debasement compared to his former state. The essence of Rousseau's work is this: the rebellion of the deified self against society and civilisation. His rebellion

65 Delbos, La §ńi/õs., French, p. 2Š4.

66 Rousseau, *Collected Works,* p. 305.

67 Delbos, *Lettres philosophiques,* p. 236.

68 J. Rousseau, *Rêveries..., published as [t]'on]'.‹sion.‹,* ed. Ad. Van Bever, *ô* promenade, p. 230.

It never leads to anarchy. The self is not selfish. Or, at the very least, it is not solitary; it is never self-sufficient. In the universe, one can—and indeed must—seek a permanent order upon which the self can rely as its true source. This order is to be found within nature. Whilst in nature, humankind was good, sincere, happy and generous. By stepping outside nature, he brought about his own misery. 'O son of man,' it cries out, 'seek no longer the perpetrator of evil; that perpetrator is yourself; there is no evil other than that which you have done and the suffering you feel; both come to you from within yourself... Do away with our ill-fated achievements, do away with our mistakes and sins, do away with what man has wrought, and then all will be well. Where all is well, nothing is unjust. Justice cannot be separated from goodness; goodness, in turn, is the very structure and essence is the inevitable consequence of an infinite power and the love of one's own self." "Spiritual evil, just as material evil on a grand scale, is the result of man losing his natural state. "Man, once he begins to reason, is a corrupted animal." Rousseau discovers God, who speaks to the heart, in nature. Were nature allowed to speak for itself, it would be the very voice of God. Divinity is born in the heart through the spontaneous emergence of nature. In this spontaneous emergence, Rousseau perceives the self's connection to nature through a kind of wholeness. Since the self cannot exist in isolation, it finds its God in this connection. Thus, without feeling the need to step outside the order of nature, he finds the sole natural necessity and the existence of God within nature, and there he attains God. Within this peaceful order, in which Spinoza saw the strictest necessity, Rousseau finds the most perfect freedom. According to the former, the order of nature was held up as a model for all areas of human life. According to Rousseau, however, if we wish to remain just and happy, we are obliged to content ourselves with this order alone. If human morality

69 Rousseau, *Profession de foi du vicare savoyard*, 1822, pp. 87-88.

70 Rousseau, *Profession de foi du vicare savoyard*, 1822, pp. 87-88.

had society not corrupted him and had man abandoned himself to the influences of nature, nature would have instilled in him a kind of profound mercy and truly divine compassion. “I was born sensitive and kind-hearted, filled with compassion to the point of weakness, and, feeling that my soul had been elevated by generous sentiments, I became a benevolent and helpful person, driven by pleasure and even passion, as long as my heart was not resisted; if I were the strongest of men, I would undoubtedly be the best and the most forgiving of them all.”

Consequently, in Rousseau, the solution to the question of salvation lies in a kind of surrender of the heart to the spontaneous unfolding of nature; this nature, at the same time, inspires its own divinity. Since he unites with God through his heart, he possesses Him to a certain extent. In a sense, divine pride is inspired in the natural human being by a sense of self—that is, a feeling which determines an excessive self-assertion towards others. “I feel myself,” he says, “to be so superior to them (human beings) that I cannot hate them… I love myself too much to be able to hate anyone, whoever they may be. If I were to hate, I would be constricting and narrowing my existence, whereas I wish to expand it by spreading it throughout the entire universe.”’ His sense of self-esteem gives rise to contempt for others, extending even to disdain and indifference. “In me,” he says, “self-respect began with rebelling against injustice, but ended with despising injustice by enduring my own soul; self-respect contented itself with seeking its own good by severing external relationships that made one self-satisfied, and by renouncing comparisons and preferences; at that moment, the self, having fallen in love with itself once more, returned to nature and freed me from the yoke of public opinion. ‘Thus, I attained peace of mind once more, verging on divine bliss.’ ‘All ties with humanity—

71 Rousseau, *Degree...*, ed. Ad. Van Bever, 6 Promenade, p. 223.

72 *Ed., ibid.,* p. 22’7.

73 *Ibid.*, 8th promenade, p. 254.

Withdrawing from the world and retreating into true seclusion, taking refuge in the bosom of nature: this was, it seems, his final passion.

I wonder, will he be self-sufficient in this state of seclusion? Can the religion of nature bring peace to the soul? His quest along this path—which leads to the love of God through the pride of divinity—by stripping the self entirely of society's impurities and the torments of sin, and by denying the self complete fulfilment in this struggle against those torments, a struggle that could lead to self-sacrifice—can this truly bring the self to salvation?

In fact, Rousseau's renunciation of humanity was not absolute; nor was his retreat into nature a salvation. One must recognise the expression of bitter regret in these words: 'For me, everything on earth is over. No good can be done to me now, nor any harm. In this world, there is nothing left to hope for, nor anything to fear; here I am, at the very bottom of the abyss, in tranquillity; I, wretched, unfortunate, mortal, yet as unfeeling as God." If he fled from people, it was because he could not find what he sought in them. His ideal of humanity transcended reality. When confronted with a negative and feeble reality—when faced with humanity, and indeed with humanity that was unaware of itself—his sensitivity was wounded. The charm inherent in his nature always kept him within humanity. Yet his divided personality, his second nature, went further still, leading him into a quest for another kind of humanity that would complete this one, which was insufficient for his heart. A will that was never satisfied with the universe as a whole did not seek refuge in the shade of a tree in search of salvation; but would it not be a mistake to believe this? No, we shall say; if Rousseau fled from people, it was so that he might love them all the more within his own solitude. He expresses this as follows in his third letter to Deputy Malesherbes: '... the power of imagination did not leave the earth, which it had thus adorned, desolate for long. Soon afterwards, it filled the earth with beings suited to its heart—

74 *Ibid.*, on the promenade, p. 16?.

‘I was taking people worthy of dwelling there to nature’s sanctuaries and settling them there. From these people, I was creating a charming community in which I would not shy away from living.’°

He was seeking a love capable of shattering the pride we must fight within ourselves. As the heart opens to compassion, the pride from which love springs is shattered. Self-respect was leading him to arrogance, and ‘he was doing nothing but mingling contempt with the hatred he felt for people.’ The wise priest of Savoie says, ‘Without directly subduing this pride, I prevented it from turning into hard-heartedness; and without losing my self-respect, I made this respect less contemptuous towards my fellow human beings.’”

Rousseau struggled against this pride throughout his life. He would always say, ‘Be sincere and humble.’ From the very beginning of his intellectual life, his rebellion was directed against the individual’s pride. From the outset, he never tired of searching for a principle that could transform the individual into a universal being. “There is another principle,” he said, “of which Hobbes was certainly unaware: although this principle is given to man to temper the cruelty of his self-respect under certain conditions, it also restrains his excessive devotion to his own comfort—arising from an innate aversion to seeing his fellow human beings suffer... ‘In other words, I am speaking of compassion’.” Thus, according to Rousseau, “true generosity, forgiveness, and humanity” consist entirely of compassion.* Through compassion, Rousseau would enter his own conscience and there be fully self-sufficient. “Conscience is the best of all moral judges. It is the voice of the soul... He who heeds it submits to nature and never fears losing his way.”

75 E. Seillière, J.-R. Rousseau, p. 96.

76 Rousseau, *Profession de foi,* 1822, pp. 16–17.

77 *Id.,* ibid., p. 217.

78 *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, published by* Éditions des Deux-Ponts, p. 91.

79 *Ibid.,* p. 92.

80 Rousseau, **Profession of Faith*,* pp. 106–107.

Conscience is 'the infallible judge of good and evil'.[8] According to him, to be self-sufficient in one's individual conscience means constantly returning to the very pride one ceaselessly rejects. In reality, turning in on oneself means surrendering to one's own pride; to console oneself is to consume oneself. Rousseau is a victim of himself even before he becomes a victim of society. Rousseau's rebellion has come to naught within his individualism, which is defined by the need to struggle against himself; this rebellion has failed to achieve its goal; in our view, had Rousseau been a man of action, his rebellion would have amounted to a submission to the movement of a world governed by natural law.

81 *Id., ibid.,* p. 124.

CHAPTER THREE
SCHOPENHAUER'S REBELLION

We shall examine the following three claims in Schopenhauer: 1. The will is *the essence* of being, and every being is the manifestation of the will to live; 2. Evil constitutes the essence of being and consists solely in the actualisation of that will to live; 3. Salvation lies in the denial of the will to live and in taking refuge in the non-existence known as nirvana.

Schopenhauer's rebellion is directed against existence itself. According to him, to exist is to will evil. To be freed from this fundamental evil, one must deny existence.

As we moved from Stirner's instinctualism to Rousseau's philosophy of the heart, we had drawn closer to our own perspective. Now, as we move on to Schopenhauer's voluntarism, we are approaching a point closer to our own understanding of rebellion. However, just as we have rebelled against Stirner's egoism and Rousseau's individualism, we shall oppose Schopenhauer's pessimism to the same degree—indeed, perhaps even slightly more so. This movement is ours,

transition from nothingness to absolute being, and ensure that our rebellion is grounded in submission to the supernatural and the absolute.

1. THE WILL AS THE ESSENCE OF BEING

In Schopenhauer's philosophy, the world is regarded as a manifestation of the will. 'The world… with its extremely variable and complex events, can ultimately be reduced to a single element which Schopenhauer calls the will and which is commonly referred to as force. Human beings, like every other part of nature, are an embodiment of the will; they are therefore a manifestation of being-in-itself, and as such, the reality of human beings is this original being-in-itself. Accordingly, the will is the ultimate cause in this explanation, that is, 'being-in-itself'; yet we cannot know whether it has a cause or not, nor whether it is without cause. We cannot know where it came from, where it is going, why it exists, nor whether it has any cause at all: we know only that it exists and that it is the origin of all things." The world has emerged from the will; since the will determines itself, it also determines its own actions and its own world. It is 'the All-Powerful'. [3]Will is 'the original, inner foundation of existence itself, the essence of the universe; whereas life—that is, the world of appearances, the realm of phenomena—is merely the mirror of will'." 'Will is not the result or product of the world; on the contrary, "it is the world that arises as the result of the will to live".' Will is the sole true reality; the world has been made necessary by it. 'Schopenhauer states that "in the plant kingdom and likewise in the animal kingdom, the entire

"attributes its inclinations to the will." … "the animal's desires and inclinations express its organic structure, which is itself the result of the will" p8ó Thus, the principle of life and the principle of the will become identical, and indeed

82 Th. Ribot, *La philosophie de Schopenhauer*, 1925, pp. 20–21.

83 Schopenhauer, *The Philosophy of* Life, trans. Btir-deau, 1888, vol. I, p. 284.

84 *Ibid.*, p. 287.

85 *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 172.

86 Rìbot, *La* §ńi/osQftie ***& Schopenhauer,*** p. 77.

"Within its totality, the universe appears to us as the gradual externalisation of the will." The will exists outside of time. For it, there is only the present moment. It has neither past nor future. Consequently, 'the form of life and reality consists solely of the present, and that is infinite'." In the world of events, it is not the individual but the species that represents the will to live. "The individual dies; the species cannot be abolished. The individual is the expression, within time, of the species, which exists outside of time. 'What sleep is to the individual, death is to the species'.*' The species, as a self-existent being, represents one of the manifestations of the will. The will, as a self-existent being, is the only thing that cannot be abolished. It is *the* sole *substance* and the first cause of the world.

2. THE WILL **TO LIVE** AS THE SOURCE OF EVIL

The will is the source of evil; for life, which is its creation, consists entirely of suffering. Suffering arises when the will is not halted by some obstacle. If the will attains its goal, it finds satisfaction. Every satisfaction is merely 'the starting point for a new desire'. And desire "encounters obstacles everywhere, is in a state of struggle everywhere, and therefore remains in a state of suffering at all times. There is no final limit to the effort; consequently, it has no measure, and there is no end to suffering." Thus, satisfaction is only temporary. Since desire is perpetual, it perpetuates suffering along with itself. 'Pain is real; in itself, desire represents something painful, and the fulfilment of desire brings nothing positive.' 'Joy is akin to a perceptual illusion; pain makes itself truly felt. Pain is constant, and it is nothing other than the transient relief from pain, which is itself constant.' 'Life consists of nothing but effort; a struggle—

87 *Id., ibid.*, p. 79.

88 Schopenhauer, *The World as Will*, vol. I, p. 291.

89 Ribot, **La philosophie...**, p. 82.

90 Schopenhauer, *The World as Will...*, vol. I, p. 323.

91 *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 386.

92 *Ibid., vol*. III, p. 387.

"Effort leads to no positive goal, nor to any outcome commensurate with one's longing. 'The life of our body is like a constant, suspended agony, a death postponed moment by moment; the activity of the soul is merely a boredom dispelled from time to time.' Life resembles a soap bubble to which man sacrifices all his time and care. Develop a path between suffering and boredom.

"Suffering is the essence of life".9 "It is futile to try to extract suffering from the very heart of life. It will come upon us again in other forms".'t 'Suffering derives its root and source from the very act of desiring. To desire is, in essence, to suffer. The greatest culprit in life is love. "For by sustaining life, one also sustains suffering."'[7] In fact, our world is "the worst of all possible worlds". Existence is an evil; being is something that ought not to be.

3. SEEKING REFUGE IN NIRVANA

Since the world is so wretched, the best thing is not to exist. This tendency towards non-existence is the very last thing to which human will can turn. 'Taken in and of itself, the will is a blind and unconscious desire for life; having developed in the realm of inanimate nature, plants and animals, it reaches its own enlightened realisation in the human mind. A marvellous situation then arises. Man realises that what is called reality is an illusion, that life is suffering, and that the best thing for the will is to deny itself. For there is no separation between effort and suffering, which are inseparable at the same time

93 U., *ibid.*, vol. III, p. 385.

94 *Id., ibid.*, vol. I, p. *325.*

95 *Ed.*, ibid., p. 326.

96 *Id., ibid.*, p. 529.

97 Ribot, ***La philosophie de*** *Scope*, p. **133.**

98 *Id., ibid.*, p. 137.

"That is so." This annihilation of the will cannot be achieved through suicide. For suicide is "not so much a denial of the will to live as the strongest affirmation of the will itself". Suicide merely denies the individual's life, whereas the annihilation of the will is achieved through the denial of life itself; it is the very embodiment of the will to live. The highest summit of morality is reached through the complete denial of the will to live. This summit is *asceticism*; the highest degree of asceticism is chastity, which is voluntary and absolute, 'just as the individual's will to live is affirmed in the satisfaction of sexual desire, so too does asceticism deny the will to live by preventing the satisfaction of this desire, thereby proving that, along with the life of the body, the will manifested through this body also comes to an end.' [1]

Through the denial of the will, one enters 'the realm of grace *(grâce)*'—or, in the words of the mystics, 'the truly moral world where virtue begins with mercy and compassion, is completed through the endurance of suffering, and attains complete freedom in the nothingness known as nirvana'. 'The final counsel of reason and wisdom is to be lost in nothingness.' [0] 'Is Buddhism's nirvana truly the same thing as nothingness? It signifies, in Schopenhauer as in Buddhism, the denial of this world *(samsara)*.' 'To describe Nirvana as nothingness simply means that our world, known as samsara, contains no element that could serve to describe or construct Nirvana.' [4] In that case, Nirvana may also be accepted as absolute being. Might some form of consolation be found in absolute existence? If absolute existence is sufficient for us, it is, in this respect, fundamentally distinct from nothingness. Here, there is no need to enter into a discussion of a

59 See *ibid.*, p. 116.

100 *II. ilüd.* p. 138.

101 *Id., ibid.*, p. 118.

102 *Id., ibid.*, p. 159.

103 Schopenhauer, **The Third* Roman *Colony**, vol. I, p. 428.

104 *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 420.

There is an issue here. However, we must point out the following in this summary: according to Schopenhauer, salvation consists in the will to live rebelling against itself and finding refuge in nirvana.

CHAPTER FOUR
GOD'S REBELLION WITHIN MAN
(The Meaning of 'I Am the Truth' – Ene'l-Haqq)

1. DENIALS THAT DENY REBELLION

We have summarised three different conceptions of rebellion. One of these led to the denial of all human institutions; another to the denial of social institutions alone; and the third, finally, to the denial of existence itself. All three doctrines sought salvation. The first sought it in the selfishness of the self—that is, in the unrestrained indulgence of the inner desires; the second, in the heart's direct participation in nature; and the third, in the self-denial of the will, which was regarded as the source of evil and suffering. However, a movement can only be called a rebellion if, in opposition to the order it defies within itself, it embodies the passionate will for a new and necessarily superior order. Yet within a single negation—that is, a form of radical or partial anarchism—lies the negation of rebellion itself. Stirner, Rousseau and Schopenhauer are not true rebels. For they did not merely seek to negate the order they wished to reject, but also negated themselves. The former rendered existence utterly barren by claiming to confine it within the narrow confines of his own individuality. The latter, by rejecting humanity's contribution to nature and burying himself within his own self—fearing the turmoil of the spirit—saw only the bosom of nature as a refuge. Finally, Schopenhauer, finding no path to salvation, sacrifices even the possibility of rebellion through absolute denial. He directs existence towards the past, as if in a single stroke transcending all the orders of being—

wishes to drag us, through a 218-like journey, towards a non-existent order, or, to put it another way, towards nothingness. Schopenhauer, by following the path that seemed most suitable to us, ultimately arrived at the strangest of inconsistencies. In truth, he denied human existence and even one's own—
), and then endeavoured to negate this will itself—which is contrary to the nature of the will. In fact, the will is nothing more than a yearning to ascend from the plane in which it is realised to a higher plane. Will is not something in a state of motion, but rather in a state of power; in our view, it is an infinite *transcendence*. This activity of boundless transcendence is, in our view, the sole proof of God. In truth, it is God who makes this transcendence possible. Divinity is constantly present within our movement, which is a true transcendence.

2. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF REBELLION

By analysing consciousness step by step, we have, as it were, inevitably arrived at rebellion. In fact, we have demonstrated that thought undergoes a natural development from intuition to belief, and from belief to faith. We have drawn attention to the fact that, in faith, thought is divided into two parts. Mystical faith contains two kinds of knowledge within the same given: knowledge about itself and knowledge about God. This dual knowledge, which lies hidden in every activity of thought, becomes manifest within faith and, from the perspective of the consciousness that realises it, presents itself as a problem. This problem manifests as an internal conflict. As we have previously stated, knowledge concerning the self entails the inadequacy of human agency, whilst knowledge concerning divinity is the contemplation of the sole power capable of realising one's destiny. Consequently, rebellion will be a call to this redemptive power in response to the aforementioned inadequacy. By positing a redemptive power for our destiny, we move on to the optimistic outlook of Islamic mystics—an example of which we find in Halâc—

, we move on to the optimistic conception of Islamic mystics, an example of which we find in Halâc.

Halâc's mysticism is directed towards a complete detachment from the will bound to the body—from the selfish and animalistic self—in order to submit to the will of Allah. This entails completely renouncing the desires inherent in the self—which exists in a primal state within the human being—and relinquishing the self's desires with the aim of turning back to that Other who created us without our knowledge, and who undoubtedly directs us to desire Him directly. In this way, whilst the human being seeks a transcendent being by transcending their humanity, they are in fact desiring their own self. In this way, the human being ultimately becomes one with God. His action consists of constantly and ceaselessly seeking God's help to bring about the liberation of his soul, which is oppressed within his mortal existence. The human being's action must be situated beyond time, the events unfolding around us, transient beings, and the visible world."

We do not intend to summarise Hallâc's doctrine in its entirety. Our sole purpose here is to point to the meaning of the mysticism within him, in order to demonstrate, time and again, the inner and sincere power of rebellion that can lead a person to the very annihilation of their own self.

In this mystic, who possesses both an anarchist and a docile personality, we recognise the presence of a true rebel. In fact,

105 *Ibid., vol. III*, p. 420.

106 For a study on Hallâj's doctrine, see Louis Massignon, *La passion d'Al-Hallâj*, 1921, Chapter Two. (In the new editions of this work, Massignon has devoted a sub-chapter to Topçu and his work in your hands, in which he describes him as 'a Turkish philosopher who exemplifies Hallâjist individualism in the Republic of Turkey'. See: L. Massignon, **La passion*, Vol. III, ed. İleri, Matts î1,r I-lulInj,* Vol. II, Gallimard, Paris, 1975, pp. 449–451, Furthermore, the sub-section in question was translated from the English edition of the work and published in the **Dr.g‹ılt** journal: 'Nurettin Topçu as the Last Interpreter of Hallâj', trans. Neriman Kalın, issue 85, p. 22, Istanbul, 1997. (Trans.)

There is a form of anarchism in acknowledging one's own inadequacy and in turning to a power capable of bringing about a change in one's course of action. The attitude adopted by a person in the face of this power from which help is expected is, however, a sign of true submission. To bow down before God means for a person to rebel against their own self. The rebellious man becomes, as it were, a bridge between humanity and divinity. This is humanity's participation in the divine nature. In truth, in this act of rebellion—which is the fruit of mercy and faith—is there not a divinity hidden beneath the veil of our self, crying out its existence to us more earnestly than we do to ourselves? Through the presence of this divinity that lives within us—and, so to speak, lives with us—we transcend the narrow confines of society and pure individualism. Neither the individual nor society understands rebellion. In both the individual and society, only one of these two personalities can exist and act. The conflict between these two personalities—that is, between anarchy and docility—gives rise to rebellion. And one of them is inevitably and perpetually docile without the other. Just as the submissive, left to his own devices, follows his primal nature even whilst on the path to sainthood, so too will the anarchist, left to his own devices, seek to destroy the work created by others solely for the purpose of giving form to the primal impulses that fill his individuality. Just as within society, the individual, confined solely to his own individuality, is far from knowing himself and belonging to himself. Neither the individual nor society constitutes the person. Both the anarchist and the docile are victims of the same delusion; whilst seeking to belong to themselves, they are lost in the truest and most wretched sense. We therefore reject both anarchism and docility, each as flawed as the other; likewise, we move beyond individualism and sociologism, each as flawed as the other. And we embrace the view of personalism *(pRTSOHOlisme)*, which recognises individualism as a passage, a means, between man and God, and accepts it as man's ascent or leap towards God.

Now it is up to us to distinguish between the anarchist and the docile in the rebellion movement—

in the rebellion, one after the other.

Anarchism or revolution in the context of rebellion is nothing other than the voice of faith—which seeks help from God, the One who alone is master of one's destiny, and without whom that destiny would be subject to a foreign rule—combined with compassion, which has become a universal responsibility for humankind; were it not for this One Being, faith would be corrupted. This state is, in every act of resistance against oppression, obedience to God, who is the object of our rebellion, and submission to His will.

Bondage consists of a universal refusal to submit to the supernatural order. Unless one takes one's place within the supernatural order, action is impeded, incomplete and unsuccessful. The supernatural is the sole source of every action that might be considered free from self-interest. Every free action is, in our view, anarchy; yet, in the face of divine will, it is an act of obedience. Is freedom, then, bestowed as a divine grace that precedes action? This freedom, or divine grace, 'intervenes both before, during, and after action'[17]; this is also Hallaj's understanding. It would be a mistake to believe that we accept this grace or freedom passively. Whilst acting with complete freedom, whilst truly rebelling—as we mentioned earlier—we possess neither merely our humanity nor purely divinity; rather, we are both in equal measure, partaking of both humanity and divinity. Once we separate from our humanity, we no longer exist as human beings, and once we sever ourselves from divinity, we can no longer be rebels; therefore, if we wish to exist and to be rebels, we become a participation of the human being in God. Free movement realises this kind of participation. Humanity is in a state of movement together with God. Movement, we repeat, is a genuine act of rebellion. Movement is an act aimed at 'changing things and oneself through one's own hand'—
The person who practises their faith is the one who fulfils their destiny. God, whilst in motion, is not outside of motion, and man can never act without Him. So to speak, in motion they are one and the same—

107 Massignon, **Le Passi*'on d'Al Hallaj**, p. 614

. This event—the human being's attachment to God or their ascent towards Him, which constitutes the very essence of rebellion—is the human being's attainment of a state transcending the self.

We shall not delve into an examination of the nature of movement here. We merely wish to highlight the rebelliousness inherent in every free movement. The freedom of movement is the expression of the rebellion that gives rise to it within us. Only the rebellious are free, or at the very least, only they are truly free. From what source, then, do they derive their freedom? This mystical source from which morality springs is the will of God—that is, the absolute will; in other words, it is the will to be God. Thus, the concept of God is united with the question of morality. Without God, there can be neither true morality nor rebellion in the true sense. The foundation of every religion is constituted by a moral system, a doctrine of rebellion: rebellion against the delusion of the human being who is content with their current situation; and likewise, rebellion against humanity's sole submission to the wills that exploit the will of humanity on this earth. The believer's rebellion manifests itself, in appearance, as mere submission before the divine will. And the mystic, too, presents himself, first and foremost, as a submissive being in the truest sense before the absolute will. "Halaj's submission finds expression in the passion of his martyrdom." Compliance with the absolute will can also be achieved by following the mystical tradition. This tradition is the proof and treasure of the wills directed towards Allah. It is the best judge of action, sincerity and individual will.

The most important task in understanding the psychology of rebellion is to examine, through subtle analysis, the infinite variability of the divine movement within us. This psychology will seek to shed light on the faces of the anarchist and the docile—who at times join hands—and will wish to dwell in the hearts of both.

The docile soul in a state of rebellion acts out of anxiety. The mystic, the pain

108 /r/., //›id., pp. 70, 93, 515, 610, 612, õ14, 618, 626, 723–724, 775.

'makes friends with it and remains in constant contact with it, enduring it to the very end.' The path of suffering is the path to divinity. This obedience to the divine will—unjustly accused by the religions and wisdom of the East of being fatalism—is, in truth, the greatest strength of the mystics. This friendship with suffering is redemptive. It is a sentiment that protects the mystic from Stirner's monstrous selfishness, from Rousseau's naive pride—which grows in solitude—and his pathological weakness, and finally from Schopenhauer's dark and fruitless pessimism. It is also this sentiment that leads the soul towards the source of the divine wills, towards which all wills are ultimately directed.

In truth, suffering is what makes a person human; it is the creator of humanity. One must go so far as to create it within oneself through suffering, and to desire it with love and passion, as the mystics—and Hallâc in particular—did; to atone for the sins of those who accused him, Hallâc implored his Allah on the gallows in this astonishing manner: "Forgive them, but do not forgive me... since You are annihilating my humanity within Your divinity, for the sake of the humanity within Your divinity, forgive these people who are seeking to kill me."'"

3. THE MEANING OF 'ENE'L-HAKK' AND THE PURPOSE OF ECSTASY

The purpose of the mystic's inner struggle, having become aware of his own inadequacy, is to dissolve this human inadequacy in the perfection of divine consciousness and action; this is, to a certain extent, to become divine, to be lost, even for a moment, in the very presence of Allah. This, according to the Sufis, is 'attaining the secret of Wahdat (Unity)'; and thus Hallâc, by rebelling against all human inadequacies, will attain divinity and realise union with that Being (Wahdat al-Wujūd), and will be able to say, 'I am the Truth' or 'Ene'l-Haqq'. The mystic's journey is towards the One,

109 *Ibid.*, p. 150.

110 L. Massignon, /.e3 G72 fits *‹1,u 1.exsiqI1,e l,erli'n,i,que d«* /o *'myst'i,que trtlis ulmu-* p. 8.

111 Massignon, **La passion d'Al-Halla'j**, pp. 412, 3, 4, 5.

It is a true ascent: 'The goal of the mystic is the One and Only Being, which is solely within oneself', l1° The mystic will never reach this point—not even once—nor remain there eternally, provided he does not let go of it. Throughout his entire life, he will seek Him, transforming this quest into his own unique will, and he will lose himself within this absolute will. Perhaps Hallâc's 'astonishing desire to sacrifice himself for the salvation of all' [3]can thus be explained. Is this not the sacrifice of one's self within the divine will, which he believed to be one and the same as himself? In fact, this state is, for humankind, a true liberation from endless bondage—from being perpetually a prisoner of one's own actions. It is also a liberation from the distress that weighs heavily upon our conscience; a liberation from our insincerity regarding the fact—recognised by the most enlightened among us—that we cannot be ourselves; and a liberation from dependence on everything that is alien to us and that divides us from within.

This is, for us, the absolute incomprehensibility of others and our own liberation from the enigma of this strange incomprehensibility; liberation from the curiosity and anxiety within us that causes us anguish—both from ourselves and from others; liberation from this very desire of ours, which constitutes the greatest obstacle to our self-possession... In this will to liberation, divine mercy becomes a source of knowledge and guidance for the movement of faith that is spreading amongst humanity in the form of a rebellion; it is like a divine grace descending into our consciences. But how fervently have we sought this divine grace? Thus, salvation can only be sought through rebellion—the mystic's rebellion. A divine grace that will bring about our salvation demands a thousand sacrifices from us. A thousand sacrifices are required for us to attain a single grace, and a thousand divine graces are necessary for us even to be able to ask for a single sacrifice. In other words, we might say that a thousand acts of rebellion are required for a single grace, and that within a single act of rebellion there are a thousand graces. This mystery, which is so close to us,

112 *Ibid.*, pp. 306, 7, 8; 412.

113 Ibid., p. 758.

We shall not search in vain for the key; we shall content ourselves with interpreting a phenomenon which not only exists in us but also constitutes the reality of will or action—in a word, the reality of the human being. We have sought to discover the essential bond that connects the human being, in both body and soul, to the Absolute, which is the source of their actions. Human action is a tormented and ceaseless plea, directed towards the Absolute that created it, expressing—in both body and soul—the desire for one's own salvation. This plea for salvation, from which nothing can be saved, is nothing other than rebellion. Now, must we once again raise this contradiction: submission or rebellion? When considered separately, we have rejected each of these two in turn. Just as freedom is lost within a blind and unconscious determination when there is no deliberate and conscious determinism, so too does rebellion, when not grounded in a decisive resolution, turn into a blind and destructive force. The family, society, humanity—in short, all the forms of expression of this creative Will throughout human history—have shown the path leading to salvation. Tradition becomes the guide for individual wills. As for the individual, they rebuild humanity and tradition. In order to carry out their rebellion, the individual must be in harmony with tradition and humanity; to secure their salvation, they must be the recipient of the grace of all of history and all of humanity. On the other hand, the individual's rebellion is necessary for the salvation of history and humanity. We have identified the fundamental relationship between the individual and tradition, and between humanity and divinity, which is fully and uniquely comprehensible from our perspective and according to our understanding; this fundamental relationship consists of the rebellion, as we have previously set out.

Rebellion is the knowledge revealed by a bond of friendship between people; to a certain extent, this knowledge makes the self and the other confidants.

Rebellion is a form of contempt that reveals the nothingness of the universe and of the self, both in the individual and in their desires; rebellion is an act of devotion to suffering, as if casting aside one's body and soul, by throwing oneself into eternity through love.

Rebellion, even at the threshold of the absolute saviour, with outstretched hands imploring the Absolute's movement; rebellion is the act of defiance, symbolised by those outstretched hands, calling upon God to join him and to rebel within himself—a refusal to submit to the salvific decree that the individual, alone, would never dare to challenge.

Rebellion is a form of forgiveness that keeps the human heart on the path of its own passions—within the realm of mercy—by holding it back from the trivialities of those passions, whilst reminding it of the duty imposed by universal responsibility.

Rebellion is light; it flows from spirit to spirit, from guide to disciple, from father to son; just as it serves as light and support for the disciple and the son, so too does it serve as light and support for the guide and the father; indeed, in this way, it leads both the guide and the father to salvation; in this sense, the guide becomes a guide to his own guide.

Rebellion was a transformation, as if the individual were to rush towards the salvation of the world with his own salvation, bearing the heavy burden of an inescapable responsibility and preparing within himself for the social revolution that necessarily arises from this, whilst participating in the world's historical and present-day infinity.

Rebellion is the stance of the mystic (sufi); the mystic, who becomes aware of his own spirituality through his participation in God, is consumed by the desire to die having sacrificed himself

and for the salvation of all, he burns with the desire to die as a sacrifice.

Our God is the God of rebellion.

SONUÇ

Does the path we have travelled, from freedom to rebellion, signify progress, or is it merely the replacement of one term with another? It seems to us that our endeavour was to dispel not only the fallacy of unrestricted freedom (free will) in human beings, but also the fallacy of determinism, which is inevitable in their actions. Consequently, the problem of rebellion emerges not as a hypothesis to be proven or as a conflict (antinomy) within a debate, but as a fact discovered within the very core of the human being—a choice that will determine their salvation. One must choose between wanting or not wanting to rebel, or wanting or not wanting to take action; one of these two must be chosen. To choose the best, it is enough to always desire more, to reach further, to expand one's heart; whilst, on the one hand, giving oneself to the universe, and on the other, making oneself the centre of the universe. Have we not conflated action and rebellion too much? Indeed, we have sought to define the 'hur' movement through rebellion and within rebellion. Every movement that stands against natural determinism and social conformity is, in fact, a genuine rebellion. Thus, the creation that is sought and desired—the individual's discovery of their own life's rules—consists of acts of rebellion. Thus, human beings are, for the most part and to a certain extent, in a state of rebellion. Our endeavour has consisted solely of revealing the true attitude of human beings and the ideal towards which their actions are directed, and in this way, of awakening within them a sense of their fundamental duty. Human beings, and indeed humanity as a whole, will only progress by rebelling in a conscious manner. And progress, in the individual, is only the product of a rebellion if

It is the nature of things. There can be no true revolution without the change that brings it about, or even makes it inevitable. True rebellion lies in change; revolution is its inevitable consequence.

So, what is rebellion according to our understanding? We are opposed to both docility and anarchy. Just as we are opposed to all forms of sociologism—that is, the notion that social reality is everything—we are also opposed to selfish and rigid individualism. We accept the individual's submission only to a Will that determines all wills in the same way. This Divine Will has been sought and granted by the individual through rebellion. This Divine Will possesses everything we know and desire. It is particularly essential for the most powerful among us. The will within us is an intimate bond between us and the Supreme Being. Were it not for this Supreme Being, the will within us would be incomprehensible, a strange thing. In the same way, is not mercy—which perhaps constitutes the deep source of the will, and which stands as the divinity that saves humanity in the face of the tyranny of the oppressors—a superhuman act?

Your action, which is a decision born of will and compassion, will run counter to the order of nature; this is another order—a transcendent order that is at work within us, an ever-creative order. Thus, true freedom becomes an act of rebellion; that is to say, what you achieve with the aid of 'arm, mind and heart' becomes a phenomenon that transcends nature. Perhaps, by describing man as a 'rebellious being', we are offering the best definition of him. The section we have devoted to rebellion in this study is not merely a part of the whole; rebellion has been the problem that has occupied us throughout the entire course of this work. Freedom, will, compassion and responsibility—all these factors of moral life—prepare the ground for a single phenomenon; they manifest themselves in us through the existence of that single phenomenon, namely rebellion. Rebellion constitutes the very essence of our humanity; it governs all our actions. During rebellion, fate and necessity no longer hold any meaning; yet the emergence of rebellion as the defining phenomenon

is a reality, indeed ‘the very essence of truth’.

It is rebellion that appears to us as the defining factor of our disregard for pleasure, our forgiveness of sin, our responsibility that arises in conflict and crime when circumstances demand it, and our compassion—which changes us as a result of another’s actions and changes another as a result of our own actions. All of these are bound to a single principle: the very phenomenon of rebellion. The astonishing diversity of an ideal—manifesting in crime, conflict and religion—is bound up with the unity of rebellion, which draws its power from compassion. Immorality lies in actions that run counter to compassion and rebellion; such is the case with despotism and crime, which are justified and protected by the law—the sole form of social compliance; by contrast, a crime committed out of compassion and rebellion is not immoral.

In society’s obsession, we find an open admission of powerlessness when it comes to rebellion and free action. As a force of oppression to which the individual is compelled to submit, society fosters tyranny and oppression, thereby creating a state of servitude and docility bordering on captivity. In this way, it stifles the individual’s volitional powers. Yet society should, on the contrary, be an ideal towards which individual action strives and is directed—that is, an ideal born of compassion and rebellion. The effective dissemination of beliefs amongst humankind is, in truth, the creator of society and civilisation. It is precisely this dissemination that transforms each of you, in proportion to your strength, into a rebel—that is, into a moral being. We have sought the salvation of all humanity in this very phenomenon of the dissemination of beliefs.

What do we mean by ‘salvation’?

In our view, salvation consists in being bound to an Absolute in which history and humanity will find the reasons for their very existence. A rational humanity could never conceive of itself as an entity without a purpose or a predestined destiny; even if it does not reach the point of knowing its own purpose, it will act as though this purpose were to be attained through the endless succession of generations. Consequently, moral character consists of realising this ideal through its own existence.

will regard it as a means. Man's mission is a heavy one. Indeed, in this life, as Schopenhauer rightly pointed out, everything that is truly given to us is evil. The hedonist has been deceived by an illusion. Looking at our mortal existence, this wretched realm that crawls along the ground, one must say: 'Existence is a burden; being is something that ought not to be.' This is why the strongest amongst us have, of their own free will, dedicated themselves to nothingness: having realised this eternal delusion—which consists merely in mistaking one's own actions for their own purpose—they have become more discerning, casting their actions into the infinity of the universe. Nothingness is the meaning of this void to which every action ultimately arrives. Is this Schopenhauerian pessimism, which has been so prominent in Eastern philosophy for centuries, a certainty? Is this truly the meaning of nothingness? We have accepted nothingness as a transition to the Absolute. The Absolute has been proven through the existence of divinity—that is, through the infinite impulse of the will and the call of universal compassion within humanity. The Absolute lives within all our movements; none of our actions can escape it. This unity of orientation, which determines all wills, is the anxious desire for eternity—that is, for not to be nothing, for not to be a shadow vanishing at the twilight of life. This striking unity, which determines all wills amidst the astonishing multitude of beings and movements, must surely have as its source an Absolute, is the One, and is indispensable for each of us in determining our destiny. To recognise the Supreme Being who determines us in this way is, as it were, for a human being to determine their own destiny, to recognise God in their own actions; this is, to a certain extent, to be God. Human salvation consists in acquiring this knowledge—which transforms this life and humanity—and thereby gaining the power of self-determination. The salvific power sought by the artist amidst his virtues and weaknesses, and by the mystic through heroism and courage, is precisely this.

Moving from belief to faith, and from art to religion, we have now arrived at the question of our salvation. Thus, our responsibility and our knowledge,

Art and religion—all these exist solely to shed greater light on our destiny and to serve it. Just as in all forms of human worship, this tragic question arises before us, unconsciously, in all our knowledge and in all our actions. And even the most meaningless act, no less than the most personal knowledge, represents a step towards the resolution of this sole question. It is not only the events of man's spiritual life but also those of his entire moral life, all his actions and all his thoughts that are directed towards this unity. If we are responsible for and anxious about our destiny, it is only through rebellion that this anxiety will be allayed and this responsibility accepted. Rebellion, which determines our freedom and our destiny, is the only thing that can ensure the well-being of both soul and body—within history and humanity, in time and eternity—by continuing from generation to generation for all eternity.

Throughout its thousand-year history, Anatolia has never been without heroes and martyrs who sacrificed themselves for the welfare of the community, 'not only at the borders, but also at the heart of the state… and at the same time, in the depths of their own hearts, by declaring a holy jihad'. The children of Anatolia, who will once again turn to their own mystical (Sufi) tradition, *will* always declare a holy jihad against both the tyranny of their own egos and the oppression of despots*; and* standing before their own gallows with courage and pride, fully conscious of the true meaning of their jihad, they will be able to say: 'I am the Truth: "En'el-Hakk"'.

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A
Clarity and Distinctness 119 The concept of justice 83, 112 Justice and mercy 111 The Old Testament 183
The Ahis 94
Ethical doctrines 35
The spectre of morality 196
Moral ideal 21, 32, 34
Moral truth 21, 33, 51, 112, 137, 140
Moral voluntarism 29
Moral determinism 32
Moral responsibility 100, 101, 102, 103
Moral purity 169
Moral law 138
Ethical system 14, 22, 32, 36, 221
Ahmed Yesevi 172
Mental illnesses 146
Reasoning 41, 100, 124, 135, 137, 139
Linking reason to faith 143
Deceptive salvation 167
Alfred de Musset 170 The essence of Allah 44
The unity of God and the universe 41, 44 Being in the presence of God (presence) 169
Divine self 192
The mystic of God 167
The self without God 23, 192
The Godless Man 182, 193; Alvarez de Paz 176; Amiel 170
Children of Anatolia 231

Sufis of the Path 184, 186
Anarchist 24, 193, 200, 219, 220, 222
Anarchism 23, 24, 219, 220
Animism 181
Encyclopaedists 50
A priori 118
Aristippus 78
Aristotle 32
A. Spaier 122
Love 42, 16S, 164, 165, 166, 168, 171, 175, 184, 185, 201, 222, 225
Transcendence 217
Atabe 187
Atman 175
Clarity and certainty 130
Philosophy of Enlightenment 50
Identity 29

g

Baudelaire 165
Baudin 158, 159
Beethoven 174, 175, 178, 235
Selfish law 198
Selfishness 23, 24, 72, 195, 197, 200, 201
Bergson 14, 55, 56, 58, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 71, 73, 100, 101, 106, 122, 125, 126, 233
Bergsonian intuitionism 32, 123, 124
The wise man 48
The Unknowable Object 141
A Thousand Rebellions 224
Division even within unity 145
Faith in the One 182
Bougle 85
Bourgeois 83, 84
To submit 89, 178, 218, 219, 229
Buddhist mysticism 174
Buddhist Nirvana 215
Denial of this world (samsara) 215
Great men of faith 148, 150
Byron 164

C

The welfare of the community 231
The definition of the essence 46
Jihad 186, 187, 231
Enduring Hardship 169, 171, 181, 183, 187
The Endurer 170
Belief in the Plurality 161

D

Ethics of solidarity 24
Delacroix 170, 183, 188, 234
Democracy 86, 91
Democratic regime 93
Empiricism 67
Experiment and Science 130
Inner knowledge 30
Inner melody 127
Despot 86, 112
Determinism 31, 39, 50, 55, 224, 227, 228
Statism 110
Secular (profane) 162, 168
The spectre of religion 196
Religious Faith 158, 182, 183
The essence of religion 183
Eastern religions and wisdom 222
Prayer-poetry 169
The will to perceive emotions 11, 163
The Transcendent 138, 140
The Relationship Between Thought and Action 118
Method of thought 52

e

Eternal happiness 49
Eternity 166

Edgar Allan Poe 128, 167

Plato 32, 107
E. Husserl 122
Émile Durkheim 34, 165, 234
Ene'l Hakk 36, 193, 216, 223
The meaning of 'Ene'l Hakk' 216, 222 The intellectualist (mentalist) movement 50
The Supreme Good 78
Epicureans 78, 80
The Prophet Jeremiah 177
Aesthetic knowledge 128
Aesthetic faith 10, 161, 182, 201
Aestheticism 162
Ethics 31
Universal law of biology 78
Universal will 31, 32
Universal order 31, 33, 35, 72, i11
Universal responsibility 35, 112, 192

F
Utilitarianism 33 Philosophical system 56
The phenomenal world 212
Ethics of self-sacrifice 32
The individual's will to live 215
Individualism 20, 89, 193, 197, 210, 211, 217, 219, 220, 228
Fichte 139, 140, 145, 197, 199, 234
Fouillée 108
F. Rauh 34
Freudianism 79

6
Gandhi 25, 186, 187 Al-Ghazali 1S5
General will 86, 92
Geometric mindset 135
Rebellion in the true sense 221
True knowledge 30, 144
True liberalism 93
True duration 56, 57
Gide 195, 200
Goethe 50, 168
The World of Appearances 212
G. Tarde 147, 149
Guyau 78, 102, 105, 106
The Imitation of Laughter 152

H
Hallâc 184, 185, 186, 187, 193, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223
Hallâc's doctrine 185, 219
Hallâc's docility 221
Hamilton 141, 142, 143
Hamilton's theory 143
Ethical action 29, 72
The purpose of action 21, 33, 34, 79
The intention of action 108
The death of an action 80
The theory of vital construction 106 Henri Bergson 55
Christianity 182, 199
Hinduism 186
H. Poincaré 51
H. Taine 50
Theory of Law 142
Freedom (free will) 43, 55, 227
Liberalism 88
The source of freedom 47
Definition of freedom 61
The problem of freedom 67, 69
Jesus Christ 182
Prophet Muhammad 172, 182, 184, 186, 187

I-İ
Faith 157
Fideism 158
Faith movement 133, 141, 143, 223
The irrationality of faith (irrationa-lité) 158

The Experience of Faith 158
Ibn Hanbal 187
Ibn Wasi 187
Inner Enlightenment 52
Curiosity and Anxiety Within Us 223 Ignatius 177
Divine essence 50, 100, 107, 185
Divine freedom 192
Divine grace 220, 223, 224
Divine mercy 223
Inspiration 134, 136, 138, 139, 146
Scientific intelligence 51
The universality of faith 147
The source of faith 137, 138
Imitation of faith 152, 153
The will to believe 140, 149
The will to believe 139, 148
Subtle thought 135
Revolution 113, 183, 228
Human solidarity 82
Volitional idealism 32
Scholastic philosophers 32
Islamic mysticism 184, 186
Rebellious thought 32
Rebellion movement 24, 36, 219, 220
The God of Rebellion 225
The psychology of rebellion 222
Division of labour 85, 86, 87
Knowledge of goodness 32

J
Jean de la Croix 169, 172, 173

K
Fatalism 222
The Eye of the Heart 135
The Causes of the Heart 65
Kant 21, 33, 80, 108, 129, 132, 137, 138, 234
Kantian understanding 138
Legal liability 101, 102
Dark experience 173, 174
Cartesian philosophy 132
Concept of the categorical imperative 108 Unconditional freedom (free will) 43, 46, 55, 56, 57, 227
Rebellion against oneself 72, 215
Changes in personality 71
Collective conceptions 15S
Communism 110
Cosmic system 45
Radical empiricism 67
Blind docility 152 Blind obedience 35
Will to evil 109
The Qur'an 184, 185, 186
Liberation 80, 163
Holy Jihad 186, 187, 231
Holy Spirit 195, 196
Separation of powers 91, 92

L
Lamartine 128
Lévy-Bruhl 100, 101, 102
Liberalism 93, 196
L. Roy 51
Lucretius 168
L. Xavier 139, 234

M
Maine de Brian 134, 135, 170
Mallarmé 165
Logical thinking 129
Logical intelligence 30
Maréchal 169, 175
Massignon 13, 182, 184, 186, 218, 222
M. Blondel 13, 18, 23, 29, 30, 53, 68, 80, 118, 144, 145, 160, 170, 182, 183, 188, 191
Civilisation 10, 15, 18, 19, 88, 110, 111, 147, 188, 204, 205
Church of the Medici 177
Movement of Mercy 112
The Experience of Mercy 33
Mercy and Responsibility 229

Metaphysics 42, 56
Methodical Thought 129
Mevlâna 172
Mesopotamia 10, 110
Egypt 10, 110
Michelangelo 164, 165, 171, 172, 174, 176, 177, 178
The mystical realm 157
Mystical Enlightenment 124
Mystical knowledge 160
Mystical union 176
Mystical life 167, 169, 173, 174
Mystical faith 124, 126, 161, 162, 181, 217
Mysticism as a religion 182, 187
Tradition of mysticism 221
Tradition of mysticism (Sufism) 231
Mystical art 126
Mystical experience 169
Mystical ecstasy 124, 174
Mystical ascent 162
Modern citizen 88
Montesquieu 91, 92
Hadith scholars 185
Absolute Self 197
Absolute will 221, 22S
Absolute tranquillity 128
Philosophy of happiness (eudemonism) 33
Mystical insight 183
The Believer's Faith 160
Possible Worlds 214 The Disciple and the Son 225
The spiritual guide and the father 225

N

The honourable man 22, 30, 31, 34, 35
A Theoretical Freedom 69
Newman 158, 159, 233
Nietzsche 23, 200
Taking refuge in Nirvana 214, 215

O–Ö

Factual truths 21, 33
Oligarchy 113
Olle-Laprune 133, 144, 145
Organic solidarity 86
Will to die 174, 177
The ideal of immortality 111

P

Paliard 120
Pantheism 32
Parsifal 165
Pascal 18, 81, 112, 113, 134, 135, 136, 138, 234
Faith in Pascal 134, 136
Passive solidarity 192
Paul Claudel 168
Paul Valéry 164
P. de Grand Maison 178 Sense of remorse 108
Police state 95
Postilla 51, 57
Positive science 18, 50
Pragmatism 51, 134 Belief according to pragmatism 134
Practical reason 21, 33, 137, 138

Father Brémond 168
Rationalist psychology 159
R. Bastide 170
Renouvier 108, 124
Ribot 212
Rodin 127, 171
Romain Rolland 174
Rousseau 16, 20, 90, 91, 164, 170, 193, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 217, 222
R. P. de Guibert 169
Spiritualism 181
Mental disorders 146, 172

Spiritual Renaissance 187
The Soul's Union with God 183

S
Pure Reason 137
Safsüye 56, 59, 63, 64, 67, 7L
73
Saint Teresa 175
Saint Francis of Assisi 168 The Art of Art 126
The mysticism of art 168
Art for art's sake 163 Art and intuition 125
Schleiermacher 188
Schopenhauer 20, 23, 170, 193, 211, 212, 215, 217, 218, 222, 230
Causality 59
Aesthetics of intuition 146
Intuitive thought 120, 125
The clarity of intuition 123 Intuition and freedom 55 The Sistine Chapel 177
Slavs 111
Socrates' responsibility 112
Concrete faith 33
The Infinite and the Absolute 141, 142
The Will to Infinity 36
Endless activity of transcendence 217
The ideal of responsibility 22, 35
The will to responsibility III, 112,
113
Theories of responsibility 99
Social revolution 113, 225
Socialism 93, 196
Social contract 83, 91
Social statics 152
Social compliance 32, 153, 229
Social responsibility 84
Sociological ethics 34, 35
School of Sociology 32
Sociologism 34, 153, 228
Spencer 93, 112
Spinoza 31, S2, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 67, 71, 100, 107, 131, 206
Spinoza's intellectualism (Zi-ism) S2
Stirner 23, 193, 194, 195, 196, 200, 211, 222
The Stoics 80
Sui generis 64, 118

Ş
Individualism 220
Shakik 187
Formal justice 111
The spontaneous emergence of consciousness 60
Sceptics 134

T
Naturalism 181
Conversion
31, 32
Nature religion 208
Union with nature – connatu-ralité 160
The supernatural realm 23, 24, 169,
173, 182, 192, 210
Transcendental philosophy 159
Naturalya ity 83, 84
To recognise 223
The salvation of history and humanity
224
Man of practice 30
Determinative freedom 67
Monism (mono-idéisme) 160
Theory of representation 92
Theology 195, 197
Theoretical pure reason 137 Social affection 40
Social responsibility 109
Love of society 229

Totemism 181
Tragic issue 231

u
The will to docility 225
Theorists of docility 40
Preachers of docility 39 c

Will as the essence of existence 212 Love of one's country 31
The concept of duty 21, 33
The phenomenon of ecstasy 174
The aim of the ecstatic **222, 223**
The feeling of remorse 35, 101, 102

W
Wagner 165

Y
Creative freedom 62
Denial of the will to live 214
The sole essence 46, 213 The sole necessary being 161
Insufficient grace 178
Yunus Emre 172
Sublimation 79

Z
Truths of Necessity 21, 3S
Mentalism 32, 67
Tyrannical state 95
Life of asceticism 184, 185

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